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Introduction
Among many others two reasons for undertaking this study stand out, one 
anecdotal in origin, the other rather predictably academic. In a seminar one 
day, in a discussion of the difference between a legisign and a replica by means 
of one of Peirce’s favourite examples, the English definite article, a very sharp 
student raised her hand and asked what sort of object the definite article 
represented, given that a sign is defined in part as something that represents 
an object. A rule? A law? But what sorts of objects were these? This, it seemed 
to me, was a very pertinent question in the circumstances. But it was one 
which began to bother me – how did we know what sorts of objects were 
represented by the classes of signs I was describing? The system that I had 
been presenting to these students defined the sign and two sorts of relations 
into which it entered very precisely, but it was not designed to detect any 
sort of object, and most researchers are content to recycle examples given by 
Peirce himself. Identifying the object, then, a task which we accomplish over 
and over again every minute of our lives, became a problem that required 
further research, but this meant looking beyond the three-division system I 
was describing.
The second reason came from a more conventional source. Writing in the 
Introduction to The Essential Peirce, Volume One, Nathan Houser, the doyen 
of Peirce scholars, recognizing that Peirce had been unable to complete the 
classification of the sixty-six signs he had posited within his general theory, set 
out a programme for semiotic theorists in the form of the following statement: 
‘Perhaps in our present state of understanding of language and semiosis we have 
no need for such complexity [sixty-six classes of signs] – just as we once had no 
need for relativity physics – but where principal distinctions can be made, they 
should be made, and, in any case, they will probably someday be needed’ (1992: 
xxxviii).
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The programme
The present study, then, is a contribution to that programme, but instead of 
adopting as its scope the principal distinctions required for the ten divisions 
yielding the sixty-six classes, it is restricted to six of those ten divisions, which, 
when correctly combined, theoretically yield twenty-eight such classes. Both 
the six-division and ten-division systems were Peirce’s final statements on the 
classification of signs, and the viability of any attempt to establish the correct 
ordering of either series of divisions is conditioned by stages in their evolution. 
In this we follow what Peirce considered to be key to our understanding of the 
development of Plato’s thought: ‘everything depends upon the chronology’.1 
Consequently, the principle informing the restricted and therefore more feasible 
part of the larger programme adopted in the study is that what is true of our 
appreciation of Plato’s dialogues will also be true of Peirce’s theory of signs, 
and for this reason in the chapters to come a chronological approach has been 
adopted.
However, there is a drawback both to the larger programme outlined by 
Houser and to the less ambitious one undertaken here. Peirce spent nearly half 
a century developing his various contributions to logic and philosophy, and yet 
the later statements characterizing these contributions are still only available 
in a piecemeal fashion. Now the greater part of the research reported in the 
pages to follow deals necessarily with Peirce’s later semiotic theory, namely the 
period following the course of lectures he gave on logic at the Lowell Institute 
in Boston in 1903. It is rather sobering, then, to have to admit that much of 
the most interesting material from 1904 and after not only comes from largely 
unpublished manuscripts and from letters, but even from drafts of letters. These 
in particular contain some of the most illuminating semiotic material that Peirce 
produced, but the fact that they were never sent confers on the enterprise an 
unavoidably ‘but what-if ’, hypothetical character. If the Writings2 had reached 
the period from 1903 to 1910 there would be no problem. They haven’t, and so 
the present study is also an attempt to present some of the semiotic riches of this 
period in spite of the difficulties induced by this editorial handicap.
We know from the available documents that Peirce struggled to finalize the 
late sign-systems in 1908, and even now, over a century later, there is still no 
consensus as to how the ten divisions they projected should be arranged, or 
even as to the viability of such an enterprise in spite of its being a necessity, 
as Houser has noted. Some authorities, Weiss and Burks (1945), for example, 
have proposed a reordering of Peirce’s original scheme. Others, like Spinks 
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(1991), have claimed that the task of identifying the sixty-six classes is, if not 
impossible, counterproductive.3 Yet others, more circumspect, like Liszka 
(1996), have suggested that in view of the incomplete and disparate nature of 
the available data, it is more prudent to concentrate on the three-division system 
Peirce announced in 1903.4 But perhaps the most significant comment on the 
problematic nature of the more complex of the late systems and on the need of 
a research programme of the sort mentioned by Houser is that of another noted 
Peirce scholar, Thomas Short:
For all the enthusiasm that Peirce’s later taxonomy has elicited, with its promise 
of a vast system, an endlessly ramifying formal structure that applies everywhere 
and to everything, close examination of it disappoints. It is sketchy, tentative, 
and, as best I can make out, incoherent. Its importance lies not in what it contains 
but in the kind of project it defines. That project has not yet been adopted by any 
of Peirce’s devotees. (2007: 259–60)
Other authorities, Savan (1988) and Shapiro (1983), for instance, have indeed 
attempted to characterize the later typologies and identify some of their defining 
features. Nevertheless, Short’s rather extreme statement clearly describes the 
sorry condition in which Peirce’s final statements on signs find themselves 
within the Peirce community, even now, some ninety-odd years after Ogden and 
Richards first brought them to the attention of the public in the ten pages devoted 
to Peirce in their Appendix D (1923: 279–90). It is precisely the purpose of the 
present study to take up the ‘project’ mentioned by Short, but the emphasis will 
be less on how best to order those later divisions as on how coherent at least one 
of the two systems announced in 1908 can be shown to be. As the title suggests, 
the study develops two interrelated themes: the late 28-class sign-systems and a 
‘philosophy of representation’; but in doing so it also investigates the evolving 
logical status of Peirce’s object.
To begin with, it should be noted that in what follows the term ‘sign-systems’ 
refers both to the definition of semiosis – the complex process in which the 
sign participates together with the object it represents and the effects that it 
produces  – and to the typologies which were derived from it. All of Peirce’s 
definitions of the sign in 1903 and earlier were triadic in nature, whereas in the 
period after 1904 they came to be defined as effectively involving six elements. In 
this respect the year 1903 constitutes a sort of theoretical watershed, and the late 
sign-systems are therefore those established after 1903 and based upon the more 
complex definition of sign-action. As it happens, the ten divisions of the ‘later 
taxonomy’ mentioned by Short which should, theoretically, yield sixty-six classes 
of signs also include the very six from which twenty-eight can be obtained. This 
Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and the Philosophy of Representation  4
being the case, one approach to a better understanding of the ordering problem 
is to investigate the specificity of the six-division system before attempting to 
master its more complex companion. By isolating characteristics of this simpler 
typology and then comparing and contrasting them with the remaining divisions 
of the 66-class system we might gain a greater understanding of how they differ 
and, consequently, of how better to integrate the two, should this prove to be 
theoretically possible.
There is, however, an even more compelling reason for examining the 28-class 
system (which, apparently, Peirce referred to only once, namely in a letter to his 
English correspondent, Lady Victoria Welby), an enterprise that so far has been 
overshadowed by discussions of the more complex typology. Investigating the 
simpler system as an independent, ‘stand-alone’ instrument for the identification 
and classification of signs will also make it possible to exploit its analytical 
power, which, if only in terms of the greater number of different types of signs 
it identifies, must surely have a theoretical potential not possessed by the earlier 
10-class system of 1903. One innovative aspect of this particular taxonomy is 
to be found, for example, in the fact that Peirce’s best known division, which 
distinguishes between icon, index and symbol, is entirely absent from the later, 
hexadic 28-class system,5 which means that we have at our disposal two radically 
different analytical approaches – an earlier and a later, both within a genuinely 
Peircean framework – to the examination and classification of the same semiotic 
phenomena, so to speak. They present, in effect, two distinct conceptions of the 
classification of the same sign. And so an assessment of the nature and analytical 
potential of the 28-class system is the first of the two major themes the study 
develops.
Now Peirce defined semiotics6 as nothing other than logic, which he conceived 
in two distinct ways, one narrow and one broad. As we see in Chapter 1, the 
narrow dealt with the relation between signs and what they represent, whereas 
he was led in 1903 to identify the broad, ‘grand’, logic as a veritable ‘Philosophy of 
Representation’. The sheer ambition of such a project is astonishing, and testifies 
to Peirce’s confidence in the theoretical framework he had established at the time 
and in his attendant association of the sign with the process of representation. 
However, this confidence can be seen to diminish with the development of the 
later sign-systems, characterized as they are by a complex series of interpretants, 
a development which may have neutralized or even appropriated the purpose he 
had earlier attributed to a branch of logic which he referred to as ‘methodeutic’ 
or ‘speculative rhetoric’. For this reason, the waning influence of the philosophy 
of representation and its relation to Peirce’s mature understanding of signs 
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constitute the second of the themes to be developed in the book, for in this age 
of biosemiotics and zoosemiotics, which in their Peircean versions are based 
essentially upon the 1903 semiotic ‘model’, it is important that the logical status 
of representation itself and its altered status within the later systems as well as 
Peirce’s more complex final conception of the sign they were based upon be 
clarified.
Organization of the book
Chapter 1 begins the chronological development of the relevant concepts, 
and traces Peirce’s general theory of representation as far back as the 1860s. 
It comprises two major parts. In order to present the general background to 
Peirce’s theory of signs the first part reviews selected influences from the modern 
Western philosophical tradition which contributed to Peirce’s intellectual 
development and which he ultimately came to break with. The second presents 
Peirce’s semiotics as he introduced it during that course of lectures at the Lowell 
Institute. Since most introductions to Peirce’s theory of the sign are hybrid in 
the sense that they combine material from 1903 and the later definitions, the 
description given in Chapter 1 will surprise many readers as all the statements 
and quotations have been restricted to the 1903 period for purposes of 
comparison with the later systems.
Chapter 2, the longest in the book, traces the ways in which Peirce’s 
conceptions of the sign came under considerable pressure over the period of 
the four years following the Lowell Lectures, that is, from 1904 to 1907, and 
how the theoretical developments which occurred in this period contributed to 
the pioneering features of the later sign-systems, and, ultimately, to the by-now 
problematic status of the speculative rhetoric/methodeutic branch of the general 
philosophy. The successive stages described in the chapter show Peirce breaking 
with the philosophical tradition outlined in Chapter 1.
Chapter 3 introduces the hexadic sign-systems which evolved from the 
principles discussed in the previous chapter. It shows how Peirce moves 
innovatively from his earlier category-based conception of signification and 
classification to one based upon three universes. A further purpose of the 
chapter is to review the debate concerning the ordering of the divisions involved 
in the late typologies, which to this day continues to be a subject of disagreement 
among Peirce scholars to the almost complete neglect of the characterization 
and exemplification of the sign-classes themselves.
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Chapter 4 compares and contrasts the two very different typologies by 
examining the way in which each accommodates a corpus of literal and figurative 
signs. It shows how the triadic system of 1903 classifies signs according to the 
way they represent their objects – the well-known division of the icon, index 
and symbol is an excellent example of this principle, together with Peirce’s 
highly original concept of the hypoicon – while the 1908 hexad classifies signs 
according to the sorts of objects that they represent, a typology from which, as 
mentioned earlier, the icon-index-symbol division is absent.
Having compared the earlier typology with the later in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 
exploits the analytical potential of the later system in its own right. It begins with 
a discussion of the way in which interpreters can react differentially to the same 
sign. One course of enquiry into this problem is provided by the 1908 system, 
and involves tracing the evolution of Peirce’s conception of the object over the 
early years of the century. The final stage of this theoretical development is 
used to show how a number of pictorial signs are determined by an object quite 
different from the perceived entities they depict.
Most of these chapters have, in addition to their specific theoretical material 
and the illustrations, a summary of the chapter’s main findings, a section which 
expands upon some of the more complex ideas introduced in the chapter and, in 
some cases, suggestions for further reading. The chapters cover as wide a variety 
of pictorial representations as our copyright laws allow, without neglecting, of 
course, the sorts of verbal examples that Peirce himself tended to use. Finally, 
as an aid to understanding the rapidity with which Peirce’s theorizing on signs 
developed in the period after the Lowell Lectures, I have included an appendix 
containing eight increasingly complex typologies developed in the two years 
between August 1904 and August 1906, all from his Logic Notebook, R339.
Since the study seeks to establish the theoretical differences between two of 
Peirce’s sign-systems, the purpose of this first chapter is to provide the reader 
with as complete a description as space allows of the one which was conceived 
late in 1903.1 It is in this context that the term ‘Philosophy of Representation’ has 
been adopted to cover all aspects of Peirce’s sign theory at that time:
Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in general. But as 
I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be and ought to be true 
representation, so far as representation can be known without any gathering 
of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It is in short The Philosophy of 
Representation.2 (R465, 1903)
The expression itself is from a draft of the third of the Lowell Lectures on 
logic but as it was used by Peirce after a discussion of degeneracy the editors 
obviously thought it more thematically appropriate to group it with texts on 
phenomenology in Volume One of the Collected Papers instead of in Volume 
Two with the other texts on signs from the Lectures. This is of no consequence. 
The expression usefully exploits the fact that Peirce grew over the years preceding 
the lectures to conceive of logic in two ways – a specialized branch of logic and 
a broader conception composed of three distinct but interrelated branches, 
this being the ‘grand’ logic. Moreover, since up to and including 1903 Peirce 
considered signs as the units of representation, and since, by ‘representation’ he 
meant a signifying process of the widest possible scope,3 the notion that logic 
should be considered as the general philosophy of representation – a love of 
knowledge and a search for knowledge in the field of representation, therefore – 
is entirely appropriate.
The chapter traces what one can consider to be the major developments of 
the theory up to and including the Lowell Lectures on logic. From a semiotic 
point of view it was a remarkable achievement, an autonomous and complete 
descriptive system accounting for ten logically valid classes of signs. However, 
1
The Philosophy of Representation
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like all theories, it was subject to revision, as a consequence of the intellectual 
restlessness of its founder and his quest to discover all possible types of signs. For 
convenience, the subject matter of the chapter has been divided into three distinct 
sections. The broad lines of the trivium forming the philosophy of representation 
are introduced first as an explanation of one theme from the general title of the 
study; the second reviews the most relevant aspects of the theoretical background 
to Peirce’s theory of signs and the advancement of knowledge leading to the period 
of the Lowell Lectures; the third describes the theory of the sign developed in the 
Lectures and their accompanying Syllabus of November and December 1903.4 
This is not an arbitrary decision. Many Peirce scholars see three or four stages 
in the development of Peirce’s thinking on signs, the 1903 stage being referred 
to as the ‘interim’ stage by Atkin (2010) and Liszka (1996), for example. As I 
shall be contrasting the 1903 system with the 28-class system of 1908 the third 
section effectively corresponds to that interim stage. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of the characteristics of Peirce’s theory of semiotics in 1903 and a 
discussion of their interest for the general study. As the theory presented here is 
necessarily a personal point of view, I have appended bibliographical references 
to other accounts of the way Peirce’s logic developed in this particular period in 
order to offer the reader a balanced presentation of the problem.
The philosophy of representation
Peirce’s logical trivium was based upon the structure of the medieval teaching 
system composed of grammar, logic and rhetoric, itself an outgrowth of 
Ancient Greek theory. In the Lowell Lectures he defined it and its relation to his 
conception of logic in the following manner:
All thought being performed by means of signs, Logic may be regarded as 
the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1) Speculative 
Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, whether 
they be icons indices, or symbols; (2) Critic, which classifies arguments and 
determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; (3) Methodeutic, 
which studies the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the 
exposition, and in the application of truth. Each division depends on that which 
precedes it. (CP 1.191, 1903)
The three branches received different denominations over the years, but 
the important point to note is that logic in the broad sense – a ‘grand’ logic 
– is a field of study comprising three hierarchically organized branches, while 
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logic in the narrow sense is but one of the three. He termed the latter ‘critic’, 
the branch of the philosophy of representation concerned with the validity of 
inferences, these being classified within the relation holding between a sign and 
the object it represents. Speculative grammar is the first of the three branches. 
As the final sentence in the quotation notes, its relative position within the 
group, or order of ‘application’, is significant since it deals broadly with the 
conditions of signhood: determining what constitutes a sign is obviously a 
priority, given that the other two branches necessarily depend upon an entity’s 
having been previously identified as a sign within speculative grammar. The last 
of the three, the least developed and the branch that Peirce ultimately found 
most difficult to circumscribe to his satisfaction, is the one he refers to at this 
point as ‘Methodeutic’. As Peirce understood it in 1903 this branch sought to 
validate the conditions governing signs and the interpretants they were intended 
to determine. The term ‘methodeutic’ alternated until 1906 with ‘speculative 
rhetoric’, a case of a terminological instability which pertains specifically to 
the nature and function of this third branch of the grand logic, and scholars 
reviewing it have found considerable variation in the terms and definitions 
concerning it: Kent (1987: 206), for one, identifies nine different denominations 
for the methodeutic branch, while more recently Liszka (2000: 440) cites seven 
different names for the rhetoric and something like 30 different definitions, 
some of which will be met with in the following sections. This, then, was the tri-
partite structure of Peirce’s grand logic, his philosophy of representation of 1903.
The semio-philosophical background
It is a fact that no theory, philosophical or otherwise, suddenly breaks upon an 
unsuspecting world ex nihilo, and Peirce’s semiotics is no exception: like that 
of others, his thinking on signs was determined partly from what he had read 
and absorbed from the Western philosophical tradition, from the Greeks and 
the Scholastics in particular, and partly from his reactions to it. However, it is 
the philosophy of the modern period that is most pertinent to the development 
of his theory of the sign. In this context, the study of the nature and origin 
of knowledge was decisive as far as the peculiar emphasis of the theory was 
concerned, given that for Peirce knowledge could only be acquired by signs: 
‘and a sign is something by knowing which we know something more,’ he was to 
write to Lady Welby in 1904 (CP 8.332). Since one of the problems of knowledge 
is to determine how the judgements which more sceptical positions enjoin us 
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to suspend are actually derived from sense data, it was essential for Peirce to be 
able to offer a logical, as opposed to a psychological, account of their formation 
and progress from their source at the ‘gate of perception’, as he puts it. And as he 
was initially concerned to hypothesize how knowledge could be obtained from 
perception his semiotics evolved into a powerful and original set of statements 
concerning the sign. Furthermore, the inquiry into, and modelling of, the 
cognitive processes by which knowledge is acquired inevitably determined 
the number and nature of the elements involved in the model. In Peirce’s early 
work there were three: sense data, percept and perceptual judgement. Since, 
from the start, he always conceived the latter of these as being inferential in 
nature, there was no theoretical reason why these stages or ‘moments’ in the 
knowledge acquisition process should not be assimilated to those involved in 
the interpretation of signs generally. The following sections, then, exploit this 
aspect of Peirce’s semiotics by comparing and contrasting it with concepts from 
the work of John Locke and Emmanuel Kant, two of the major figures of the 
constructive, anti-sceptic strain of Western philosophy.
Testimony from Peirce himself argues, perhaps, for a more comprehensive 
discussion of the latter than of the former: we learn that his earliest readings 
in philosophy were in the ‘classical German schools’ (CP 1.4, c.1897); that in 
1855, under the influence of his father, he began to study the first Critique two 
hours a day over a period of three years until he virtually knew it by heart (CP 
1.4, c.1897); and that, as a consequence, he was ‘in the early sixties a passionate 
devotee of Kant, at least as regarded the Transcendental Analytic in the Critic of 
the Pure Reason’ (CP 4.2, 1898). However, Kant’s influence upon Peirce’s early 
thought has been extensively discussed by many major studies, Deledalle (1987) 
and Murphey (1993), for instance, which renders such an enterprise redundant 
in the present context. Locke, on the other hand, might initially seem an 
improbable choice, for evidence from Peirce gives the impression that there were 
other, more important influences: Aristotle, the Scholastics and, above all, Kant.
The decision to include comparison with Locke is to a large extent justified 
by the fact that the chapter seeks to show how Peirce’s theories of knowledge 
and the sign, which in this study has been identified as the philosophy of 
representation, belong to an established empiricist philosophical tradition. In 
this context Locke is a thinker with whom the general reader will probably be far 
more familiar, whereas Peirce’s ‘obligation’ to Kant is probably best seen as a debt 
by disagreement: having devoted much of his early philosophical energy to the 
assimilation of the critical philosophy, Peirce came to define his own philosophy 
in reaction to that of his teacher. The debt to Locke is potentially of the same 
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type, although less clear-cut and, in one area at least, possibly one that Peirce 
was not entirely aware of. For while Locke’s use of the term ‘semeiotic’ to refer to 
his doctrine of signs, for example, was subsequently taken up by Peirce, thereby 
justifying at least a cursory study of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Locke may nevertheless have exerted more subtle influences.
It should be noted that Peirce’s theory of semiotics and its place in the overall 
scheme of the sciences underwent considerable modifications, but the general 
tendency seems to be that whereas Peirce was initially a self-confessed Kantian 
who spent his first years in philosophy throwing off the transcendental yoke, so 
to speak, to the extent that he ultimately repudiated much of what he had learned 
from his teacher, the influence he received from Locke followed the opposite 
course: although never ever more than a background figure among the influences 
Peirce explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged, Locke’s concepts of semeiotic and 
experience were to become progressively more important as his own thinking 
matured and his conception of the categories, for example, matured in the years 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. The purpose of this second section of 
the chapter, then, is not to engage in yet another analysis of, for example, Locke’s 
epistemology and its alleged inconsistencies and contradictions or in yet another 
piece of eighteenth-century exegesis – such a task is not only beyond the scope 
of the present study, it is also irrelevant – but rather to pinpoint and illustrate 
selected aspects of the specificity of Peirce’s thought by contrasting them with 
earlier theoretical statements from the same tradition.
Semeiotic
By virtue of a ‘discontinued way of writing’, interrupted by political activities, 
Locke  took nearly twenty years to complete An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (henceforth the Essay), and, by the time of his death, had prepared a 
fifth edition of the text. In spite of the modifications brought to the three subsequent 
editions published in his lifetime, the text nevertheless constitutes a single, relatively 
homogeneous statement on the problem of knowledge. Peirce, in contrast, spent 
some fifty years constructing and considerably revising a theory of semiotics, 
cognition and scientific inquiry which was never completely consigned to a single 
text, and consequently poses problems of interpretation of an entirely different 
order. In spite of this, we begin with a discussion of what must naturally seem to 
be Peirce’s principal debt to Locke, namely Locke’s ‘semeiotic’, or doctrine of signs.
Although the third book of the Essay, titled ‘Words’, is devoted to language and 
various forms of linguistic use and abuse, it is not until the final chapter of Book 
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IV that Locke defines the object of his theory of signs and their specific function 
in relation to the epistemological predicament exploited by scepticism, namely the 
discontinuity between the apprehending mind and objects in the world:
Thirdly, the third branch may be called ∑εμειωτικὴ, or the doctrine of signs; the 
most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Λογικὴ, logic; 
the business whereof is to consider the nature of the signs the mind makes use of 
for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For, since 
the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present to the 
understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of 
the thing it considers, should be present to it; and these are ideas. ([1690] 1964: 
IV, xxi, 4)
The passage calls for a number of comments. First, in anticipation of Peirce, 
Locke locates his doctrine of signs within a scheme which classifies the sciences 
of the understanding according to their specific function in the ‘commonwealth 
of learning’ to which he alludes in the Epistle to the reader. Second, the ‘ideas’ that 
Locke has been working into a theory of knowledge are here defined explicitly as 
proxies, or surrogates, standing to the mind for objects, particularly substances, 
which, by the nature of things, cannot be present there of themselves. What 
Peirce actually thought of this definition is apparently not recorded, but there 
can be little doubt as to his initial approval: it posits that signs or ideas enter, 
together with ‘the things the mind contemplates’ and the mind or understanding 
itself, into an embryonic form of the triadic relation governing his own sign, 
object and interpretant. It implies, moreover, that with the obvious exception of 
the immediate degree of knowledge which Locke had inherited from Descartes, 
and, allowing for the fact that cognitions (i.e. ideas) are determined immediately 
by qualities, such a process of knowledge acquisition functions by inference, and 
considers not only ‘public’ representations but thoughts, too, to be the referents 
of signs. Third, just as Peirce was to do two centuries later, Locke conceives his 
doctrine of signs as a form of logic, the principal business of which being to 
determine the nature of the signs used to register and communicate ideas. Peirce, 
however, as mentioned above, considered logic in two distinct manners, although, 
here as elsewhere, he was not entirely satisfied with his definitions. Consider, for 
example, the following statement, an alternative to the quotation from the Lowell 
Lectures with which the philosophy of representation was introduced above:
The term ‘‘logic’’ is unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses. In its 
narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions of the attainment 
of truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of the necessary laws of thought, 
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or, still better (thought always taking place by means of signs), it is general 
semeiotic, treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions of signs 
being signs … also of the laws of the evolution of thought.(CP 1.444, c. 1896)
Peirce had already defined logic at this time to be what he called, variously, 
‘semeiotic’, ‘semiotic’5 or, on at least one occasion, ‘semiotics’: as we saw earlier, 
it was both the entire grand logic and also the narrower branch of the trivium 
(the term ‘critic’ itself was borrowed from Locke). Surprisingly, in a fragment 
from 1906 he redefined the scope of his whole research enterprise by positing 
independent logics for icons and indices, and restricting the scope of the trivium, 
now no longer general, to the symbol alone, a position uncannily reminiscent of 
his work in the 1860s:
Therefore, I extend logic to embrace all the necessary principles of semeiotic, and 
I recognize a logic of icons, and a logic of indices, as well as a logic of symbols; 
and in this last I recognize three divisions: Stecheotic (or stoicheiology), which I 
formerly called Speculative Grammar; Critic, which I formerly called Logic; and 
Methodeutic, which I formerly called Speculative Rhetoric. (CP 4.9, 1906)
The trivium, then, by this account, is restricted to the study of the symbol. 
Later still, however, in a draft to Lady Welby, with whom he had begun to 
exchange views on matters of signification and logic in 1903, he returned to the 
earlier conception of the grand logic, considering it once more to be a general 
semeiotic: ‘It seems to me that one of the first useful steps toward a science of 
semeiotic (sémeiötiké), or the cenoscopic science of signs, must be the accurate 
definition, or logical analysis, of the concepts of the science’ (CP 8.343, 1908). 
Finally, he claimed in another draft to her that he was working on a ‘logic-book’ 
to be titled ‘Logic considered as Semeiotic’ (CP 8.377, 1908). The classificatory 
wheel has come full circle.
The Peirce scholar Max Fisch has suggested with respect to such statements 
that Peirce began his career as a logician by rebutting Locke’s conception of logic 
as the general doctrine of signs (1986: 321–55):6 Fisch calls this ‘logic-within-
semeiotic’. No doubt still under the influence of Kant, and with a conception 
of the categories restricted to thought, Peirce considered the business of logic 
to be the study of symbols, more precisely, of arguments or inference generally. 
By the mid-1880s, however, he had come to realize that a theory of signs cannot 
dispense with icons and indices, and apparently conceded in deference to Locke 
that logic might well have a second, broader application. Finally, by 1902, Fisch 
claims, the original, restricted conception of logic was dropped altogether. ‘It has 
taken Peirce most of his productive lifetime’, he concludes, ‘to come all the way 
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back to Locke’ and to see semiotics as ‘logic-as-semeiotic’.7 Whatever the merits 
of Fisch’s analysis, it suggests that a comparison of Peirce’s later, more elaborate 
version with Locke’s theory of semeiotic contributes to our understanding of 
how a doctrine of signs can become a system of logic. Concerning the way each 
locates his doctrine of signs within a classification of the sciences, however, they 
differ considerably.
Architectonic
In the penultimate chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes, ‘By the 
term Architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. Without systematic 
unity, our knowledge cannot become a science; it will be an aggregate, not a 
system …. Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected 
and rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should 
constitute a system’ ([1787] 1974: 471).8 Now, with the exposition of his 
cognitive theory completed, Locke undertook, in the final chapter of the Essay, 
a schematic classification of the sciences involved in the study of ‘all that can fall 
within the compass of human understanding’, namely, as he claimed, natural 
philosophy, or knowledge of things; practical philosophy, or ethics; and, finally, 
semiotics, which studies the signs used by the understanding for private and 
public purposes, that is, the recording and communicating of ideas. Since the 
majority of signs used by the understanding are words, he suggested that logic 
might be an alternative name for this science. This classification is restricted 
to three sciences, suggests a natural division of all objects of knowledge, but 
distributes these objects across distinct, unrelated fields of inquiry: ‘All which 
three, viz. things, as they are in themselves knowable, actions as they depend on 
us, in order to happiness, and the right use of signs in order to knowledge, being 
toto coelo different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the 
intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct one from another’ (Essay, IV, xxi, 
5). By Kant’s definition, then, Locke’s classification is an aggregate, not a system, 
or ‘organism’: in short, it is not governed by the architectonic principle.
In contrast, as we saw earlier, Peirce’s conception of science is systematic and 
architectonic, and the various classifications of the sciences that he established 
particularly in the early years of the twentieth century posit them explicitly as a 
unified system in which the sciences were related organically. This architectonic 
feature of his philosophy was not the only one he inherited from Kant, for 
his research is characterized by the gradual emergence of a consistent set of 
categories within a very personal conception of phenomenology, his extensive 
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use of the triad and the doctrine that every cognition involves an inference of 
some form: all Kantian in origin, although the philosophical antecedents for sets 
of categories can be traced at least back to Aristotle.
Phenomenology
Briefly, the final classification of the sciences that Peirce published in 1903 
distinguishes between theoretical and practical sciences. The theoretical 
sciences then subdivide into the sciences of review and the sciences of discovery. 
Philosophy follows mathematics in the sciences of discovery, precedes a field 
of inquiry Peirce calls ‘Ideoscopy’ and itself subdivides into phenomenology, 
normative science and metaphysics: ‘Phenomenology ascertains and studies 
the kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the 
phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way. Normative 
science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not to be … Normative 
science rests largely on phenomenology and mathematics …’ (CP 1.186, 1903). 
This abridged sample of the much larger classification is architectonic in that 
the subdivisions tend to be trichotomic and the various fields of study are 
ordered in such a way that the later presuppose theoretical principles established 
in the earlier, obeying what might be called the ‘dependency principle’ of the 
architectonic. Logic, as mentioned above in the introduction to the philosophy 
of representation, depends upon ethics, which itself depends upon aesthetics.
The noteworthy feature of this classification resides in the fact that it departs 
from previous versions with respect to relations between the categories and logic, 
and also to the changing status of logic itself. In his earlier writings, Peirce had 
made the categories, of which there were five in the mid-1860s, dependent upon 
logic. By 1903, he had created a new science to deal with this part of the system, 
which he called ‘phenomenology’9 and which was now independent of logic, 
presupposing only concepts provided by mathematics. By this time, too, his 
whole conception of logic had undergone considerable revision and no longer 
fulfilled a constitutive function in his epistemology, but a regulative one, hence 
its place among the normative sciences, that is, among the sciences which say 
how things should be, and not what they are. As a result of a series of theoretical 
problems pertaining to the coherence and mutual compatibility of the various 
parts of the organism (cf. Murphey 1993), Peirce was obliged to modify the 
relations between them if the architectonic principle advocated by Kant was to 
be preserved. The subject-predicate conception of logic characteristic of Peirce’s 
early period, for example, was entirely conventional. However, by 1870, when 
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he had come to appreciate the importance of De Morgan’s 1860 paper ‘On the 
Syllogism IV and the Logic of Relations’, he had abandoned the subject-predicate 
form of logic and he was beginning to publish on the logic of relations himself. 
He subsequently divided logic into two distinct parts and classified formal logic, 
including the logic of relations, as a branch of mathematics.
Thus by 1903, since phenomenology presupposes mathematics, it had become 
possible for Peirce to distinguish between the material ‘content’ of the categories, 
which he identified as Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, and their formal 
structure, namely the monad, dyad and triad, respectively. In other words, 
whereas Locke had conceived a system of ideas which accounted simply for the 
content of experience, and whereas Kant had made the form of experience a 
function of one of twelve mind-given, but spurious categories,10 Peirce had, in 
1903, in contrast to both, set up a system of three categories uniting both the form 
and content of experience on the basis of the logic of relations. Furthermore, on 
the strength of the theorem that any n-adic relation could be accounted for by a 
triad,11 he was able to claim that the system was complete. It is in this way that, 
instead of being derived from logic, the theory of the categories had become 
‘pre-logical’ in Peirce’s scheme of 1903. This is the uncompromising description 
he gave of the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in the course 
of his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism of 1903, where by the phenomenon, as 
we saw above, he means ‘whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way’ 
(CP 1.186):
Category the First is the Idea of that which is such as it is regardless of anything 
else. That is to say, it is a Quality of Feeling.
Category the Second is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being Second 
to some First, regardless of anything else, and in particular regardless of any Law, 
although it may conform to a law. That is to say, it is Reaction as an element of 
the Phenomenon.
Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being a Third, or 
Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it is Representation as an 
element of the Phenomenon. (CP 5.66, 1903)
The notions of quality, feeling and reaction were to reappear frequently in 
the years to come. Furthermore, he introduced at this point a concept derived 
from the theory of prescission or mental ‘abstraction’, expounded in his early 
work of the 1860s, namely a principle of degeneracy (CP 5.66, 1903). Anything 
which is considered ‘regardless of anything else’ can have nothing prescinded or 
mentally abstracted from it: nothing can be prescinded from a Firstness; it just 
is as it is. On the other hand, Firstness can be prescinded from Secondness: the 
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table I am typing on exists, resists the weight of my computer, my elbows and my 
cup of coffee, capacities which instantiate its Secondness. However, it necessarily 
has properties, its Firstnesses: made of wood, dark brown, rectangular in shape, 
hard to the touch etc., properties which can be prescinded mentally from the 
table, but in themselves intangible. These are ‘degenerate’ forms of the table’s 
Secondness. Similarly, Thirdness has two degrees of degeneracy; in other words 
both Firstness and Secondness can be prescinded from it. Consider the simple 
case of the following utterance: My table is made of mahogany. This is a sign 
which conveys meaning to an interpreter, and illustrates Thirdness. However, 
in order to be perceived aurally by anyone at all it has to produce airwaves 
of a particular type, and thus has a material existence that can be plotted, for 
example, as a sound spectrogram, this being the utterance’s Secondness. Finally 
there is a feeling or quality about the way it is pronounced – whispered, cajoling, 
screamed, hoarsely etc. This feeling or quality is perceivable but intangible, and 
constitutes a form of Firstness – whatever the sound qualities heard, they are 
such as they are, independently of anything else, and they produce a similar 
qualitative effect as part of the interpretation. The principle whereby the simpler 
categories can be prescinded from the more complex was to have important 
implications for his theory of signs of 1903.
The reasons for the pre-eminence of phenomenology within the system at 
that time and the reasons why a theory of cognition and discovery should need 
such an elaborate structure will be illustrated below. For the moment, we note 
simply that the normative, as opposed to the formal, mathematical aspect of 
logic – in other words, the philosophy of representation – subdivides by the 
architectonic principle into three branches, the first of which as we saw above, 
being speculative grammar. This Peirce defines as the general theory of the nature 
and meaning of signs and, since logic is a classificatory science,12 speculative 
grammar determines, among other things, whether a sign is an icon, an index or 
a symbol (CP 1.191, 1903).
Conceptions and signs
This leads to an important difference between the two empiricist conceptions of 
the sign, and its implications for a general semiotic theory. In Locke’s case ideas 
are either mental or verbal: no finer distinctions are deemed necessary, and the 
function and interaction of signs are both very much static affairs. Moreover, 
as mentioned before, Locke’s reference to the vague notion of ‘idea’ makes no 
distinction between the content of experience and its formal structure. Peirce, 
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by contrast, was constantly preoccupied by such considerations, and this took 
the particular form of an investigation into the way the sign functioned as a 
cognition within the relation of representation which had preoccupied him for 
almost forty years. Thus, in his earliest writings, where we find him struggling 
with the problem of the categories and the way to deduce them in what he 
considered a less fallible manner than that of his German master, he derived 
the concept of representation from what he considered at the time to be the five 
‘universal’ conceptions, but subsequently reduced to three when he made logic 
dependent upon phenomenology and removed the categories from logic.
Like Kant, Peirce held that the function of conceptions was ‘to reduce 
the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity’ (CP 1.545, 1867), the unity 
in question taking at that time, as noted above, the form of a proposition of 
conventional subject-predicate logic. In this view, for example, such conceptions 
would be considered to be at work at this very moment in my understanding 
to reduce the multitude of stimuli emanating from the external world to the 
unity of the proposition: ‘My table is made of mahogany’. Unlike the said table, 
the proposition is not ‘public’, is not ‘in the world’, as it were, until uttered, 
but, rather, in someone’s mind. In this early scheme, three other conceptions 
were involved in the passage from the manifold of substance to the unity of 
being, namely quality, relation, and representation, these being respectively a 
function of three types of ‘reference’ within the constitution of the proposition: 
reference to a ground or character, reference to a correlate and reference to an 
interpretant. This system is, clearly, nothing less than a prototypical definition 
of the sign relation upon which Peirce was to build his entire logic. He notes, 
‘Now the three links composing this chain [of conceptions], namely reference to 
a ground, reference to a correlate, and to a correspondent afford the elements of 
a complete system of logic’ (W1 353, 1866). Further, from an analysis of the three 
items involved in the function of the third conception, representation, namely 
the relate, the correlate and the correspondent, Peirce was able to classify the 
various classes of representations:
[W]here the repraesentamen has a real agreement with its object, the 
representation consists in a likeness; a simple quality is shown but the object 
itself is not said to exist. In the second case, there is a real difference of the 
repraesentamen from its object … in this case the representative character 
of the one will consist in constant accompaniment of the other, so that it 
indicates the existence of the latter without noting any characters of it. Such a 
representation may be termed an index. In the third case, where the relation 
of the repraesentamen is ideal, the ground of this relation is an attribute of the 
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correlate attributed to the relate … This gives a general sign, a word or conception, 
for the repraesentamen will necessarily apply to everything which contains its 
attributed quality. (W1 355)
By 1866, then, Peirce had not only deduced and illustrated his three categories, 
he had also defined the basic conceptions involved in cognition, subordinated 
them to the sign relation and had begun to work them into the logic that would 
ultimately yield the subclasses of icon, index (or sign, as Peirce also called it at the 
time) and symbol. Furthermore, in the 1860s Peirce was already trichotomizing 
this division by distinguishing the three types of general signs according to the 
elements involved in the sign relation. Thus, he defines symbols as ‘the objects 
of the understanding, considered as representations … that is, signs which are 
at least potentially general’ (CP 1.559), and he discriminates between symbols 
‘which directly determine only their grounds … and are thus but sums of marks 
or terms’ (CP 1.559),13 symbols which also ‘independently determine their 
objects by means of other term or terms, and thus … become capable of truth 
or falsehood, that is, are propositions’ (CP 1.559), and, finally, symbols ‘which 
also independently determine their interpretants, and thus the minds to which 
they appeal, by premissing a proposition or propositions which such a mind is 
to admit. These are arguments’ (CP 1.559). This can be summarized in Table 1.1.
The subdivision of the symbol constituting the lowest level of the triadic 
edifice described in Table 1.1, namely the term, is in all essential details the 
general term posited by Locke in the Essay. This means that in 1867, at least this 
part of Peirce’s logic was still virtually isomorphic with Locke’s. However, his 
preoccupation with logic led him not to return to Locke’s original statement but 
to develop a far more complex system of his own, with a decisive effect on his 
semiotic theory. This involved the subordination of logic to phenomenology in 
the classification of the sciences; the development of the categories of Firstness 
and Secondness in addition to the Thirdness already present in the system of the 
1860s; increased awareness of the nature of reality, of the function of the object 
and of what Peirce termed the ‘Outward Clash’; and, finally, the development 
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of the interpretant. All of this represents a considerable departure from the 
semeiotic of Locke.
Categories of the forms of experience
It remains to be seen how Peirce’s theory of cognition integrates the three elements 
of the sign relation as conceived in 1903. We have already seen that Peirce’s early 
work on the categories derived five universal conceptions: substance, being 
and, between them three references, respectively, to ground, correlate and 
interpretant. He subsequently dropped being and substance, leaving the three 
‘material’ categories corresponding to these three references, quality, relation 
and, finally, representation; seen in the light of the later categories of the forms 
of experience, they realize, respectively, the monad, the dyad and the triad:
The metaphysical categories of quality, fact, and law, being categories of the 
matter of phenomena, do not precisely correspond with the logical categories 
of the monad, the dyad, and the polyad or higher set, since these are categories 
of the forms of experience. The dyads of monads, being dyads, belong to the 
category of the dyad. But since they are composed of monads as their sole 
matter, they belong materially to the category of quality, or the monad in its 
material mode of being. It cannot be regarded as a fact that scarlet is red. It is a 
truth; but it is only an essential truth. It is that in being which corresponds in 
thought to Kant’s analytical judgment. (CP 1.452, 1896)
These are forms that are to be found in many, if not most, of Peirce’s theoretical 
concepts: trichotomies, the categories, the later universes of experience and their 
three modes of being, his triadic relations and their three correlates etc. In 1866, 
in an early attempt to define his categories he wrote, ‘These three conceptions are 
all we require to erect the edifice of logic. Why they should be three is unknown; 
although a reason can be given for every other logical division. But this number 
may indicate an anthropological fact’ (W1 524). This aspect of his intellectual 
background is obviously important for full understanding of his theory of how 
signs function and of the various types of signs it is possible to identify. He 
was, in a special sense of the term, an idealist: he belonged to a philosophical 
tradition reaching back to Pythagoras via Newton, Descartes and Leibnitz, to 
name but these; that is, to a tradition which holds that number is the key to our 
understanding of the world around us (CP 1.421 c. 1896).
He was aware of the possible ‘anticipated suspicion …. that he forces divisions 
to a Procrustean bed of trichotomy’ (CP 1.568, 1910) that he might encounter over 
his insistence on the theoretical importance of the number three – its inevitable 
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association with the Trinity and thence with theology and religion – but declared 
himself innocent of ‘triadomany’, that is, of attaching ‘a superstitious or fanciful 
importance to the number three’ (CP 1.568, 1910). After all, by 1903 Peirce had 
founded his semiotics upon his theory of phenomenology, which itself turned 
upon the number three. Moreover, by virtue of the theorem mentioned above 
that any n-adic relation could be accounted for by a triad, he had argued but 
without real proof that three ‘objects’ or correlates were all that were necessary 
in such cases, and that any higher n–adic relation could be accounted for by a 
triad: ‘A triad is something more than a congeries of pairs …. Systems of more 
than three objects may be analyzed into congeries of triads’ (NEM4 307, 1894?). 
In matters of internal structure Peirce’s classifications are now far from Locke’s 
aggregate of sciences.
Continuous interpretant series
Thus the sign relation that Peirce named ‘representation’ in his early work on 
cognition and which is obviously the object of his philosophy of representation 
of 1903 – ‘so far as representation can be known without any gathering of special 
facts beyond our ordinary daily life’ – can be considered as the archetype of all 
triadic relations, and the basis of all cognition. Just how the process pertains 
to the sign relation and its three relates is best seen in the light of the work on 
reference to an interpretant, particularly as it is realized in comparison. In a 
rough draft of a paper subsequently published under the title ‘On a New List of 
Categories’ (1867), Peirce defines the interpretant thus:
Reference to a correlate is clearly justified and made possible solely by 
comparison. Let us inquire, then, in what comparison consists …. Suppose, we 
look out the word homme in a French dictionary; we shall find opposite to it the 
word man, which, so placed, represents homme as representing the same two-
legged creature which man represents. In a similar way, it will be found that every 
comparison requires, besides the related thing, the ground and the correlate, 
also a mediating representation which represents the relate to be a representation 
of the same correlate which this mediating representation itself represents. Such a 
mediating representation I call an interpretant, because it fulfils the office of an 
interpreter who says that a foreigner says the same thing that he himself says. 
(W1 522–23)
Within the theory of cognition this means that since there can be no first 
thought, or intuition, the system is set in motion, so to speak, by the sense data 
determined by the object of the cognition, and every thought determined by that 
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object determines an interpreting thought that refers to that same object within 
a continuous process which admits of no first stage. Empirically, this is difficult 
to accept, as we imagine cognitions to be the results of discrete events, but within 
the logic of continuity it presents no problem. The process is well illustrated by 
any text. Since they are recorded in an existential medium, all texts have a first 
sentence, of which all subsequent sentences are the successively more complex 
interpretants. By integrating previously given information, both negatively and 
positively (e.g. by ellipsis and repetition), these successive interpretant sentences 
collectively ensure the text’s syntactical cohesion and semantic coherence. 
However, at ‘thought level’, so to speak, where the text originated, things are 
quite different, for logically what functions as the first sentence of the physical 
text is, in fact, an inference from prior cognitions, and it would be virtually 
impossible to trace the text to any such origins at this level.14
In this way thoughts are translatable, and indeed are translated by interpretant 
thoughts.15 It is in this manner that the chain of inference progresses. Since 
Peirce denies that a cognition can be determined directly, immediately, by the 
object of perception, as Locke’s epistemology would have us believe, and that 
even one’s own existence is inferred and not intuited, three important principles 
follow from this. First, the triadic model of representation illustrates the ‘kinetic’ 
progression of the inferential processes involved in cognition. Second, no formal 
distinction need be made between our understanding of the world about us 
(including the understanding of images) and the interpretation of verbal signs. 
Since the two functions are isomorphic, Peirce dwells little on the ‘grammar’ of 
linguistic interpretation: language signs are simply one class of signs covered 
by the same general definition. Third, as we see below in the discussion of the 
extracts from the Lowell Lectures and the Syllabus that accompanied them, 
Peirce considered the interpretant itself to be a sign in 1903, and therefore that 
the interpretant series was continuous:
Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A Sign is anything which is related 
to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a 
Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such 
a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad 
infinitum. (CP 2.92, 1902)16
It follows that the dynamic continuity of sign-action as conceived in 1902 can 
be represented by Figure 1.1, where the symbol > signifies ‘bring X into relation 
with Y’, and O, S and I indicate, respectively, object, sign and interpretant, each 
subsequent interpretant becoming a sign for a new interpretant, (I1 = S2) for 
example, and so on ad infinitum, as Peirce claimed.
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This principle of a ‘continuous’ interpretant series was a characteristic of the 
period in which Peirce conceived of the action of the sign as one of representation, 
with the sign ‘standing’ for its object, and he maintained it for a short time after 
1903. However, as two later chapters will show, this was a concept that he was 
ultimately led to abandon: the notion of a continuous series of interpretant-signs 
was not to last in the manner stated in 1903.
Sign, divisions and classes in 1903
The preceding sections should have provided sufficient background information 
concerning Peirce’s debt to the philosophical tradition and the ways in which he 
departs from it for the reader to understand Peirce’s semiotics of 1903. With this 
in mind, we examine the relevant features which characterize the sign-systems 
of the ‘philosophy of representation’ in what we can consider its final form 
presented at the Lowell Lectures and in the brief Syllabus which accompanied 
them. Most of this material comes from two manuscripts, R478 and R540, much 
of which can be found in chapters 20 and 21 of volume two of The Essential 
Peirce.17 At this point the reader should remember that by the concept of ‘sign-
system’ is meant not only definitions of the sign and sign-action, but also the 
typology these may generate.
We have seen that it was his phenomenology, or his ‘Categoric’ as he called 
it in the Carnegie Application of 1902, which justified his particular manner of 
organizing the branches of logic.18 In the first of the eight lectures Peirce set out 
once more the purpose of logic and the logician, and terminated the lecture with 
another such highly organized classification of the three branches:
The ultimate purpose of the logician is to make out the theory of how knowledge 
is advanced …. So Methodeutic, which is the last goal of logical study, is the 
theory of the advancement of knowledge of all kind. But this theory is not 
possible until the logician has first examined all the different elementary modes 
of getting at truth … This part of logic is called Critic. But before it is possible 
to enter upon this business in any rational way the first thing that is necessary 
is to examine thoroughly all the ways in which thought can be expressed … 
I, therefore, take a position … in regarding this introductory part of logic as 
O > S > (I1 = S2) > (I2 = S3) > (I3 = S4) ... (In = Sn+1)
Figure 1.1 The continuous nature of semiosis as conceived in 1902
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nothing but an analysis of what kinds of signs are absolutely essential to the 
embodiment of thought. I call it … Speculative grammar. I fully agree … in 
thinking that this Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those 
conventional signs of which language is composed, but that it will do well to 
widen its field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which, 
not being conventional, are not of the nature of language. (EP2 256–57, 1903)
We note that in this case Peirce works backwards from the most specialized of 
the three branches, methodeutic, which, following the tradition of constructive 
philosophy alluded to earlier, is the branch which promotes ‘the advancement of 
knowledge of all kinds’; he then introduces critic, which deals with inferences 
and upon which methodeutic depends; he presents, finally, the branch that 
deals with ‘signhood’, that is, the branch of the grand logic which establishes 
the conditions qualifying a given entity as a sign, classifies all possible signs and 
establishes an inventory of them. This organization is another illustration of 
the dependency principle according to which branches appearing earlier in the 
general system provide those coming after with relevant theoretical concepts 
and processes. In what follows it is the last of the three mentioned in the extract, 
and the most important for a theory of what constitutes a sign and the ways 
in which it functions, namely speculative grammar, that we deal with, leaving 
critic aside completely and reserving brief concluding remarks for methodeutic 
or, as it was also referred to at the time, speculative rhetoric. After reviewing 
the manner in which Peirce presents his phenomenology and the purposes he 
ascribes to it, the sections to follow deal, first, with the sign, its definitions and 
its two correlates; then with the divisions he defined, first two and then three; 
finally, with the ten classes of signs which Peirce obtained from these three 
divisions. For reasons given in the Introduction, all the quotations to follow, 
except where stated otherwise, are necessarily from 1903 or earlier.
Phenomenology
In the lectures Peirce approaches the problem of what constitutes a sign and 
the divisions and subdivisions it is involved in from two different directions – 
initially by the application of his categories and, in a later manuscript, by 
deducing the sign and its correlates in the signifying process by means of his 
theory of triadic relations. In both cases the reasoning he applies is justified 
by principles provided by his particular conception of phenomenology. This 
material is organized thematically in the Collected Papers, with the result that 
associated elements may appear out of chronological order. The prominence of 
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phenomenology and the categories in the sign theory of this period cannot be 
emphasized enough. Since the definition of the sign is a priority, we begin by 
examining the way in which the sign and its correlates were established.
Triadic relations, the sign and its correlates
What makes the sign-systems of 1903 particularly impressive is the way in which 
many apparently diverse aspects of Peirce’s philosophy seem to be woven into 
the theory. Referring once more to his phenomenology, Peirce introduces the 
concept of triadic relations with which he is going to define the sign as the unit 
or agency of representation:
The principles and analogies of Phenomenology enable us to describe, in a 
distant way, what the divisions of triadic relations must be …. In the case of 
triadic relations, no part of this work has, as yet, been satisfactorily performed, 
except in some measure for the most important class of triadic relations, those of 
signs, or representamens, to their objects and interpretants. (CP 2.233)
As seen above, he had already established the general concept of the triadic 
relation to his satisfaction by the early 1890s (NEM4 307). This accomplished, 
he had now to distinguish between the three correlates associated by the 
relation, and he did so by defining them in terms of relative ‘complexity’. The 
three correlates are the representamen, the object and the interpretant. If any 
of the three is the simplest in nature, it is identified as the representamen, 
and therefore the first correlate; if any correlate of the relation is more 
complex than the others, it is the interpretant, while the object is of ‘middling’ 
complexity:
We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any 
triadic relation.
The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest 
nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not 
being a law unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.235)
The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most 
complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.236)
The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling 
complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being either mere 
possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second Correlate is of that same 
nature, while if the three are all of different natures, the Second Correlate is an 
actual existence. (CP 2.237)
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The passage not only reflects the ordering structure of triadic relations but 
also introduces the concept of the three ‘modes of being’, namely, possibility, 
existence and law in order of increasing complexity. These are given by the 
categories and Peirce employs them as criteria in the classification of signs to 
be discussed below. From this system of representamen, object and interpretant 
Peirce then establishes the sign relation:
A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate 
being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its 
Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined 
to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and 
for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some 
interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that 
have been much studied. (CP 2.242)
From this it follows that for all triadic relations the first correlate is the 
representamen. However, in the special case where the interpretant of a 
representamen is a ‘cognition of a mind’ then that representamen is a sign. The 
same idea is expressed in CP 2.274: ‘A Sign is a Representamen with a mental 
Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs.’ A sign, 
then, is a species of representamen, although as we now see, in this period Peirce 
employs both terms almost interchangeably. Either is the unit of representation 
as Peirce conceived the purpose of sign-action in 1903. The debate generated by 
the presence of both terms in various definitions of signs at this time has been 
vigorous, to say the least; however, discussion of it in this study is deferred to 
Chapter 2. Both terms appear in the definitions of 1903:
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, 
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which 
it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its 
three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any 
complexus of dyadic relations. (CP 2.274)
The triadic relation thus defined is obviously composed of a single sign, a single 
object and a single interpretant. It should be noted, nevertheless, that by virtue of the 
properties of triadic relations the third correlate, the interpretant, ‘is determined to 
be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some 
possible interpretant’ – in other words, while there is only one sign or representamen, 
and one object, the triadic relation guarantees a possible interpretant series as 
discussed above in the final section of the general philosophical background.
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Divisions of signs
Once the logical status of the sign and its two correlates has been established 
Peirce approaches the problem of identifying the divisions of signs from two 
distinct but related viewpoints and in both manuscripts. In the first text, R478, 
he introduces the problem with the following statement (in which the preferred 
term is ‘representamen’, but this is of no consequence):
Representamens are divided by two trichotomies. The first and most fundamental 
is that any Representamen is either an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol. Namely, while 
no Representamen actually functions as such until it actually determines an 
Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of 
doing this; and its Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its 
ever actually determining an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually having an 
Object. (EP2 273)
At this point Peirce envisages only two trichotomies of representamens or 
signs. Just why he should have considered the S–O trichotomy as the ‘first and 
most fundamental’ is obvious. It was ‘first’ for the simple reason that it was 
the division with which he had begun his research in logic almost forty years 
earlier in the mid-1860s. He held it fundamental in 1903, too, since at that time 
the sign was defined to represent an independent and usually absent entity, 
namely its object. It therefore follows that the sign’s mode of representation is of 
paramount importance for the identification of that object. He no doubt realized 
subsequently that the three possible subclasses of the sign itself had to be defined 
before he could define the three modes of representation in a logical manner. 
This became possible once the status of the sign within his theory of triadic 
relations was clearly established in the later manuscript (R540), together with 
the degrees of complexity characterizing its three subclasses. In the paragraph 
containing the extract quoted above he also applied the categories recursively 
to the icon and introduced the concept of the three ‘hypoicons’ (EP2 273–74), 
image, diagram and metaphor. These were accorded a special status in the 
Collected Papers in the form of a separate paragraph, CP 2.277, presumably on 
account of their very original logical status. However, a detailed discussion of 
the hypoicons is deferred to Chapter 4, where they are compared to relevant 
aspects of Peirce’s later semiotics.
The second trichotomy in the earlier manuscript, formed from the relation 
holding between the sign and the interpretant (S–I), distinguished between the 
three subdivisions of the symbol as Peirce conceived it in 1867: term, proposition 
and argument as presented in Table 1.1, and these are now, respectively, ‘simple, 
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substitutive signs’; ‘double, informational signs’; and, finally, ‘triple, rationally 
persuasive signs’ (EP2 275), their distinctive characteristics being indicated in 
this case more by number than category. However, Peirce was to define these two 
relational divisions more fully in the later manuscript (R540), and announced 
the final set in the following manner:
Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself is 
a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as 
the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign’s having some character 
in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an 
interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of 
possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. (CP 2.243)
To the two announced in the earlier text he has now added a third, non-
relational trichotomy and placed it in initial position in the sequence, thereby 
reflecting the order of correlates in the triadic relation defining the sign, namely 
S, S–O, S–I: in other words, the order holding between representamen, object 
and interpretant in the basic triadic relation was extended to that of the three 
divisions. By now Peirce had no doubt realized that it was not logically possible 
to propose a rigorous definition of the relations holding between the sign and 
its object and the sign and its interpretant without having first established the 
categorial nature and logical status of the sign itself.
This first trichotomy distinguishes between qualisign, sinsign and legisign, 
these being, respectively, signs which are simple qualities, singular, existent signs 
and, finally, general signs, signs which are laws or are rule-governed (CP 2.244–
246) and at the same time signs of laws. In order of growing complexity, they are 
realized as, for example, colours and feelings in the first case; an individual thing 
or occurrence, in the second; a regular sign such as the English definite article, 
or, indeed, any verbal sign, in the third. Peirce had already suggested that a sign 
by Thirdness ‘without Secondness would be absurd’ (EP2 270), and availing 
himself of the principle of degeneracy, he introduces at this point the concept 
of the replica: ‘Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, 
which may be termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word ‘‘the’’ will usually occur 
from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one 
and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica’ (CP 
2.246). Thus through the application of his categories he has established that a 
replica is an individual existent instance of the general sign: all language signs, 
for example, are manifested through replicas, for the general signs themselves 
are thinkable but unperceivable.
The Philosophy of Representation 29
The implication principle
What is now the second trichotomy distinguishes between icon, index and 
symbol. The interesting feature of this division is the principle by which the 
subdivisions lower down the categorial scale are integrated – ‘involved’ is Peirce’s 
term – into the higher in such a way as to account for the specificity of the class 
of signs and its peculiar ‘perceivability’ or materiality. In this way the icon is 
defined as a sign which refers to its object ‘merely by characters of its own’ (CP 
2.247) which it possesses irrespective of whether the object exists or not. The 
index, on the other hand, represents its object by virtue of a physical connection 
with that object. In that case it must somehow share some quality or qualities 
with that object, and, therefore, involves a ‘sort of icon’, the sign by quality: the 
index must have some quality or qualities making it recognizable which can 
be prescinded from it. For example, if we take a road-sign pointing to a nearby 
town as an index it is possible to prescind from it the quality of directionality, 
or in the case of an aria we prescind the tessitura quality of a soprano’s voice as 
we hear her singing. This is how Peirce describes the involvement of the icon in 
the index:
In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in 
common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the Object. 
It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and 
it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes 
it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object. (CP 2.248)
In similar fashion the symbol represents its object by virtue of some law or 
general convention – by ‘an association of general ideas’ in Peirce’s terms – but 
it can only be interpreted by means of the instances it determines. This is how 
Peirce describes the implication principle as it concerns the symbol:
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, 
usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol 
to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or 
law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica … There must, 
therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must 
here understand by ‘‘existent’’, existent in the possibly imaginary universe to 
which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or 
other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort 
of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any 
means true that the slight effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for 
the significant character of the Symbol. (CP 2.249)
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It follows from this that if the symbol involves a sort of index, and the index a sort 
of icon, then at two removes a symbol, too, will by transitivity involve a sort of icon. 
For example, any Halt sign by a road junction is only one of a thousand such signs 
in any given country. It represents by its very existence the general law determined 
by the government, and is therefore a replica of that general injunction. As a replica 
it has indexical status in that it is placed in the exact position where the motorist 
is enjoined to stop his vehicle. In addition, it is only recognizable as a Halt sign by 
virtue of its distinctive characteristics or qualities – shape, colour, height, its verbal 
elements etc. In short, it also involves an icon: in this case Thirdness involves a 
Secondness which involves Firstnesses. This implication, or involvement, principle, 
which is sanctioned by the phenomenology, is an important characteristic of 
Peirce’s conception of signs in this period, and concerns all three divisions.
The second trichotomy of R478 is now the third of R540, and distinguishes 
between rheme, dicisign and argument. The first is a sign of qualitative 
possibility; it is understood, says Peirce, as representing ‘such and such a kind of 
possible object’, and although it may provide information, it is not interpreted as 
doing so (CP 2.250). This is the case with any common noun or verb: on their 
own the words book, wife or give tell us nothing, they simply denote classes of 
objects or processes, and are neither true nor false. The dicisign or dicent sign, 
on the other hand, was defined in the earlier manuscript as an informational 
sign, and is therefore a step up the categorial scale from the rheme: I gave my 
wife a book, for example, is an informational sign. It can be either true or false, 
although dicisigns always represent themselves to be true representations of 
events or facts, otherwise communication would be impossible. It is a double 
sign with a ‘syntax’ which associates two elements: a subject and a predicate, or, 
paraphrasing statements in R478, an index and an icon (cf. CP 2.310). Finally 
the argument, or triple sign, is any inference, of which three principal forms – 
abduction, deduction and induction – are examined in the critic branch of 
the philosophy of representation. It is a triple sign as it generally involves two 
premisses and a conclusion as in any syllogism (CP 2.309).
The ten classes of signs of 1903
The final feature of speculative grammar is the ultimate goal of all Peirce’s 
work in this branch, the identification of classes of signs. Having defined the 
sign and its correlates, organized them into trichotomies and then subdivided 
these according to categorial distinctions, Peirce is able to extract from the 
resultant nine subdivisions ten classes of signs according to the complexity these 
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subdivisions exhibit. Table 1.2 summarizes the system of three trichotomies 
established by Peirce in 1903, while the three categories serve as the criteria on a 
scale of increasing complexity.
Table 1.2 is based upon a scheme to be found in Peirce’s ‘Logic Notebook’ 
and is reproduced as Figure 1.2. This shows how Peirce established the relations 
between the various subdivisions and so identified the ten classes.
The rules drawn by Peirce in Figure 1.2 are simple. First, two vertical 
lines associating three subdivisions form a class. For example, the first class, 
the qualisign, is obtained by tracing the leftmost pair of vertical lines from 
qualisign to rheme through icon. Similarly a second class is obtained by tracing 
from sinsign to dicisign through index, yielding a dicent (indexical) sinsign, a 
photograph for example. Finally, a third vertical trace leads from legisign to 
argument through symbol, yielding an argument. At this point we note that 




Thirdness Legisign Symbol Argument
Secondness Sinsign Index Dicisign
Firstness Qualisign Icon Rheme
Figure 1.2 Extract from R339, 239v (H450)
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there are redundant indications in some signs and so they are dropped in the 
final terminology. For example, since the two vertical lines lead necessarily 
from qualisign to icon to rheme, naming the latter two is superfluous; similarly, 
as the two vertical lines show, an argument can only be linked to a symbol and 
from the symbol to the legisign, so there is no point in mentioning either of 
the latter two in the designation. Similarly since the tracing from sinsign to 
dicisign necessarily passes through the index, mention of the latter is again 
superfluous.
The second rule allows a downward diagonal trace from right to left, going 
from the more complex subdivisions to the less. For example, it is possible to 
trace a class from sinsign to icon, which necessarily leads to rheme. This yields 
the iconic sinsign, ‘a sign by likeness purely’ (EP2 294), where mention of the 
rhematic status of such a sign is superfluous. Similarly, tracing from legisign to 
index to rheme yields the rhematic indexical legisign, a personal pronoun, for 
example. Note that since each stage in this particular tracing is on a different 
complexity level from the earlier, it has to be mentioned in the designation. 
In this way Peirce was able to extract ten such classes, which he numbered in 
order of relative complexity. His triangular table is to be found in paragraph 
CP 2.264, while there is a much clearer representation on page 296 of Essential 
Peirce Two. For completeness they are given as follows and can easily be traced 
in Figure 1.2: 1, qualisign; 2, iconic sinsign; 3, rhematic indexical sinsign; 4, 
dicent sinsign; 5, iconic legisign; 6, rhematic indexical legisign; 7, dicent 
indexical legisign; 8, rhematic symbol; 9, dicent symbol; 10 argument. As a 
conclusion to the discussion of the ten classes we examine three examples from 
the subdivisions of Peirce’s ‘first and most fundamental’ trichotomy, since this 
is the best known of all. The first is an eighteenth-century drawing of the river 
Thames (Figure 1.3).
This image is composed of lines, shapes and, in the original, muted colours 
– all qualities. It is an example of a sign by likeness or similarity, and on it we 
recognize human figures, trees, buildings, boats and a river. It is thus what is 
generally referred to simply as an icon, although the term ‘icon’ itself is not a 
complete classification. As it is a sign by likeness alone it cannot offer proof of 
the existence of the objects it depicts, and if translated into a sort of proposition, 
its structure would be represented as ‘—is like this’, where the dash means 
‘something, possibly’ and the ‘like this’ is the pictorial representation: there may 
have been something with the qualities depicted but the image cannot prove 
this. However, as a class the image on its own is to be identified as an iconic 
sinsign – it must be inscribed on some sort of medium, here paper, otherwise we 
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should be unable to perceive the qualities composing it. That paper medium is 
an existent object, hence the image is a sinsign. Continuing the analysis we note 
that it has a caption: Cheyne Walk, London. If we take this complex indexical 
proper noun into account, the syntactic structure of the sign is double and has 
the structure of a proposition: a complex index functioning as the subject plus 
an icon as predicate. The syntax of this more complex sign is now ‘Cheyne 
Walk, London, is like this’, where ‘this’ is the pictorial representation. Since the 
index is composed of verbal signs, it is necessarily a legisign or a replica of one. 
The complete sign of image plus caption composes a dicisign, namely a dicent 
indexical legisign.
Now compare Figure 1.4, a photograph. On its own as a photograph, it is a sign 
by physical connection with its object: the entities represented in the photograph 
have projected rays onto the film in the camera, thereby determining the visible 
patterns of light and shade on the print. In this case, the photograph is a type of 
index. However, if it is an index and hence a sign with its own existence, the object 
of the photograph must also be an existent object, which makes the photograph an 
informational sign, with a ‘double’ syntax (CP 2.309). This is how Peirce explains the 
informational capacity of the photograph: ‘A better example [of an informational 
index] is a photograph. The mere print does not, in itself, convey any information. 
But the fact, that it is virtually a section of rays projected from an object otherwise 
Figure 1.3 Cheyne Walk, London, © Museum of London Picture Library.
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known, renders it a Dicisign’ (CP 2.320): the section of rays, he says, constitutes 
the quasi-subject of the photograph’s propositional structure while the print itself 
is its quasi-predicate. In this case we classify the image in Figure 1.4 as a dicent 
(indexical) sinsign (the photograph was a ‘one-off ’ at a particular, never-to-be-
repeated time and in a particular place). Note, however, that if we take the verbal 
caption into account, this more complex sign contains instances of legisigns, here 
a place-name, and the photograph plus caption is classified in this case, too, as the 
replica of a dicent indexical legisign.
 (1.1) Today we have naming of parts
Finally, the symbol. Utterance (1.1) is a verbal sign, composed of indices, namely 
the deictics Today and we, the preposition of, the invisible present tense marker 
of the verb have, and the plural marker –s. In addition, there are three symbolic 
elements, the verbs have and name, and the noun parts – these are signs by 
convention if only because we have to learn what they mean. The utterance is 
an informational sign as it is composed of a double syntax associating a subject 
and predicate. In terms of the class to which it belongs, it is the replica of a 
dicent symbol and is therefore more complex than the two images with their 
captions.
Figure 1.4 At the Summer Palace
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Summary and discussion
In the light of the principles established in the preceding sections we can now draw 
up an inventory of the major characteristics of the grand logic, characteristics, 
therefore, of the philosophy of representation of 1903. Within this system the 
sign had a central function and position, being the determination of a single 
object and in its turn the determinant of a single interpretant, although the 
interpretant being conceived as a sign itself at this time determined a series of 
subsequent interpretant-signs. Together with his new science of phenomenology 
Peirce’s logic of relations provided a set of criteria for the definition of the sign in 
the form of triadic relations composed of three correlates which Peirce identified 
as representamen, object and interpretant, a sign in this system being defined as 
a representamen with a mental interpretant, and also the unit of representation: 
‘I call that which represents, a representamen. A Representation is that relation 
of the representamen to its object which consists in it determining a third (the 
interpretant representamen) to be in the same relation to that object.’ (R491, 
1903).
To the original single ‘first and most fundamental’ trichotomy defining 
the icon, index and symbol Peirce added two more: first, the constitution of 
a separate sign-interpretant relational division to accommodate the term (now 
rheme), proposition (now dicisign) argument division which had earlier formed 
three subdivisions of the symbol in the original trichotomy of the mid-1860s; 
second, a division for the sign itself, distinguishing qualisign, sinsign and 
legisign in order of increasing complexity.
Peirce’s phenomenology, which made the three categories of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness that it defined independent of the logic, and by 
being ‘outside’ logic, were eligible to constitute the criteria for the subdivisions 
of the new, three-division typology. Thus by following a strict hierarchical rule 
according to which a subdivision could only be associated with a subdivision 
of equal or lower phenomenological complexity, the three divisions S, S–O 
and S–I, in that order, yielded ten classes of signs. Moreover, the principle of 
categorial degeneracy made it logically possible for a symbol to involve a ‘sort 
of ’ index, and an index to involve a ‘sort of icon’, and therefore by transitivity, 
for a symbol, too, to involve at two removes a sort of icon, a principle which, 
as Jakobson first observed in a paper of 1965,19 underwrote the principle of 
language motivation and the theory of iconicity. What we conclude from this is 
the pervasive influence of the phenomenology on the theory of the sign at this 
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time, and how its principles seemed to hold what might seem disparate features 
of the theory together.
However, this logically perfect and complete system was soon to be expanded 
and made to coexist with another, more complex system for at least two major 
reasons. First, the ten classes, although fully functional, were a meagre haul 
for a logician wishing to identify as many types of signs as possible, and these 
were all that could be obtained from the three correlates of the triadic relation. 
Second, in the following extract from the Minute Logic, Peirce is describing 
an earlier version of the grand logic and its three branches: obsistent logic 
(critic), originalian logic (speculative grammar) and, finally, transuasional logic 
(speculative rhetoric): ‘Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is 
substantially what goes by the name of methodology, or better, of methodeutic. 
It is the doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other 
Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine’ (CP 2.93, 1902). As we 
shall see, development of the interpretant system from 1904 on, together with the 
less prominent role of the sign in what Peirce was to call ‘semiosis’, neutralized 
the notion that a sign could ‘aim’ to determine anything at all, and it was to cede 
its primacy as a determining agency to the object.
One indication of the intense intellectual activity to come concerning the 
sign and its two correlates can be gathered from the definitions researchers have 
found of the sign over the long period of Peirce’s work on it, approximately from 
1865 to 1911. Robert Marty, for one, found seventy-six different definitions in 
the period,20 while John Deely, in an appendix to his presentation at the 2014 
Charles S. Peirce Centennial Congress, amended this number to eighty-five.21 
For Marty twenty-seven of the seventy-six definitions were recorded up to 1903, 
while thirty-four of Deely’s eighty-five occur within the same period of almost 
forty years. This means that in each case almost two-thirds of the definitions 
were composed in the eight-year period after 1903. Allowing for the fact that for 
roughly fifteen years up to the mid-1880s, when Peirce came to reappraise the 
importance of the index, his research into signs took relatively little of his time, 
and also for the fact that several of the definitions from 1906 and 1907 come 
from single manuscripts (R793 in 1906 and R318 in 1907, for example), it is 
nevertheless clear that Peirce subjected the 1903 systems as described above to 
a very rigorous theoretical review. It is to this reappraisal of the systems that the 
following chapters are devoted.
Finally, readers wishing to turn to other accounts of the theoretical 
development of Peirce’s thinking on semiotics in the period described above 
would do well to consult some or all of the following: Atkin (2010), an exhaustive 
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internet page in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the development of 
Peirce’s conception of semiotics from beginning to end; Fisch (1986: 321–55), 
Freadman (1996), a chapter in a collection of Peirce papers delivered at the 
Charles S. Peirce Sesquicentennial Congress in Harvard in 1989; Liszka (1996), 
although now over twenty years old, is still the best all-round introduction to 
Peirce’s signs-systems, and is especially interesting on the period described 
above; Houser (1992), a general overview of the material discussed in the second 
part of the chapter, written by a philosopher and not by a semiotician; Short 
(2007), a wide-ranging discussion of all aspects of Peirce’s theory of signs and 
includes material from the later period. Note, in this respect, that they are mainly 
hybrid descriptions: they associate concepts from later statements with those 
made in 1903, a strategy which, for purposes of comparison, I have avoided in 
this chapter.

This chapter traces some of the ways in which Peirce’s triadic conception of sign-
systems came under considerable pressure during the years following the Lowell 
Lectures, principally between 1904 and 1907, and examines the theoretical 
developments which occurred in this period, their contribution to the pioneering 
features of the later sign-systems and, ultimately, to the problematic status that 
befell the speculative rhetoric/methodeutic branch of the general philosophy. 
Since the chronological approach has been adopted throughout this study, the 
transitional period from 1904 to 1907 is examined from the point of view of 
the various sign-systems Peirce developed prior to what constitutes a veritable 
semiotic revolution.1
From a methodological point of view, the chapter will examine material year 
by year from 1904, finishing with a discussion of a specific set of denominations 
of interpretants from 1907. However, this essentially chronological approach 
will, on occasion, require that material from later years be adduced in support of 
ideas advanced in earlier ones. There are many important texts – manuscripts, 
correspondence, published papers etc. – from this period which merit discussion, 
but since this is not a general introduction to Peirce’s philosophy for reasons of 
clarity and economy I have chosen to prioritize one major text and a relevant 
classification per year.
It might be asked why we should bother to examine any of these classifications 
in detail. The reasons are simple. First, in the four and a half years between 
August 1904 and December 1908 Peirce established in letters, drafts and the 
Logic Notebook no fewer than twelve different, mainly complete, typologies – 
an amazing number – whereas in the almost forty-year period between 1866 
and 1903 there was only one complete classification system – his single-division 
‘first and most fundamental’ trichotomy – and none of significance from 1909 
on, surely testimony to the considerable experimentation undertaken by Peirce 
in the period to which this chapter is devoted.
2
The Transition
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Second, in their often very diverse ways, these typologies yield important 
insights into the way Peirce’s conception of sign-action developed between the 
two major statements on signs of 1903 and 1908, which is why a comprehensive 
sample from the Logic Notebook has been included as an appendix. Moreover 
such an analysis enables us to follow closely Peirce’s own methodology, namely 
definition and division in the exemplary manner of a zoologist. The chronological 
approach is primordial as the well-known 1903 system has to vie with the later 
one from 1908 as a typological instrument, and it is of theoretical interest to 
track the stages by which the later emerged from the earlier: this can be seen 
from a comparison of selected typologies. In short, while Chapter 1 finished with 
Table 1.2, which set out the ten classes obtained from his 1903 triadic definition 
of the sign, the present chapter takes over from there, but the classifications, 
which in all but one case are set out in tabular fashion, differ significantly in that 
there are no longer just three correlates in his new conception of the action of a 
sign, but six.
Third, and most importantly, there is Peirce’s testimony as to the importance 
of these classifications in his logical researches. Anticipating the discussions of 
the texts from which they have been extracted, we should consider the following 
statement:
My excuse for not answering the question scientifically [that those signs that 
have a logical interpretant are either general or closely connected with generals] 
is that I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of 
clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential 
nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too 
vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer. (R318 119, 1907)
There is no mistaking Peirce’s research project here – it is to identify all 
possible varieties of signs. He doesn’t mention classifications as such at this 
point, nor does he give a single typology of consequence in the text ‘Pragmatism’ 
from which the quotation is drawn. It is nevertheless by a complex process of 
definition and division and with the subsequent classification of the results 
that Peirce saw his task as a logician. Should there be any doubt as to this, the 
following statement from a letter to William James echoes the first, but in more 
detail: ‘My classification of signs, however, is intended to be a classification 
of possible signs and therefore observation of existing signs is only of use in 
suggesting and reminding one of varieties that one might otherwise overlook’ 
(EP2 500, 1909). The letter outlines the projected grand logic, the remnants 
of the philosophy of representation, here referred to as his ‘System of Logic’, 
and Peirce is describing yet again the field of speculative grammar.2 Finally, it 
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should be noted that alterations made on the classifications by Peirce in the 
Logic Notebook, for example, concerning, principally, the denominations of the 
interpretants, and deemed of theoretical interest, are included in ‘barred’ form: 
for example, proper signified Interpretant, where the label ‘proper’ has been 
struck out in the manuscript.
However, before examining the definitions and the typologies they generated 
during this period the general scene is set by this astonishing judgement from 
Peirce on his work on the classification of signs to be found on the page dated 1 
November 1909, in his Logic Notebook:
During the last 3 years I have been resting from my work on the Divisions of 
Signs and have only lately – in the last week or two been turning back to it; 
and I find my work of 1905 better than any since that time, though the latter 
doubtless has value and must not be passed by without consideration. Looking 
over the book labelled in red ‘‘The Prescott Book’’, and also this one, I find the 
entries in this book of ‘‘Provisional Classification of 1906 March 31’’ and of 
1905 October 13 particularly important from my present (accidentally limited, 
no doubt) point of view; particularly in regard to the point made in the Prescott 
Book 1909 Oct 28 and what immediately precedes that in that book but is not 
dated.
Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to define the difference between 
Icon, Index, & Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction as 
to the Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign. (R339 360r (H674))
What is striking about these remarks is that only a year earlier Peirce had 
confidently presented his six and ten divisions in a letter to Lady Welby dated 23 
December, and had spent the days following working feverishly on attempts to 
organize the latter set. His remarks pertain specifically to the Logic Notebook, 
judging by the references to the typologies of 31 October 1905, and 31 March 
1906, which seemed particularly important for their methodology and notational 
conventions, and one can only suppose that he had forgotten the 1908 letter to 
Lady Welby and the subsequent drafts in his portfolio. Surprisingly, too, the page 
also testifies to his dissatisfaction, some 40 years after having first introduced it, 
with aspects of the trichotomy defining the icon, the index and the symbol. The 
note continues thus:
The amount of labour still required upon the ten trichotomies of signs (and 
more than these ten I don’t enquire into, not because I don’t think they are in 
truth there, but simply because it will be all I possibly can do to define and to 
prove these ten) is enough of itself to occupy the ten ± years of efficient thinking 
that may remain to me if no accident cuts them short. (R339 360r (H674))
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We can therefore conclude that six years after the Lowell Lectures on 
logic, Peirce was still not satisfied with his work on the classification of signs: 
his methodology of definition and division had even at this late date not 
produced results that satisfied him (if any would). This chapter therefore 
also seeks to investigate possible reasons causing this dissatisfaction – the 
intellectual restlessness which characterizes much of Peirce’s work is insufficient 
justification – and it holds that these can reasonably be found in the typologies 
he developed during the period between the Lowell Lectures of 1903 and the 
revolutionary set of definitions and divisions set out in the letter of 23 December 
1908, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
1904
In spite of the fact that there are a number of texts of interest to a study of the 
development of Peirce’s logic at this time, the main thrust of this section of the 
chapter concerns the letter to Lady Welby dated 12 October 1904: it offers an 
important definition of the sign and an accompanying six-division classification, 
and therefore makes a useful starting-point to the chapter. Rather in the manner 
of R478 (EP2 267–72), discussed in Chapter 1, the letter begins with a detailed 
account of the categories which leads naturally to the definitions. This in itself is 
of interest as the definitions of the sign and the twenty-eight or sixty-six classes 
to which it can be assigned as described in the letter dated 23 December 1908, 
on the other hand, are prefaced by a detailed discussion not of the categories, but 
of three universes and their modes of being.
Two objects
In 1904 Peirce was led to expand the set of correlates involved in the action of 
a sign and, with this expansion, to envisage a corresponding amplification of 
the number of divisions of signs it made available: therein lay two theoretical 
problems he was never quite able to resolve, namely the problem of reconciling 
in a single typology two distinct types of trichotomy, one involving relations 
between correlates and one involving the correlates themselves, and that of 
establishing their order of occurrence in the classification. An early account of 
what this expansion involved can be seen in the introduction to the typology 
which he proposed to Lady Welby in the October 1904 letter, although he doesn’t 
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seem to have mentioned the possibility of this initial hexadic system generating 
twenty-eight classes of signs:
I am now prepared to give my division of signs, as soon as I have pointed out 
that a sign has two objects, its object as it is represented and its object in itself. 
It has also three interpretants, its interpretant as represented or meant to be 
understood, its interpretant as it is produced, and its interpretant in itself. Now 
signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their relations to their 
objects, and as to their relation to their interpretants. (CP 8.333)
An initial problem to be addressed, then, is what might have led Peirce to 
expand the original correlate system in this way. One possible explanation 
concerns traditional accounts of the sign and the two objects. Peirce notes on 
several occasions that past logicians have generally recognized two objects, as 
in this extract from the ‘Pragmatism’ text: ‘But all logicians distinguished two 
objects of a sign; the one, the Immediate object or object as the sign represents it, 
(and without this a sign would not be a sign); the other Real object, or object as it 
is independent of any particular idea representing it’ (R318 373, 1907).3 He adds 
to this as an afterthought a remark which, if taken independently of his attempts 
in this particular set of notes to use the semiotics as his proof of pragmatism, we 
would find particularly sibylline: ‘Of course, many signs have no real objects.’
As with his use of the term ‘representamen’, as he originally called the sign, 
the adoption of the two objects could be accounted for by his acquaintance 
with the philosophy of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas 
Reid, through his knowledge of Sir William Hamilton’s edition of his work. The 
following is a suggestive sample of Reid’s discussion of cognition quoted by 
Deledalle (2000: 133):
The Leibnitio-Wolfians […] distinguished three acts in the process of 
representative cognition: 1° the act of representing a (mediate) object to the 
mind; 2° the representation, or more properly speaking, representamen, itself as 
an (immediate or vicarious) object exhibited to the mind; 3° the act by which 
the mind is conscious immediately of the representative object, and, through it, 
immediately of the remote object represented. (Reid 1863: 877n.)
The terminology and concepts in this short extract are echoed in similar, if 
not identical, fashion by Peirce in his discussions of the sign and its two objects: 
‘representative object’ and ‘remote object’ correspond, respectively, to what 
Peirce refers to in the letter to Lady Welby as the ‘object as it is represented’ and 
the ‘object in itself ’, and thus, respectively, to what he most frequently refers to 
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as the sign’s ‘immediate’ and ‘dynamic’ (also ‘dynamical’, or ‘dynamoid’) objects. 
In view of the preceding remarks, it is thus possible to conclude that Peirce was 
led to adopt the two objects through respect for a philosophical tradition which, 
according to Short (2007: 179–80), can be traced back to the Stoics.4 Peirce 
himself had already used the expression back in 1868.5 A justification for just 
two objects beside the three interpretants is to be found in the efforts to deduce 
his pragmatism from his semiotic theory:
As I said above, the object is the idea or thing that the sign finds, the meaning 
what it leaves. The immediate object resembles the emotional meaning in being 
common to all signs, and also in being subjective. The real object corresponds 
to the existential meaning very obviously. Plainly, the reason for there being a 
third meaning but no third object must be grounded in the essential differences 
between the relations of the two correlates of the sign. The object is antecedent, 
the meaning subsequent to the sign. That third meaning, therefore, must be in 
some sort of future tense. (R318 677–79, 1907)
There is, nevertheless, a more logically justified reason for establishing the two 
objects and three interpretants in 1904,6 involving three important interrelated 
concepts, namely, the complexity structure of the triadic relation within which the 
sign operates and is exemplified in the correlate order of Representamen, Object 
and Interpretant of any triadic relation; the three categories – which Peirce had 
just defined anew in considerable detail in the letter to Lady Welby quoted earlier; 
and, also, the notion of ‘degeneracy’ within the categories discussed in Chapter 
1. These were not new ideas in 1903, as Peirce had already developed the idea of 
degenerate grades in a ‘Guess at the Riddle’. However, there is an intriguing entry 
in the Logic Notebook on the verso side of the page dated 10 July 1903 (R339 
239v (H449)), although more likely to have been added at a date presumably later 
than 7 August 1904 (R339 240r (H451)), in which Peirce gives the genuine and 
degenerate forms of the icon-index-symbol division and the genuine and two 
degenerate forms of the rheme-dicent-argument division (Table 2.1).7
There are two things of importance to note here. First, genuine-degenerate 
categorial distinctions are used to define the subdivisions of the typology. 
With respect to the object, the letter A serves to indicate the ‘degenerate’ 
form in the first division and what is presumably in this period the ‘doubly 
degenerate’ form in the second, although Peirce doesn’t mention the term. B 
is the genuine form in the first division and the degenerate in the second. C is 
the genuine form in the sign-interpretant division, while B is the degenerate 
form and A is the doubly degenerate form (indicated as ‘Dedegenerate’ in the 
final line). Second, rather in the manner of the quotation from EP2 275 (below) 
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Table 2.1 The typology of August 1904?
August 1904? 239v (H450)  
B Icon   B Index   B symbol
are Icon Index Symbol
in the genuine sense
A Icon   A Index   A Symbol
are Icon Index Symbol
in the degenerate sense
C Rheme   C Dicent  C Argument
are Rheme   Dicent   Argument
in the genuine sense
Rheme is represented in the proper signified Interpretant as if a Quality  
of the Object
Dicent is represent [sic] in the signified Interpretant as if in a Real Relation to its 
Object
Argument is represented in the signified Interpretant as if it were a Sign
Rheme professes to describe a quality
Dicent has two terms professing to describe Quality & Existent
Argument has 3 terms professing to be Major Quality, Minor Existent, Middle Sign
B Rheme   B Dicent   B Argument
are Degenerate Rheme Dicent Argument
B Rheme determines its interpretant formally by definition making it one sign
B Dicent determines its interpretant by force
B Argument determines its dynamic interpretant by its being represented as doing so
  B Dicent has to be asserted  C Dicent may be asserted
A Rheme   A Dicent   A Argument
are Dedegenerate Rheme Dicent Argument
NB probably follows 7 August 1904
Peirce associates the interpretants with the subdivisions of the two relational 
trichotomies he had now defined, although here rhemes, for example, 
are defined to be represented in the signified and dynamic interpretants, 
whereas in R478 a member of a given subdivision may have an element from 
another subdivision as its interpretant, for example, the index may have an 
‘Individual [Singular] Symbol’ for its indirect Interpretant (EP2 275). The 
denominations of the interpretants have changed – but the principle is more 
or less the same. Moreover, there is no division corresponding to the sign on 
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the table. Nevertheless, even without the sign another notable feature of the 
table is the order of presentation of the correlates Peirce is using as criteria 
for the classification of the sign: the genuine precedes the degenerate form, 
which, with respect to the single interpretant in this case, precedes the doubly 
degenerate; another is the fact that the attempted typology deals with the 
classes of signs from 1903. In later typologies Peirce replaces this method 
of deriving subdivisions by divisions obtained by a combination of the six 
correlates themselves and four relational criteria, each subdivided by either 
of three modes of being, although Peirce may have conceived of a possible 
hexadic expansion of the original triadic relation as early as 1903, as Short 
has suggested:
Composed largely in one month, the ‘Syllabus’ shows a swift development of 
thought; for example, in the third section, signs are divided by two trichotomies, 
but in the fifth section, a third trichotomy is introduced and placed in first 
position […]. In fact, several other trichotomies are suggested in the fifth section 
as well, although this seems not to have been noticed. (2007: 237)
Short doesn’t enlarge on this statement. However, the idea that Peirce was 
thinking of further trichotomies in 1903 is supported not so much by the 
discussion of the various triadic relations in the fifth section of the Syllabus 
as, rather, by a reference to three interpretants – immediate, imperfect and 
indirect – in the earlier third section.
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since 
its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may 
have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be 
an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an 
Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol for 
an imperfect Interpretant. (CP 2.294, 1903)
This brings us to the interpretants, accounting for the emergence of which 
is more problematic. Whether by tradition or, more likely, as a result of Peirce’s 
personal theory of the action of a sign, it is clear that the representamen and 
the two objects were established philosophical concepts in his system in 
1903.8 The three interpretants, on the other hand, were completely innovative. 
Furthermore, as can be seen from the surprising remarks quoted above from 
the Logic Notebook concerning the ten divisions (R339 360r (H674)), they 
also had to be defined and proved. In view of the terminological hesitations 
characterizing the various descriptions of the interpretants we cannot be sure 
that he was ever able to do this to his satisfaction. Here again, as before, it is the 
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combination of the theory of the categories together with the ordering and the 
relative complexity of the three correlates of 1903 that suggests the emergence of 
the three interpretants: ‘It is now necessary to point out that there are three kinds 
of interpretant. Our categories suggest them, and the suggestion is confirmed 
by careful examination’ he wrote in 1907 (R318, 251). To this should be added 
a description of the correlates from a relational perspective to be found in the 
same series of variants, in which the third interpretant is seen as a future tense:
If there are three interpretants and only two objects, – the object and the 
interpretant being the correlates of every sign, – the reason of this discrepancy 
can only lie in some difference between the relations of the Object and of 
the Interpretant, respectively, to the Sign. The object is the antecedent, the 
interpretant the consequent of the sign. The reason sought must, then, be in 
this, that the interpretant is, in some sense, in a future tense, relatively to the sign, 
while the object is in a past tense. (R318 381, 1907)
Even later he writes to Lady Welby that it is the definition of the sign that 
determines what the three interpretants are like: ‘Your ideas of Sense, Meaning, 
and Significance seem to me to have been obtained through a prodigious 
sensitiveness of Perception that I cannot rival, while my three grades of 
Interpretant were worked out by reasoning from the definition of a Sign what 
sort of thing ought to be noticeable and then searching for its appearance’ (SS 
111, 1909). For whatever reasons he was led to establish three interpretants 
it is important to note that the letter to Lady Welby included a relatively full 
description of a new hexadic formula for the classification of signs. Table 2.2 sets 
out the gist of the typology proposed by Peirce in the letter and, like Table 2.1, is 
of interest for the way it reflects the innovative direction his conception of signs 
was taking.
The hexad of 1904
Returning now to the letter itself it is interesting to note that after having detailed 
the six new divisions Peirce paradoxically completes his presentation of the 
material set out in Table 2.2 with the recapitulation of the ten classes obtained 
from the 1903 Lowell Lectures. He seems not to have envisaged either in the 
letter or in the Logic Notebook the possibility of generating twenty-eight classes 
of signs. He recapitulates the ten classes, too, in the postscript to the draft of 
28 December 1908 (CP 8.376), which suggests not only that he was far from 
satisfied with his work on the ten divisions but also that he found the original 
10-class system logically complete and correspondingly more satisfactory.
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Table 2.2 The six-division typology of October 1904
12 October 1904    Letter to Lady Welby   CP 8.334-8.339
As it is in itself, a sign is
of the nature of an appearance = qualisign
an individual object or event  = sinsign
of the nature of a general type = legisign
In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects
Icon  sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of its own internal 
nature
Index  sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real 
relation to it
Symbol  sign determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be 
so interpreted
In respect to its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of quality, of an existent, 
or of a law
In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, 
or an Argument
A sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways:
1st, an argument only may be submitted to its interpretant
2nd, an argument or dicent may be urged upon the interpretant by an act of 
insistence .
3rd Argument or dicent may be and a rheme can only be, presented to the 
interpretant for contemplation
In its relation to its immediate interpretant, I would divide signs into three classes as 
follows:
1st, those which are interpretable in thoughts or signs of the same kind in infinite series
2nd, those which are interpretable in actual experiences
3rd, those which are interpretable in qualities of feelings or appearances
The typology, like that of Table 2.1, maintains the subclasses of signs from 
1903  – qualsign and icon, for example – but here includes a division for the 
sign itself. The order in which the divisions are presented and set out for 
purposes of comparison as Figure 2.1 is the same as that in Table 2.2,9 an order 
which led Hardwick to remark that the ordering of the first and third of the 
three interpretant trichotomies differed from the one Peirce seemed to prefer 
(SS 35n22). Indeed the orderings displayed on the two tables above are the only 
examples to be found either in the correspondence or in the Logic Notebook. 
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We note, too, that the terminology concerning the interpretants is identical to 
that in Table 2.1 and that the order in which they figure in the typology seems 
similarly to be determined by phenomenological complexity. Of the three 
interpretant trichotomies, the final one, S-Ii, was dropped, presumably because 
Peirce realized that neither the Oi nor the Ii divisions can be relational as he 
subsequently considered the correspondence between them as a sort of ‘mirror 
image’ of each other (not Peirce’s term): the immediate object representing 
the dynamic object and the immediate interpretant being the sign’s inherent 
interpretability (SS 111), and as such a necessary ‘semantic reflection’ of the 
former according to the sign’s particular mode of being.10
1905
Sign
Although this section deals with material from 1905, this year and the following 
one could easily have been taken together as the relevant texts overlap with 
respect to the theoretical material they contain. These are a draft dated by 
Hardwick as July 1905 (SS 189–94), a manuscript R793 from 1906 which 
presents a striking similitude to the 1905 draft, the relevant pages from the Logic 
Notebook and an important text from 9 March 1906. The draft of 1905 begins, 
as was the case in the Lowell Lectures and the 12 October 1904 letter to Lady 
Welby, with a discussion of the categories (‘My three categories appear always 
more clear to me’ (SS 189)), as a theoretical springboard for a presentation of 
the sign. His discussion of the ‘three grades of structure’ of what he now calls the 
‘phaneron’– Primans, Secundans and Tertians – leads him to define the sign in 
terms of active and passive correlates:
A “Sign” is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation r, to a purely active correlate,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be [in?]11 a dyadic
 relation, S, to B, the relation S corresponding in a recognized way to the 
relation r.
(SS 192)
S, S−Od, S–Oi  S−If, S−Id, S−Ii
Figure 2.1 The six divisions of 1904
Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and the Philosophy of Representation  50
The importance of this definition is that the idea of sign-action being a process 
of representation is now replaced in this formal statement by the expressions 
‘stands in a dyadic relation … and also in a triadic relation’: we see Peirce here 
moving from the rigid triadic definition of a relation as in 1903 to this more 
dynamic conception of sign-action involving an active-passive constraint, surely 
evidence of a movement away from the sign as a substitute, ‘standing for’ its object.
Representamen
Moreover, according to the definition S, a relation, is different from A, defined 
as the sign. This corresponds to remarks that Peirce then makes in the draft 
concerning the concept of the ‘representamen’, a long-standing source of 
contention among Peirce scholars and enthusiasts. He begins by introducing 
the preferred terminology: ‘I use “Sign” in the widest sense of the definition. 
It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost 
the exact sense of the scientific definition’ (SS 193) and then goes on to add: ‘I 
formerly preferred the word representamen. But there was no need of this horrid 
long word. On the contrary, it requires some stretching to cover such imperative 
ejaculations of drivers, as, “Hi!” or “Hullah” …’ (SS 193). He adds a little later in 
the draft that ‘I thought of the representamen as taking the place of the thing; 
but a sign is not a substitute’ (SS 193). The whole draft seems thus to suggest 
that during this period Peirce was beginning to realize that the correlates were 
independent, each with its own specificity and function, and that sign-action 
was to be represented as a truly dynamic process, positions confirmed by R793 
and the draft of 1906.
Why should the concept of the representamen create a theoretical problem? 
The confusion turns on what scholars consider to be a sign and how it relates 
to the representamen. We have already referred to Peirce’s 1903 definitions 
concerning triadic relations, which are composed of representamen, object and 
interpretant in order of increasing complexity (CP 2.235–237), and to the rider 
that ‘A Sign is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of 
a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied’ (CP 
2.242). In 1903 the sign was clearly a species of representamen, representamens 
also being the first correlates of triadic relations which do not necessarily have 
mental interpretants. However, some Peirce scholars advance the idea that the 
sign is, like semiosis, a process or relation in which representamen, object and 
interpretant participate as its three correlates. This is essentially the position 
adopted by Merrell, who writes:
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Peirce’s sign sports three components (Figure 2.1). What usually goes for sign in 
everyday talk Peirce called a representamen. He did so in order to distinguish 
the representamen from the other two sign components, that, as we shall note, 
can become signs in their own right. The representamen is something that enters 
into relation with its object, the second component of the sign …. The third 
component of the sign is the interpretant. (2001: 28)
Merrell’s Figure 2.1 represents the sign as a rotor-type three-way structure 
with the three ‘components’ branching from a central hub. Quite apart from the 
dubious nature of the idea that the object can also become a sign, the passage 
and illustration clearly assimilate the sign to the entire triadic relation and 
consequently to what Peirce was later to define as the process of semiosis. This 
is essentially the idea advanced in Deely (2014), who doesn’t state unequivocally 
that the sign has the representamen as one of its components, but quotes 
Benedict (1985), who does:
The undeniable use for “representamen” in semeiotic is to be the name of one of 
the three branches of the triadic relation. The other two branches have names; 
i.e., object and interpretant. The remaining branch frequently, nay, almost 
universally, has been called sign. However, that is really poor form! The word 
“sign” should be reserved for the triadic relation. Refusal to do this has generated 
and perpetuated a source of ambiguity that has been unnecessarily deceptive. 
(1985: 265–66)
I suggest that the source of ambiguity has been perpetuated by scholars who 
have not paid sufficient attention to Peirce’s post-1903 theory of the sign, and 
to the 1905 draft in particular. For his part, Benedict was clearly indulging in 
a piece of wishful thinking: ‘Concerning the matter of reinstating the term 
[representamen], there seems to be an undeniable use for the term in semeiotic. 
Of course, this assumes that the connotation of “sign” includes its being a triadic 
relation’ (1985: 265). He has proved nothing but has neglected the later writings, 
drafts and correspondence. For, by this time, Peirce must have been beginning 
to think of the nature of the association of the six correlates and of the process of 
‘semeiosy’, (CP 5.473, 1907) or semiosis, which he introduced in 1907 as being 
the cooperation of three subjects, a sign, its object and its interpretant:
It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical action, 
or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two 
subjects [whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the 
other patient, entirely or partially] or at any rate is a resultant of such actions 
between pairs. But by ‘semiosis’ I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, 
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which is, or involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, 
and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable 
into actions between pairs. (CP 5.484, 1907)
This strongly suggests that the scholars mentioned above, and many others 
no doubt, have confused sign and semiosis, to the mystification of the newcomer 
to Peirce’s semiotics. By this time Peirce preferred the term ‘sign’ and was in 
the process of replacing the sign’s representative function (‘a sign stands for 
…’) by one of mediation. The temporary rejection of the representamen was 
surely representative of a shift of perspective in Peirce’s view of sign-action. The 
rejection of the term was indeed temporary, for in 1911, in a projected article 
titled ‘A Sketch of Logical Critics’ (R675), Peirce was to return to the concept of 
the representamen, attributing to it a slightly different logical status, one akin to 
the distinction made between symbols and their replicas in 1903, with the sign 
nevertheless retained as a species of representamen:
In the first place, a “Representamen’’, like a word, —indeed most words are 
Representamens, – is not a single thing, but is of the nature of a mental habit, it 
consists in the fact that something would be. The twenty odd thes on an ordinary 
page are all one and the same word, – that is, they are so many instances of a single 
word. Here are two instances of Representamens: “—killed—”, “a man”. The first 
of several characters which are each of them either essential to a sign’s being truly 
called an instance of a Representamen or else necessary properties of such an object 
is that it should have power to draw the attention of any mind that is fit to "interpret" 
it to two or more "Objects" of it. The first of the above examples or instances of 
representamens has four objects; the second has two. (R675 39–40, 1911)12
In view, too, of the fact that by now Peirce had expanded the original triadic 
relation to what was effectively a hexad, the concept of the representamen 
defined as the first correlate of a triadic relation was presumably no longer 
operative. With this final remark regarding the possible reasons for Peirce’s 
rejection of the concept of the representamen, we turn to the manuscript R793. 
This particular set of pages seems to have been transitional between the 1905 
draft and that of 1906, since it shares feature of each. What it has in common 
with the 1905 draft is the reference to the phaneroscopic ‘grades of structure’, 
namely the Primans, Secundans and Tertians on which Peirce constructed 
the very formal definition of the sign given above. It shares with the draft the 
definition of sign-action as a sign which is passive in relation to the object but 
active in relation to the interpretant (R793 2). It also, more anecdotally, contains 
the same jocular reference to seme, the Italian for seed, from canto XXXIII of the 
Inferno: Ma se le mie parole esser den seme13 (SS 194, 1905; R793 14,14 c. 1906), 
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which seems to have been a cue for Peirce to introduce terminology which was 
to figure prominently both in the 1906 paper ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for 
Pragmaticism’ and the later, 1908 hexadic typology to be discussed in Chapter 
3: ‘seme’ which he associated with ‘pheme’ and ‘delome’ in 1906 as alternatives 
to the original rheme-dicent-argument triad, and introducing the terms ‘type’ 
and ‘token’ which were to figure prominently in the later typologies on the same 
page (SS 194).15 We return to R793 below with the discussion of the equally 
important draft of 9 March 1906. In the meantime, to complete this discussion 
of Peirce’s theorizing in 1905 we examine the typology for 13 October 1905, 
Table 2.3, one of the two which still found favour with him in the passage from 
the Logic Notebook of 1909 quoted earlier in the chapter. We know that Peirce 
was much occupied by classification systems during this period.16
Perhaps the most important feature of Table 2.3 is the fact that by 1905 the 
six correlates yield a total of ten divisions capable, although Peirce seems not 
Table 2.3 The typology of 13 October 1905
13 October 1905     262r     (H497)
A Nature of Sign in itself
Abstraction = Qualisign
Existent = Sinsign
Combinant Type = Legisign
B Of Object
a Immediate
In what form Object is represented in Sign { Indef./ Sing. /General as far as 
affects Form of Sign
b. Dynamical
α Nature of Object in Itself {Abstraction/Concrete/Collection
β Cause of/How Sign is/being determined to represent obj  
Causation of sign's representing Obj
C Of Interpretant
a Immediate
In what form interpretant is repr. in sign
As far as it affects form of sign {Interrog/Imper./Significat.
b Dynamical
α Nature of Interpretant in Itself
As far as this affects Nature of sign {Feeling/ Fact/ Sign (? Sign.)
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to have mentioned the possibility at the time, of generating sixty-six classes 
of signs, whereas the earlier typology in Table 2.2 was restricted to a possible 
twenty-eight. We note, too, that the order of presentation of the correlates differs 
considerably in 1905. In the letter of 12 October 1904, for example, the order for 
the two objects and the three (standardized as ‘immediate’, ‘dynamic’ and ‘final’) 
interpretants was S–Od, S–Oi, S–If, S–Id, S–Ii, in which the order of occurrence 
seems still to be dictated, like the material in Table 2.1 above, by the perceived 
phenomenological complexity of the correlate in question: the dynamic object 
is somehow genuine and therefore considered to be phenomenologically more 
complex than the immediate, which, by definition, can never represent it other 
than partially; and in this view, the final interpretant is genuine, the dynamic 
degenerate and the immediate doubly degenerate. What we find in Table 2.3, on 
the other hand, is ‘correlate’ order: the sign division comes first, followed by the 
two objects, and, finally by the three interpretants. However, within this order 
the immediate precedes the dynamic and the dynamic the final, which suggests 
that Peirce was already adopting the order of semiosis which characterizes the 
order  the sign’s correlates in the hexadic typology of 23 December 1908.17
By July 1905 the genuine-degenerate distinction had been replaced by a set 
of Greek letters, making the whole system more abstract. This is presumably 
one of the reasons why the typology found special favour with Peirce in 1909, 
together with the fact that it defined ten divisions. It is significant, too, that 
the descriptions of the various divisions are organized hierarchically from 
‘form’ to ‘nature’ to ‘connection-combinant’, early realizations of the distinction 
between quality-possibility, existent and generality-necessitant characteristic of 
the later modes of being. Furthermore, the terminology employed to identify 
the correlates was beginning to take its final form: immediate and dynamic 
are relatively stable from now on, while the final interpretant, identified as 
β Cause of sign being determined to affect/ being represented
Causation of Sign's affecting Interp. {Sympathy/Compulsion/Representat.
c Representative
α In what form sign is represented in Interpretant
As far as this affects form of sign,
β Causation of representation of Sign by Interpretant
As far as this affects nature of the Sign,
γ Rationale of Connection between Sign and Object effected by Interpretant
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the representative interpretant in Table 2.3 was to be the object of a series of 
terminological hesitations. Finally, the typology in Table 2.3, unlike the two 
previously discussed classifications, offers tentative subdivisions for each of the 
criteria: qualisign, sinsign and legisign remain from 1903, but, surprisingly, icon, 
index and symbol have disappeared as subdivisions. Other divisions anticipate 
the typologies of 1908: Bbα, for example, has the subdivisions Abstraction, 
Concrete, Collection, which later become the subdivisions corresponding, 
respectively, to the three universes to which the dynamic object can belong.
1906
A new definition of the sign
We review Peirce’s transitional description of the sign and its interpretants in a 
draft to Lady Welby dated 9 March 1906, before discussing one of the complex 
classifications the system generates.18 In this, probably the most detailed and 
coherent exposition of his mature theory of semiotics, the several sheets 
devoted to logic occur towards the middle of a 55-page draft from the Peirce 
correspondence RL463 (pages 26–33 in the manuscript with pages repeated) 
in which Peirce discusses, at times quite sternly, a ‘pragmatoidal’ poem from a 
volume that Lady Welby had sent him, British and American diction (‘spoken 
dialects’) and spelling reform, while the relevant passage is sandwiched between a 
brief introduction to the Existential Graphs and a longer description of the Graphs 
illustrated by diagrams. In the following passage he first defines the sign in a 
radically different way from before and introduces the two objects, after which he 
proceeds to describe functional aspects of the three interpretants in relative detail. 
The resultant manner in which signs are now classified is no less radical, and has 
important implications for the third branch of the philosophy of representation, 
for a theory of communication and, indeed, for the ecology of signs:
I use the word ‘‘Sign’’ in the widest sense for any medium for the communication 
or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by 
something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant 
or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order rightly 
to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In order 
that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should 
have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the communication; 
and it is necessary that there should be another subject in which the same form 
is embodied only as a consequence of the communication. The Form, (and the 
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Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is 
quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object 
of a sign can be nothing but what the sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order 
to reconcile these apparently conflicting Truths, it is indispensible to distinguish 
the immediate object from the dynamical object. (RL463 26–27, 1906)19
This definition of the sign, in a manner not dissimilar to that of the letter of 
12 October 1904, introduces the two objects at the same time as the sign. This 
was not an isolated case of Peirce defining the sign as a medium: ‘All my notions 
are too narrow. Instead of ‘‘Sign’’ ought I not to say Medium?’ (R339 293r, 1906). 
As noted by the editors of EP2 this was a prominent feature of Peirce’s research 
into and on the sign in 1906.20 See, too, Robert Marty’s discussion of the seventy-
six definitions of signs.21 The following extracts are from manuscript R793:
For the purposes of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the 
communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything possessing 
consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality of all our feeling 
should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, 
quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determination as to forms of the 
kind communicated.
As a medium, the Sign is in an essentially triadic relation, to its Object which 
determined it and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the 
Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is 
brought about by an effect upon the sign, the Object remaining unaffected a 
circumstance otherwise expressed by saying the Object is real. On the other 
hand, in its relation to its interpretant the Sign is active, determining the 
interpretant without being itself thereby affected. (R793 1–2, 1906)22
These very radical, and indeed prophetic, definitions raise a number of 
interesting questions. What, for example, are we to understand by a sign being 
a medium? What, too, are we to understand by the form that is communicated 
from the object to the interpretants? And what are the ‘subjects’ that appear for 
the first time in a definition of the sign? The following paragraphs address these 
questions in turn.
Medium
Peirce is using the term ‘medium’ both literally as a mediating element in the 
hexadic expansion of the original triadic relation, and metaphorically in the 
sense of ‘vehicle’, as an artist might, for whom media or vehicles such as oil and 
water bear pigments to make paint, while in Peirce’s case the sign is a medium or 
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vehicle bearing form to produce meaning. Examples of media that can convey 
forms extended by the object in this way are to be found everywhere, from the 
humble painter’s sketch-pad (Figure 2.2), blackboards, sound spectrograms and 
computer screens to the sorts of neon billboards and giant electronic hoardings 
outside department stores advertising the wares within: even human skin with 
branding signs and tattoos can function as a communicating medium according 
to the 1906 definition of the sign.
Figure 2.2 is a good, if simple, example of the way Peirce conceived the sign as a 
medium at this time. This is a portrait and is obviously far more easily followed as 
an example of the process of semiosis than, say, a written description of the same 
scene. It is also necessarily incomplete as only readers of this study can register 
and account for any interpretant effects that the sign has on them. If we ‘go behind 
the frame’ and ignore the fact that we are looking at a photograph, and describe 
the situation as artist and model experience it, we can see how the sign functions 
as a medium. We identify the dynamic object as the sitter. The immediate object 
functions as a ‘filter’ and is the determinant of the incomplete representation of 
the model’s face being sketched on the sheet of paper, while the sign, as Peirce 
described it in 1906, is the particular sheet from the sketch-pad on which the artist 
is working. The artist, on the other hand, as we shall see, was not deemed by Peirce 
to play a logically significant role in the determining process at the time.
Figure 2.2 Artist, model and representation, Adobe Stock.
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Form
Now both the quotation from the 1906 draft and the extracts from R793 insist 
upon the fact that the sign is a medium for the communication of a ‘Form’. Peirce 
offers an explanation for this in a variant page 3 of the manuscript:
[That] which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the 
Interpretant is a Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a Singular thing were 
first in the Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must 
thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not 
necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing 
because its being is the being of a predicate. The Being of a Form consists in 
the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances something 
would be true. The Form is in the Object, entitavely as we may say, meaning 
that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which 
constitutes the Form is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may 
or may not be embodied entitavely, but it must be embodied representatively, 
that is, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon 
the interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under 
favorable circumstances. (R793 4–5)
Clearly, if what is communicated from the object to the sign is an existent, 
‘singular’, entity it would cease to be in the object once it found its way into the 
sign, and would cease to be in the sign as soon as it inhered in the interpretant. 
This is the basis of Peirce’s rejection of the term ‘vehicle’ as a correlate in a triadic 
relation, for we find a certain hesitation in Peirce’s usage of the term. In the 1905 
paper ‘Issues of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences’, for example, Peirce also 
introduces the definition of the sign as a medium of communication, proceeds 
to give an extended analysis of the term from the point of view of the active-
passive correlate relations introduced in the definition of the sign in the 1905 
draft above and justifies his reasons for not conceiving the sign as a vehicle at this 
time by suggesting that the transmission of a fever by a mosquito functioning as 
a vehicle is not a valid triadic relation since the ‘entity of a zymotic disease’ can’t 
be in two places at the same time (EP2 391, 1905).23 However this rejection is 
not consistent, see for example, CP2.231 from 1903, CP 5.547 and CP 5.599–601 
from 1905 and CP 4.6 from 1906, and in any case, doesn’t apply to form.
Continuing the discussion of form we see that it is necessarily a quality: 
that ‘monadic element of the world’ (CP 1.426, c. 1896) and consequently the 
only category of being that can be simultaneously embodied in sign, object and 
interpretant. In the abstract, the only forms that can be thus communicated 
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are monads, dyads and triads, or combinations thereof. This is Peirce’s earlier 
description of them ‘… the logical categories of the monad, the dyad, and the 
polyad or higher set … are categories of the forms of experience’ discussed in 
Chapter 1 (CP 1.452, 1896). These are the basic forms structuring, for example, 
the predicates of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, the various subdivisions 
defined in all of his classificatory divisions and are, indeed, to be found 
throughout the logic. Media defined by the 1906 statement above simply need 
to be perceivable and to accommodate such forms emanating, of course, from 
the dynamic – or what Peirce sometimes called the ‘real’ – object (e.g. CP 2.310, 
1903).
Subject
The question of form in the definition of the sign from the draft of 9 March 
1906 raises the further question: what are we to understand by the ‘subjects’ in 
the following extract from the quotation: ‘In order that a Form may be extended 
or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a 
Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should 
be another subject in which the same form is embodied only as a consequence 
of the communication’ (RL463 26)? By the term ‘subjects’ here Peirce is referring 
to the correlates involved in semiosis, namely the object, the sign and the 
interpretant (he identifies the utterer and the interpreter as two quasi-minds, 
who are in no way subjects in the process). This in itself is interesting since, as 
in another 1906 text, ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ (e.g. CP 4. 
546), he is already anticipating with this terminology later definitions of the sign 
in which the correlates are subjects which can be referred, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, to one or other of three universes as opposed to the categories of 
1904 and earlier.
But the draft, with its insistence on the communication of a form, is also 
prophetic in another way. We today, since the work of Marshal McLuhan, see 
communication in terms of contemporary technology. In Peirce’s day some 
of the technological developments providing media were the rotary press for 
newspapers and mail-order catalogues, the photograph and the telegraph, 
together with Muybridge’s moving photography and Edison’s Kinetoscope 
which no doubt inspired him to conceive of his Existential Graphs as ‘moving 
pictures of thought’ (CP 4.8, 1906). For McLuhan what is communicated in a 
message – its ‘form’ in Peircean terms – is less important than the particular 
medium through which it is communicated ([1967] 2008: 8), and for McLuhan 
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the technology which functioned as the medium for the message even changed 
society – individual, family, work, leisure etc. In McLuhan’s case the technology 
included the telephone, TV and radio, for example, and these, he thought, 
had a unifying influence, creating a ‘global village’ ([1967] 2008: 156–57). 
Nevertheless, the formal configurations structuring the messages borne by these 
technological advances cannot be other than those defined as the monad, dyad 
and triad – Peirce’s categories of the forms of experience – irrespective of the 
specific medium communicating them.
The actual message may be less important than the medium conveying it, as 
McLuhan claimed, but what is signified by the message is a realization of one or 
other, or combinations, of the formal configurations defined by the categories 
of the forms of experience. Similarly, the media of today are supported most 
spectacularly by the internet: Facebook, LinkedIn and Skype, for example, offer 
not so much a global village as a global family or a global workplace. However, 
irrespective of the type of media, even in those of today, the ‘ratio’ of form to 
medium remains the same as when Peirce first defined it at the beginning of the 
last century.
The role of the object
It is clear that the definition of the sign from the 1906 draft implies a very 
far-reaching determination principle: the sign, before being uttered, has been 
antecedently ‘pre-formed’ by what Peirce was subsequently led to identify as 
the sign’s ‘partial objects’ and the relations holding between them. Whereas we 
might intuitively think that the structure of a well-known statement such as:
 (2.1) I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness
is determined spontaneously by the utterer, what Peirce is saying in the definition 
is that from a logical point of view it is the object composed of its partial objects 
and the relations holding between them that structure the sign. It follows, 
therefore, that the whole process of semiosis is ‘objective’ in the sense that the 
sole structuring ‘agency’ in the process is the dynamic object. This conception 
of sign-action has implications for Peirce’s philosophy of representation, for 
the speculative rhetoric branch in particular, for it means that a rhetorical 
component in the traditional sense becomes redundant within this expanded 
logic, since any inflections produced, even if they originate in some animate 
agent, can only enter the sign through the structure of the object, if we accept 
the definitions above and their implications. In other words, any such rhetorical 
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or methodological intention is not ‘added’ to the sign in any way by the utterer, 
but is part of the form communicated to, or extended in, the sign by the object 
and thence to the interpretants, most notably to what Peirce, in the draft refers 
to as the ‘intentional interpretant’. Any rhetorical or methodological intent the 
sign may convey, then, is, within this exposition of the general theory, already 
programmed in the complex form extended by the object.
Another way of putting this is that in 1906 there is nothing in the sign that 
hasn’t come from the object, or, rather, there is nothing in the immediate object, 
for which the sign serves as the support, that hasn’t been as though filtered 
from the dynamic object, and by defining the sign simply as a medium Peirce 
is separating the materiality of the sign from the functionality it had enjoyed 
previously; the sign has been ‘de-reified’, so to speak, from the monolithic status 
it had in 1903, no doubt as a result of Peirce’s having defined six correlates of sign-
action from 1904 on as opposed to the three from the period before. In other 
words, defining the sign as a medium frees it from the danger of the reification 
inherent in negligently classifying signs as icons or dicisigns, for example, for 
these are simply subdivisions.
The role of the utterer in 1906
In this same 1906 draft, true to the principle that psychological considerations 
have no place in logic, Peirce minimizes the influence of utterer and interpreter 
on the structure of the sign by invoking instead, as mentioned earlier, the very 
much more abstract concept of the quasi-mind he had introduced earlier in the 
draft. Quasi-minds – ‘theatres of consciousness’ as he puts it in 1907 (EP2 403) – 
are the indispensable agents of any semiosis since without them there wouldn’t 
be a sign in the first place;24 the commens itself being the most general ‘mind’ 
of all, the guarantor of every semiosis: ‘A sign is supposed to have an object or 
meaning, and also to determine an interpretant sign of the same object. It is 
convenient to speak as if the sign originated with an utterer and determined 
its interpretant in the mind of an interpreter’ (R11 1, 1903). Logically, however, 
neither utterer nor interpreter has any influence on the sign’s structure: it is the 
object which, in an older sense of the term, ‘informs’ the sign, moulding its 
structure in the process of semiosis.
Moreover, while it is obvious that for logical reasons and for reasons 
of commodity Peirce’s examples are generally verbocentric, this is not the 
motivation behind his choice of the term ‘utterer’ as the first of the two quasi-
minds. Consider this from the manuscript: ‘To signify that a person puts forth a 
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sign whether vocal, ocular, or by touch, —and conventional signs mostly are of 
one or other of these three kinds or by taste, smell, and a sense of temperature 
which are the media of many natural tests and symptoms, —I like the word 
utter’ (R793 14, 1906). Any artist, like the one in Figure 2.2, as an incarnation of 
Peirce’s utterer, is necessarily ‘outside’ the determination process; he is what for 
Aristotle was the ‘efficient’ cause: difficult as it may be for us to admit, according 
to Peirce’s conception of the sign as medium in 1906 it is the dynamic object 
which structures the representation on the sign, not the artist.25
The three interpretants
After having introduced the dynamic (Peirce’s term is ‘dynamical’, but for 
convenience the terminology has been standardized) and immediate objects 
and the sign itself, Peirce goes on to complete the description of the process by 
describing the three interpretants as follows:
There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the 
utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the 
interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, 
which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and 
interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place. 
This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, and must be, well 
understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign 
in question should fulfill its function. (RL463 29, 1906)26
In view of the fact that the interpretants are presented in the order of 
intentional, effectual and communicational, and that the communication of 
the form is from object to interpretant via the sign, the relations between the 
correlates as described in 1906 can be represented in the scheme in Figure 2.3, 
in which the arrow ‘→’ indicates that in the order of determination the correlate 
preceding determines the one following, which, it must be understood, has been 
reconstructed from the material in the draft:
Now the distinctions Peirce draws between the three interpretants are 
important for a number of reasons. To begin with, the logical disjunction between 
the intentional (i.e. immediate) interpretant as a determination of the mind of 
the utterer and the effectual (i.e. dynamic) interpretant as a determination of the 
Od Oi S intentional-I effectual-I communicational-I
Figure 2.3 Hypothetical reconstruction of the hexad in the 1906 draft
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mind of the interpreter is highly significant as it introduces what we might call an 
interpretive ‘differential’. Not only does the 1906 draft confine the sign’s structure 
to the objective nature of semiosis, but it also explains how signs can produce an 
effect or reaction which diverges from the one intended: if the two agencies or 
theatres of consciousness involved in the communication have widely differing 
experiences of the world, then the non-deterministic basis of Peirce’s semiotic 
theory explains those cases where the effectual interpretant is not congruent with 
the intentional. This latter distinction accords with an initially surprising remark 
made in a discussion of the symbol by Peirce in the letter to Lady Welby of 
October 1904, to the effect that the interpretant is a determination of the ‘field of 
the interpretant’: ‘I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic 
object only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon 
a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of 
its interpretant (that of which the interpretant is a determination)’ (CP 8.335).
In the verbal example (2.1) given above the addressee might signal surprise or 
commiseration by an appropriate facial expression or verbally thank the utterer 
for having made the remark, but might equally reply with an irritated Nonsense! 
or So what? These are all valid perceivable effectual interpretants, but only the first 
two would be congruent with the spirit of the utterance. Peirce had clearly found 
the need to account for the fact that interpreters interpret signs differentially, 
each according to their experience of the world. The field of the interpretant was 
a logical concept that accounted for this interpretative differential and reinforced 
the logical validity of an autonomous effectual interpretant. Moreover, the fact 
that interpreters can, and often do, dispute the event or situation represented 
by the utterance is proof of the viability of the ‘commens’: the sign has been 
interpreted, proving that the communicative process associating utterer and 
interpreter has functioned correctly in spite of any disagreement.
Finally, one further very significant consequence of the definition of the 
interpretants in this passage is that Peirce has broken with the more general 
description of the single interpretant of the 1903 system and, having defined 
three distinct interpretants, has assigned a specific function to each. Such a move 
is more than a simple attempt to characterize and name the three interpretants, 
it is a theoretical anticipation for the hexad of 1908, in which each as a ‘subject’ 
of semiosis can be associated with one or other of the three universes. This is a 
logical necessity as in 1908 the sign has to be classified according to the universes 
to which it, the two objects and the three interpretants happen to belong, evidence 
of the extreme theoretical tension to which the status of the interpretant in the 
original Sign–Interpretant branch of the grand logic was subjected after Peirce 
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Table 2.4 The typology of 31 March 1906
 31 March 1906 Provisional Classification of Signs  275r  (H521)
 A Sign is
in its own Nature
6   5 is either A Tone A Token or A Type
What has 
all its being 
whether it 
exists or not
Whose being exists in 
dyadic relations
whose being exists in 
the order of whatever 
may come hereafter to 
be or in the order that 
will be shown whenever 
certain kinds of action 
shall take place
in reference to its Immediate Object
8   6 is either Indefinite Singular or General Sign   *
in reference to the Nature of its Real Object
7 5 1/2 ? is either  Abstract Concrete or Collective    *
in reference to its relation to the Real Object
9   7 is either Icon Index or Symbol     *
in reference to its Intended Interpretant (1906 August 30 
Transpose first & third)
5   4 is either Positive Imperative or Interrogative
in reference to the Nature of its Dynamic Interpretant
 4 is either Poetic Stimulant or Impressive
  or excitant of 
  feeling  
  Eidoseme
or excitant of  
action  
Ergoseme
or determinant of a 
Habit  
Logoseme
in reference to its relation to its Dynamic Interpretant
 3 is either Sympathetic Compulsive or Rational
in reference to the Nature of its Normal Interpretant
 2 is either Strange Common or Novel
in reference to the Passion of its Normal Interpretant
 4 is either Substitute Suggestive or Argument
Suggestive Reactive
in reference to the Significance of its Normal Interpretant
 1 is either Monadic Dyadic Triadic       ??
had first envisaged it forty years earlier: not only do we have three interpretants 
but the commens draft actually ascribes a specific position in the sequence and 
recognizable function to each.
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To complete the discussion of the theoretical developments in Peirce’s theory 
of the sign in 1906 we examine Table 2.4. There are two major taxonomies 
in the Logic Notebook for 1906. Table 2.4 displays the one from 1906 which 
found favour with Peirce as seen in the remarks of 1909 quoted at the beginning 
of the chapter. Comparing this to Table 2.1 we have a far more sophisticated 
classification system. There are seven columns on the table. The first is composed 
of amends where Peirce has hesitated as to which number to attribute to a given 
trichotomy. The first five entries in column one are therefore corrections while 
column two displays his original numbering, though what the numbers refer to 
is a mystery as the trichotomies are displayed down the page in the now regular 
correlate order.
What theoretical advances are to be found on the table? First, much of the 
terminology is ‘progressive’ in the sense that the equivalent terminology of 1903 
has been replaced by terms only to be found in the later typologies: for instance, 
‘tone’ (or ‘tuone’, a blend of ‘tone’ and ‘tune’ as Peirce writes on the verso side 
of the sheet), ‘token’ and ‘type’ now stand for the original ‘qualisign’, ‘sinsign’ 
and ‘legisign’ found in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, and these are now defined in terms 
of their ‘being’, a term which anticipates the subdividing of the trichotomies 
with reference to universes as opposed to the categories of 1903. The earlier 
triad of rheme–dicent–argument is here represented as suggestive–reactive–
argument. From another point of view, the third trichotomy anticipates the 
subdivisions of the Od trichotomy on the hexad of 1908, which will be discussed 
in the following chapter. Furthermore, the trichotomy concerning the nature of 
the dynamic interpretant will later be replaced by sympathetic, percussive and 
usual signs, which are similar to the subdivisions represented here as those of 
the relation between sign and dynamic interpretant. Finally, the Greek-inspired 
terms ‘eidoseme’, ‘ergoseme’ and ‘logoseme’ were not employed again although 
Peirce was later to replace the term ‘representamen’ by ‘logon’ in a text of 1911 
(R675 39).
Just why Peirce should have included this as the second of the two typologies 
that he preferred in 1909 relates, presumably, to the sophistication of the table 
compared to earlier efforts. He has mastered the organization of the independent 
divisions, is relatively sure of his terminology, even though there are hesitations 
in the designations of the interpretants. However, that he was not entirely 
satisfied with the typology in 1906 can be seen from the logical transposition 
of ‘positive’ and ‘interrogative’ in the intended (elsewhere designated as the 
‘immediate’) interpretant, the three asterisks and the two question marks at the 
bottom of column seven.
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1907
1907 is important because Peirce introduces a new range of interpretants and thus 
paves the way in part for the theoretical innovations of 1908, and also because 
he is preoccupied by his theory of pragmatism and the need of what he calls in 
the text a ‘logical’ interpretant. The disparate sets of texts composing R318 are 
versions of a projected article on Peirce’s conception of pragmatism, an article 
which was never published (cf. Editors’ introduction, EP2 398). Interestingly, 
unlike his practice in the previous three years, the only classification system he 
offers in this important manuscript is verbal rather than the more usual tabular 
arrangement with its ten technical subdivisions. The only set of divisions to be 
found in the manuscript is that suggested in the passage below. The divisions are 
not identified as in the tabular versions examined above, although examples of 
the subdivisions in the divisions themselves enable us to divine an order.
Now how would you define a sign, Reader? I do not ask how the word is 
ordinarily used. I want such a definition as a zoologist would give of a fish, or 
a chemist of a fatty body, or of an aromatic body, – an analysis of the essential 
nature of a sign, if the word is to be used as applicable to everything which the 
most general science of sēmei’otic must regard as its business to study; be it of 
the nature of a significant quality, or something that once uttered is gone forever, 
or an enduring pattern, like our sole definite article; whether it professes to stand 
for a possibility, for a single thing or event, or for a type of things or of truths; 
whether it is connected with the thing, be it truth or fiction, that it represents, 
by imitating it, or by being an effect of its object, or by a convention or habit; 
whether it appeals merely to feeling, like a tone of voice, or to action, or to 
thought; whether it makes its appeal by sympathy, by emphasis, or by familiarity; 
whether it is a single word, or a sentence or is Gibbon’s Decline and Fall; whether 
it is interrogatory, imperative, or assertory; whether it is of the nature of a jest, or 
is sealed and attested, or relies upon artistic force; and I do not stop here because 
the varieties of signs are by any means exhausted. Such is the definitum which I 
seek to fit with a rational, comprehensive, scientific, structural definition, – such 
as one might give of ‘‘loom’’, ‘‘marriage’’, ‘‘musical cadence’’; aiming, however, 
let me repeat, less at what the definitum conventionally does mean, than at what 
it were best, in reason, that it should mean. (R318 585–89)
Most are recognizable from the examples: the first is, of course, the division 
concerning the sign, the subdivisions being identifiable as tone, token and type 
(or, according to the earlier nomenclature, qualisign, sinsign and legisign); this 
is followed by examples of the Oi division and examples suggestive of the S–Od 
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division composed of icon (‘by imitating’), index (‘being the effect of its object’) 
and symbol (convention or habit). This is followed by Ii (‘feeling’, ‘action’, 
‘thought’), then Id (‘sympathy’, ‘emphasis’, ‘familiarity’). This division is followed 
by the nature of the final interpretant (word, sentence, whole work) after which 
there is a break in the conventional order of the interpretants with a return to the 
division concerning the relation holding between sign and dynamic interpretant 
(here ‘interrogatory, imperative, or assertory’ as opposed to ‘suggestive/
interrogative’, ‘imperative’ and ‘indicative’).27 Finally, he introduces a division 
which is difficult to identify, but he anticipates a remark quoted from the Logic 
Notebook of 1 November 1909 concerning the fact that the ten outlined are not 
necessarily definitive, though what the others are we are not told.28 The last of 
the series above is a possible candidate.
The logical interpretant
If the formal classifications are neglected in R318, there is, nevertheless, a set 
of interpretants which are dealt with quite extensively in the manuscript, and 
this identifies in order of increasing complexity the emotional, energetic and 
logical interpretants.29 As with some other concepts developed by Peirce – the 
representamen is a notorious case – this series has caused much debate among 
commentators, dividing them essentially into three groups, as the following 
quoted remarks suggest. Since the purpose of this chapter is to follow the 
evolution of Peirce’s conception of sign-action, the divisions of 1907 and the 
theoretical discussions they have provoked require attention. Briefly, the problem 
concerns the relation between this triad of interpretants and the one considered 
his final statements on the matter, namely the series described in a letter to Lady 
Welby identifying the destinate (immediate), the effective (dynamic) and explicit 
(final) interpretants, the first two of which had already figured in taxonomies 
examined above, the last being termed ‘signified’, significant’, ‘representative’, 
‘normal’ and ‘eventual’. In a letter dated 14 March 1909 he informed his English 
correspondent that:
My three grades of Interpretant were worked out by reasoning from the 
definition of a Sign what sort of thing ought to be noticeable and then searching 
for its appearance. My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each 
Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My 
Dynamical Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation 
and is different in each from that of any other; and the Final Interpretant is 
the one interpretive result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the 
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Sign is sufficiently considered. The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, 
consisting in a possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is a single actual event. 
The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends (SS 111)
The series immediate–dynamical–final can thus be taken as Peirce’s last word 
on the subject (he describes them in more or less the same terms in another 
letter of 14 March 1909, to William James, CP 8.314, where we find ‘dynamical’ 
for ‘dynamic’ and where the final interpretant is also referred to as the ‘ultimate’), 
and the problem raised by the series from R318 is whether or not it adumbrates 
the later or somehow exists as a ‘parallel’ triad. One initial attempt to integrate 
the 1907 series, emotional, energetic and logical is in Savan 1988, in which the 
author sees the triplet as realizations of the dynamic interpretant (1988: 55). On 
the other hand, Short describes the relation between the two in the following 
manner:
Much of this effort [the introduction of several divisions of object and 
interpretant] was directed toward providing principles for a sign taxonomy, 
developed in those same years.
We can see in that taxonomy … that he needed two quite different trichotomies 
of interpretant. One, following from the teleological structure of semeiosis, 
pertains to each sign: the immediate interpretant is a potentiality in which consists 
the sign’s interpretability; the dynamic interpretant is any interpretant actually 
formed (from zero to many); and the final interpretant is another potentiality, the 
ideal interpretant of that sign the interpretative purpose. The other trichotomy 
is an application of Peirce’s phaneroscopy and distinguishes among signs: an 
emotional interpretant is a feeling or 1st; an energetic interpretant is an action or 
2nd; and a logical interpretant is a 3rd, being a thought or other general sign or a 
habit formed or modified. An immediate interpretant may be either emotional, 
energetic, or logical, and so also dynamic and final interpretants may be of any 
category, actually or potentially. A sign’s final interpretant, for example, is that 
potential feeling or potential action or potential thought, habit-change, and so 
on, that would best satisfy the purpose of interpreting that sign. (2007: 178)
For Short, then, the two series exist independently of each other but not in any 
form of conflict: the final one described in the letter to Lady Welby quoted above 
is teleological in nature; the second, from R318, is based upon Peirce’s categories. 
This conception of the two series has been contested, notably by Lalor (1997), a 
paper which was based upon earlier expositions of Short’s position. Lalor, as the 
following extract shows, conceives of the two series in terms of subordination 
and superordination, the one expounded in R318 (1907) being a special case 
of the later, more general series of 1909. Writing when R318 was still dated as 
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a manuscript of 1906, he describes the situation as follows: ‘My thesis is that 
the emotional/energetic/logical classification is a special case of the immediate/
dynamical/final one. More specifically, the 1906 trichotomy reflects the concrete 
human case, the human experience of semiosis, while the 1909 trichotomy is 
more abstract and lends itself to a characterization of semiotics generally’ (1997: 
34–35). For Lalor, then, the classification of the interpretants as emotional, 
energetic and logical reflects an anthropomorphic way of looking at semiosis, 
while the later one lays down a general structural pattern which includes the 
former (1997: 35).
Finally, Bergman (2009) adopts what can be seen as a conciliatory position: 
both series are held to be realizations of a more general, formal series based, as 
Short has it, on the categories: the macro-level with its immediate–dynamical–
final series makes available a formal ‘format’ susceptible of various realizations, 
while the emotional–energetic–logical series reflects Lalor’s ‘anthropomorphic 
way of looking at semiosis’:
Instead of arguing that the more general of the divisions of interpretant identified 
by Peirce is the genus, both trichotomies may be seen as special cases of a formal 
triad of first, second, and third interpretant … Consequently, the immediate-
dynamical-final division may be seen as a description of the macro-level of sign 
action, while the emotional-energetic-logical division primarily characterizes 
the concrete field of human interpretation. (2009: 123–24)
Judging by the wealth of contributions to the issue (only three of which have been 
quoted above, but there are many others), this is clearly a matter of considerable 
philosophical interest, but for a semiotician these distinctions are difficult to 
admit. It doesn’t seem logical to imagine that in a single process of semiosis there 
should be available two distinct series of interpretants, as the extract from Short 
2007 seems to suggest, or in the other cases as a choice between one based on the 
categories and the other based upon some teleological realization of a higher, more 
abstract formal interpretant system. Interpretants can only be ‘generated’, so to 
speak, by a sign, itself determined by two objects: for a given semiosis, there can be 
only one series of interpretants, not two in parallel or two in succession. Moreover, 
the idea of human semiosis alone involving the emotional–energetic–logical triad 
is reminiscent of the remark that Peirce makes concerning the difference between 
sign and representamen, namely that ‘A Sign is a Representamen with a mental 
Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs’ (CP 
2.274, 1903). There is another way of looking at the series from R318, one which 
corresponds to the purpose of this chapter.
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Consider, first, the context in which the series occurs. As mentioned above, 
the texts composing R318 are versions of an article on Peirce’s conception of 
pragmatism. Peirce defines it thus: ‘Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism 
is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of 
things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and 
of abstract concepts’ (R318 15). Second, as far as I have been able to ascertain, 
R318 is the only text in which this particular interpretant series occurs: the 
logical interpretant, which has engendered most discussion, is a ‘local’ and 
chronologically limited concept, and there is no reason not to suppose that, as 
this chapter seeks to demonstrate, like the other series examined above, this one 
is part of Peirce’s evolving conception of the interpretant which results in the 
triad of 1909. This hypothesis can be substantiated by an examination of this 
long extract from one of the (often disparate) variants to be found in R318 (it 
corresponds roughly to CP 5.475):
But all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign; the one, the Immediate 
object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this sign would not be 
a sign); the other Real object, or object as it is independent of any particular 
idea representing it. Of course, many signs have no real objects. We turn to the 
interpretant, to see whether there is any corresponding distinction; and we find 
that in place of two, there are three different interpretants. First, there is the 
“emotional interpretant”, which consists in a feeling, or rather in the quality of 
a feeling. It is sometimes formed into an image, yet is more usually merely a 
feeling which causes the interpreter of the sign to believe he recognizes of [sic] 
the import and intention of the sign. A concerted piece of music, for example, 
brings a succession of musical emotions answering to those of the composer. 
This is an extreme case; usually the emotional interpretant consists merely in a 
sense, more or less complex, perhaps amounting to an image, perhaps not, of the 
meaning of the sign. All signs whatsoever must, in order to fulfill their functions 
as signs, first of all produce such emotional interpretants. Next, many signs bring 
about actual events. The infantry officer’s word of command “Ground arms!” 
produces as its existential interpretant, (the sign having been first apprehended 
in an “emotional interpretant”,) the slamming down of the musket-butts. The 
less thought intervenes between the apprehension and this act, the better the 
sign fulfills its function. All signs that are not to evaporate in mere feelings must 
have such an existential interpretant, or as I might perhaps better have called it, 
such an energetic interpretant. These two interpretants correspond to the two 
objects of a sign. The emotional interpretant, immediately produced by the sign, 
corresponds to the immediate object. The existential, or energetic, interpretant, 
corresponds to the real object whose action is obscurely and indirectly the active 
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cause of the sign. But now there is a third interpretant, to which no object of the 
sign corresponds. It is what we commonly call the meaning of the sign; but I call 
it the logical interpretant, or logical meaning the sign. Obviously there is such 
an interpretant; for the definition of the term aims to give it; and every vigorous 
mind feels that such a definition, though aiming at the thing, hardly hits the 
bull’s-eye. In rare cases it may; but as a general rule, it hits the target, but not the 
bull’s-eye. (R318 373–79)
Here Peirce first defines the two objects, designated as ‘Immediate’ and 
‘Real’. He then turns to the interpretants, identifying them in turn as the 
emotional, the existential or energetic and, finally, the logical. In the course 
of this description he establishes correspondences between the emotional 
interpretant and the immediate object, and between the energetic interpretant 
and the real object. This in itself is surprising as it suggests that a piece of 
concerted music – or an air played on a guitar, another example Peirce gives – 
has no real object, only an immediate one, and can only produce or generate 
an immediate interpretant in the form of a feeling, whence, in 1907, the term 
‘emotional’ interpretant. Similarly, commands such as the well-known ‘Ground 
arms!’ example are determined by a ‘real’ object and determine both an 
emotional and an energetic interpretant, in this case the slamming-down of the 
musket butts. At this point, as was noted earlier in the chapter, he introduces 
the even more surprising notion that there is a third interpretant ‘to which 
no object of the sign corresponds’: concepts have no object but determine all 
three interpretants. This is surely evidence that Peirce was still feeling his way 
through the problem of the interpretant sequence that he had introduced at 
least three years earlier, and that his thoughts on the problem were far from 
complete: he realized that a concept couldn’t have an existent object but, rather 
a class, and he presumably began to think in terms of necessitant objects. In 
the case of the logical interpretant his explanation is as follows: ‘Of what kind 
are signs which determine “logical interpretants”? They are exclusively such 
as embody and convey thought proper, whether in the form of the concept, 
or in that of the meaning of a proposition, or in that of the force of a reason, 
or argument’ (R318 385–87). At this time, then, Peirce was restricting the 
third interpretant, whether we call it signified, representative or logical, to 
determination by thought, a type of sign which determined all three types 
of interpretant. The resultant hierarchical relations between object, sign and 
interpretant as conceived by Peirce in at least one variant of the intended article 
are set out according to Table 2.5, in which concepts and intellectual thoughts 
are shown not to have an object at all.
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What, if the explanation above is to be accepted, do we make of the ‘ultimate’ 
logical interpretant? This was, after all, an attempt to prove his version of 
pragmatism: ‘Moreover, since pragmatism, in my view, relates to intellectual 
concepts exclusively, and since these are all general, the mental element we seek 
must be general. The principal general constituents of the mind are desires and 
habits’ (R318 409). The only possible conclusion to any sequence of interpretants 
of the logical type is a habit or change in existing habits, and this is the role Peirce 
attributed at this time to what he conceived as the ultimate logical interpretant:
Shall we say that this effect may be a thought, that is to say, a mental sign? No 
doubt, it may be so; only, if this sign be of an intellectual kind – as it would have 
to be – it must itself have a logical interpretant; so that it cannot be the ultimate 
logical interpretant of the concept. It can be proved that the only mental effect 
that can be so produced and that is not a sign but is of a general application is a 
habit-change; meaning by a habit-change a modification of a person’s tendencies 
toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions 
of his will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds of cause. (R318 67–69)
This is not, however, Peirce’s final word on the interpretants, and as suggested 
earlier, these concepts are not found elsewhere either in an earlier or later text. They 
were the bases of his attempt to prove his pragmatism but belong, with the others 
from previous taxonomies, to this transitional period between 1903 and 1908.
Summary and conclusions
The sign is defined no longer as a form of representation ‘standing for’ 
something else as a substitute. In 1906 Peirce breaks with the earlier conception 
of the sign and now defines it as a mediating agency between the objects and 
Table 2.5 A tabular summary of objects, signs and interpretants from R318
Object Sign Interpretant
Intellectual concept, thought Logical
Energetic
Emotional
Real The command 'Ground arms!' Energetic
Emotional
Immediate Concerted piece of music Emotional
The Transition 73
the interpretant sequence which they mediately determine. As a consequence, 
it is the object which occupies the semiotic centre of influence, so to speak. 
The only thing which can be communicated to the interpretants from the 
dynamic object via the sign is the qualitative entity, form: were the influence 
of the object an existent of some sort, it would no longer remain in the object 
once it had been communicated to the sign – a semiotic impossibility. Form 
is thus the only structured entity which can be embodied simultaneously 
in objects, sign and interpretants. His temporary rejection of the concept 
of the representamen in 1905 is perhaps indicative of this movement from 
representation to mediation.
Within the various classifications discussed above and others in R339, the 
order of determination is that of the triadic relations established in 1903. In 
the first two hexadic taxonomies, we have S, Od, Oi, If, Id, Ii. After intensive 
work on the classifications between 8 October and 13 October in 1905 Peirce 
increased the number of divisions from six to ten, albeit with varying names for, 
principally, what is elsewhere in this study referred to as the Final Interpretant, 
and altered the ordering of the six correlates to S, Oi, Od, Ii, Id, If.
Of the three interpretants, the final is the most unstable over this period, being 
referred to as the signified (1903, 1904); the significant and the representative 
(1905); and the normal, eventual,30 communicative and habitual (1906).31 
However, as seen above, this series terminates with the problematic and much 
disputed ‘logical’ interpretant with which Peirce sought to prove his version of 
pragmatism by means of his logic in 1907. We note, too, that he develops the 
idea, already present in 1903 and earlier, that the interpretant is a sign – see the 
terminology used for the final interpretant throughout the series. We end this 
long chapter with a quote from Short 2004:
The fundamental revolution in doctrine that occurred in 1907 was to 
have recognised that it is the habit itself, and not a concept of it, that is the 
interpretant (more precisely, the ultimate logical interpretant) of a concept. 
Verbal interpretants and verbal definitions, Peirce then said, are “very inferior to 
the living definition that grows up in the habit.”
The revolution of 1907 is, then, a revolution in Peirce’s pragmatism as well 
as in his semeiotic. In both, it is a step away from a too extreme intellectualism. 
1907 is also the year when Peirce first drew his pragmatism and his semeiotic 
together into one formulation. (2004: 228)
I prefer to think that the real revolution occurred the following year, when Peirce 
breaks completely with the philosophical tradition described in Chapter 1, and it 
is to this revolution that we turn in the chapter to follow.

This chapter introduces the hexadic sign-systems which evolved from the 
principles discussed in the previous chapter. It shows how Peirce moves 
innovatively from his earlier category-based conception of signification and 
classification to one based upon three ‘universes’, each defined by its specific 
mode of being (possibility, actuality and necessity). The chapter necessarily deals 
extensively with problems concerning the ordering not only of the six divisions 
yielding twenty-eight classes but also, when appropriate, of the ten divisions 
from which Peirce was hoping to generate sixty-six, problems which continue 
to divide Peirce scholars. This is no doubt the most discussed aspect of Peirce’s 
later sign-systems – to the almost complete neglect of the characterization and 
illustration of the sign-classes themselves. It is also the least understood, and, 
among other things, it is with this neglect and attendant misconceptions that the 
study seeks to engage.
A further reason for exploring the 28-class typology is that the letter to Lady 
Welby in which it is advanced is apparently the only reference Peirce ever makes 
to it, his ambition being, no doubt, to prove and exploit the more complex 
66-class system. Moreover, the structure of this hexadic system is such that it 
holds potentially important implications for the philosophy of representation 
described in Chapter 1, in particular for what Peirce saw as speculative rhetoric 
or methodeutic, the branch of the philosophy of representation which specifically 
enquires into the conditions determining the relations between the sign and the 
interpretants it determines.
The thematic structure of the chapter is determined by the order of 
appearance of the topics in Peirce’s letter. The sections, which for obvious 
reasons necessarily vary in length and theoretical scope, introduce and 
describe in detail the most important aspects of the hexad of divisions 
yielding the twenty-eight classes of signs, discussing and commenting on its 
significance and the theoretical problems it has raised over the years. As the 
3
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present study concerns this particular typology the 66-class system which has 
received far more attention from Peirce scholars will only be discussed as the 
occasion requires: since the major theoretical issues concerning the hexad are 
also those of the 66-class system they can be dealt with, however briefly, at the 
same time.
The 1904 hexad reviewed
In order to bring out the innovative character of the 28-class typology, we begin 
by recapitulating the nature of an earlier hexad, henceforth ‘hexada’. Table 3.1 
sets out the typology described by Peirce in the letter of 12 October 1904 in a 
more practical orthogonal form than the table presented in Chapter 2, since it 
is easy to read from left to right ‘along’ it to identify classes of signs. As in other 
texts, prior to presenting the sign and the six divisions which the expanded 
definition of the sign now generates, Peirce had elaborated on his theory of 
the categories, which he used at the time to justify the structure of the hexad. 
One of the important characteristics of the table is the fact that it exploits an 
unusual variant of what was referred to in Chapter 2 as ‘correlate’ order, the 
order in which Peirce defined the three correlates of any triadic relation, namely 
representamen (sign), object and interpretant in order of increasing ‘complexity’ 
(cf. EP2 290, and the discussion in Chapter 1). In the original description, the 
interpretants were identified, respectively, as signified, dynamic and immediate 
(SS 33–35), but in Table 3.1 the signified interpretant has here been standardized 
to ‘final’.1 The order of presentation of the various divisions in Peirce’s 1904 
letter is of interest as he seems to ‘cycle’ through the series, introducing the 
object series by the division involving sign and dynamic object followed by that 
of the immediate object, and the interpretant series first by the sign and final 
interpretant relation, followed by that between sign and dynamic interpretant, 
ending with the later-to-be-abandoned relation involving sign and immediate 
interpretant. As seen in Chapter 2, this and the typology hypothetically dated 
August 1904 were the only two that followed this particular order, as Peirce 
was inspired, one assumes, by considerations of relative complexity. Most of 
the other typologies, including the two from the drafts of late December 1908, 
adopt a strict correlate order. On the other hand, the 28-class system and the 
embryonic system from the 1906 draft adopt what will be called ‘semiosis’ order 
(see Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2).
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The hexad of 23 December 1908
What, then, makes the later, 28-class typology so innovative? In the letter dated 
23 December 1908, he posited a hexad of divisions based upon the correlates 
themselves which are now ‘subjects’ or members of three universes in a specific 
order defined in the letter, this system generating twenty-eight classes of signs. 
In order to bring out what can be considered the truly original nature of this 
hexad we take the pertinent elements in the following order: the definition of the 
sign and its implications; the three universes which function as criteria for the 
classification of the various sign-classes; the three divisions described by Peirce 
in the letter, to which are added by a reconstruction the final three from other 
textual evidence.
Sign and universe
Peirce begins the relevant passage in the letter by defining the sign and its two 
major correlates, referring not to the categories as before, but to three universes, 
distinguished by three modalities of being. In short, having defined a hexad of 
divisions in 1904 using the categories as distinguishing criteria he now defines 
another basing his distinctions on an entirely different set of criteria:
It is clearly indispensable to start with an accurate and broad analysis of the 
nature of a Sign. I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something 
else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect 
I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the 
former. My insertion of ‘‘upon a person’’ is a sop to Cerberus, because despair 
of making my own broader conception understood. I recognize three Universes, 
which are distinguished by three Modalities of Being. (SS 80–81)2
This immediately raises the problem, one which he had discussed in relative 
detail in the 1906 Monist article ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’, 
Table 3.1 The 1904 hexad of division set out in ‘cyclical’ correlate order
S S-Od S-Oi S-If S-Id S-Ii
Thirdness legisign symbol S (law) argument submitted S S interpretable 
in thoughts
Secondness Sinsign index S (experience) dicent urged S S int. in 
experiences
Firstness qualisign icon S (quality) rheme contemplated S S int. in 
feelings
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concerning the logical difference between a category and a universe. One 
solution – the one adopted by most if not all of the authorities who have debated 
the 66-class system – is to consider that they are equivalent. Another, the one 
which we adopt in this study, is to assume that although undoubtedly related, 
they are, nevertheless, different, and that the difference is significant. What 
complicates matters at this point is that most authorities on Peirce either seem 
reluctant to adopt a clear position on this issue or else consider the two sets of 
criteria as being of the same nature.
Short (2007), for example, one of the most authoritative of Peirce 
commentators, has nothing to say of the modalities of being and only mentions 
the concept of a universe in a quotation from Nelson Goodman: implicitly in 
Short’s case, there is no point in distinguishing between universe and category, 
even though the former is the far more frequently occurring concept in the late 
typologies. On the other hand, one of the earliest attempts to explain Peirce’s 
66-class typology was Savan (1988). In a laudable, pioneering effort to come 
to grips with the three values associated with the immediate interpretant, 
for example, he writes, ‘Guided by his categories, Peirce somewhat hesitantly 
distinguished a Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness of the Ii’ (1988: 53). 
That Savan should refer to the categories is only natural given that the second 
section of his monograph is devoted precisely to this topic. That he should have 
assimilated category and universe is, on the other hand, less acceptable.
But Savan is not the only authority to have adopted this theoretical strategy. 
Anderson (1995), for example, in a commentary on Peirce’s paper ‘The Neglected 
Argument for the Reality of God’, yet another text from 1908, has this to say: ‘The 
final point of the first paragraph is Peirce’s introduction of the “three Universes of 
Experience”. As Peirce indicates, these refer to the phenomenological categories 
of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. They are categories of experience 
precisely because they are forced on us when we examine phanera and because 
they are universal’ (1995: 140). What Peirce actually states in fact is: ‘The word 
“God” so “capitalized” (as we Americans say), is the definable proper name, 
signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes 
of Experience’ (CP 6.452). Nowhere in either this or the following paragraphs 
does Peirce mention his categories, nor does he ‘indicate’ explicitly in the first 
paragraph that the universes refer to the categories. Nathan Houser adopts a 
similar position: his Table 1 sets out the ten divisions of signs in columns as 
does Peirce in most of his typologies. The criteria that Houser uses to classify 
the ten characteristics identifying the divisions are the categories of Firstness, 
Secondness and the Thirdness (2005: 459). However Peirce refers explicitly to 
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universes rather than categories when he experiments with a ‘cardinal points’ 
format in order to determine compatibilities for the first two divisions in his 25 
December 1908 draft:
The inquiry ought, one would expect, to be an easy one, since both trichotomies 
depend on there being three Modes of Presence to the mind, which we may term
The Immediate, – The Direct, – The Familiar
Mode of Presence.
The difference between the two trichotomies is that the one refers to the 
Presence to the Mind of the Sign and the other to that of the Immediate Object. 
The Sign may have any Modality of Being, i.e., may belong to any one of the three 
Universes; its Immediate Object must be in some sense, in which the Sign need 
not be, Internal. (CP 8.354, emphasis added)
And here, too:
To begin, then, it is evident that an Actisign, or one that belongs to the Universe 
of Experience, which Brutely acts on the person, can also be a Denominative, that 
is, that its Immediate Object is represented as belonging to the same Universe; so 
that 12·22, the central class of our block of nine, is possible. Indeed, a pointing 
finger is a familiar example of a Sign of that class. (CP 8.355)
As mentioned above, in this study we adopt the position that category and 
universe are not synonymous and mutually substitutable.
A second problem arises concerning the relation between the three universes 
mentioned in the letter and the better-known logical concept of the universe of 
discourse. James Liszka, for example, shows how Peirce defines the universe of 
discourse (1996: 91–92) but, ignoring the specific reference Peirce makes to the 
three more general universes in the letter to Lady Welby, discusses the typologies 
in terms of the categories. Bergman (2009: 104–05) assimilates the universe of 
discourse to the sorts of universe that Peirce discussed in his letters to James of 
1909, and in doing so raises a slightly different problem, for in the course of his 
exposition in ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’, Peirce makes the 
following statement: ‘But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to 
denote Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, 
very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, 
and therefore can only be denoted by Indices’ (CP 4.544, 1906). This is the 
principle which justifies Peirce’s later remark to William James to the effect that 
the ‘Object of “Napoleon” is the Universe of Existence so far as it is determined by 
the fact of Napoleon being a Member of it’ (EP2 493, 1909), a problem to which 
we return in Chapter 5. However, the general logical concept of the universe of 
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discourse has nothing to do with the three universes mentioned by Peirce in the 
letter to Lady Welby quoted above, nor to the universe of existence about which 
Peirce wrote to James, for Peirce (and Mrs Ladd-Franklin) had earlier defined 
the universe of discourse in the following manner for Baldwin’s Dictionary of 
Philosophy and Psychology:
Universe (in logic) of discourse, of a proposition, &c. In every proposition 
the circumstances of its enunciation show that it refers to some collection of 
individuals or of possibilities, which cannot be adequately described, but can 
only be indicated as something familiar to both speaker and auditor. At one time 
it may be the physical universe of sense (1), at another it may be the imaginary 
“world” of some play or novel, at another a range of possibilities. “Universe”, 
1902, vol. 2, p. 742.
But, as he states in a note to ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’, 
Peirce’s very personal use of the term ‘universe’ is unlikely to correspond to the 
more conventional notion of a universe of discourse as defined above:
I use the term Universe in a sense which excludes many of the so-called 
“universes of discourse” of which Boole [An Investigation of the Laws of Thought 
etc. pp. 42, 167], De Morgan [Cambridge Philosophical Transactions VIII 380 
Formal Logic, pp. 37–8] and many subsequent logicians speak, but which, being 
perfectly definable, would in the present system be denoted by the aid of a graph. 
(CP 4.544 n)
We can assume, therefore, that whenever he uses the term ‘universe’ in the late 
semiotics Peirce is not referring to some universe of discourse or other unless he 
specifically states that this is the case. As for the three modalities of being, these 
fare even less well among Peirce scholars than the three universes, one notable 
exception being Murphey (1993).3 As the 28-class system, based specifically 
upon universes as distinguishing criteria, yields a set of entirely different classes 
of sign from those previously advanced by Peirce – for example, the ten from 
1903 – it is logically essential to respect the formulations given in the letter of 23 
December 1908.
The three universes
The position, then, here, is that the assimilation of the three categories to the 
three universes mentioned in the letter to Lady Welby is highly problematic 
and potentially misleading. This does not mean, of course, that Peirce had 
now discarded his categories – indeed he continues to discuss them in his 
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correspondence with Lady Welby and elsewhere (e.g. CP 1.288–292, c. 1908). 
However, since ‘universe’ is the concept he uses in the letter of 23 December, this 
is the concept employed in the following discussion: the three universes are not 
categories although they are clearly related to the three categories of the forms 
of experience, and are distinguished by the three modalities of being. Given this 
decision, how are we to understand the notion of universe in this context? At 
one point in ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ Peirce indicates 
a preference for the term ‘predicament’ over that of ‘category’ (CP 4.549) – 
‘predicament’ being defined by the OED as ‘That which is predicated or asserted’, 
or ‘a class about which a particular statement is made’ – having already proposed 
the difference between a category and a logical universe:
Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category are 
not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of Subjects, and 
a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of Predicates. I never said they 
were the same thing; but whether you describe the two correctly is a question for 
careful study. (CP 4.545)
A category, says Peirce in this slightly inconsequential discussion with an 
imaginary interlocutor, is not the same as a universe: ‘Let us begin with the 
question of Universes. It is rather a question of an advisable point of view than 
of the truth of a doctrine. A logical universe is, no doubt, a collection of logical 
subjects, but not necessarily of metaphysical Subjects, or “substances”; for it may 
be composed of characters, of elementary facts, etc.’ (CP 4.546, 1906). This would 
clearly endorse the principle that ‘the Universes are receptacles of Subjects’ (CP 
4.548). The correlates involved in semiosis must thus be considered as ‘subjects’ 
susceptible of belonging to one or other of three universes. This is not a new 
position on Peirce’s part, as in the 1906 draft to Lady Welby discussed in Chapter 
2 he had already employed the concept of the ‘subject’ in order to distinguish 
between dynamic and immediate object:
In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary 
that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in 
which the same form is embodied only as a consequence of the communication. 
The Form, (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what the sign represents it to 
be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting Truths, it is 
indispensible to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
(RL463 26–27, 1906)
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In this case, as in the later letter, the correlates thus described are not 
subdivided in any way by Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness but are subjects 
or members of a given universe: the dynamic object is one subject, the sign is 
another. This means that the interpretant is the subject in which the same form 
is embodied as a consequence of the communication, and that the applications 
of category or universe as criteria to the features of the sign to be classified 
follow distinct processes. This is how Peirce introduces the universes in the 
letter of 1908:
One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except 
that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be 
capable of being so present in its entire Being. It follows that a member of this 
universe need not be subject to any law, not even to the principle of contradiction. 
I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter 
designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a 
general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization 
on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason.
Another Universe is that of, 1st, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute 
reactions, and of, 2nd, the Facts (reactions, events, qualities etc.) concerning 
those Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, consist in their reactions. I 
call the Objects, Things, or more unambiguously, Existents, and the facts about 
them I call Facts. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object subject 
alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is 
expressible by a proposition having such a singular subject.
The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its Nature 
necessitant, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible in a universal 
proposition. Especially, continua are of this nature. I call objects of this universe 
Necessitants. It includes whatever we can know by logically valid reasoning. (SS 
81–82)
Why should Peirce turn to a classification in which the six correlates are 
held to be subjects of one or other of three universes of possibles, existents and 
necessitants? It is not implausible that the decision on his part should have 
something to do with the expanded system of correlates which he only established 
fully in 1904, whether or not he had already envisaged two objects either from 
Hamilton or from the philosophical tradition or both (it will be shown in Chapter 
5, in fact, that the definition of the three universes corresponds to the greater 
scope attributed to the dynamic object after 1906). As noted by the editors of 
volume two of The Essential Peirce (EP2 555n3), Peirce’s use of the concept of 
a universe occurs frequently at this time.4 Just as 1905–06 seems to have been 
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the period in which Peirce began to define the sign as medium, so too, the years 
1906–08 see Peirce beginning to develop the notion of three universes, each 
defined by its own peculiar modality of being, and consequently, as mentioned 
earlier, with no direct relation to the concept of the universe of discourse 
introduced into logic much earlier by De Morgan. After 1908, particularly in the 
correspondence, Peirce develops the broader notion of the ‘universe of existence’ 
(Cf. EP2: 492–94), another concept to be discussed in Chapter 4.
Classes of signs
After having proposed his new definition of the sign and its relation to the 
three universes, Peirce begins the task of describing the sorts of signs the system 
yields, and, discarding the qualisign, sinsign and legisign designations forming 
the first division of the 1903 10-class system, introduces a new set: tone (or 
mark), token5 and type, characterized by the particular universe to which each 
is referred.
A Sign may itself have a “possible” Mode of Being. E.g. a hexagon inscribed 
in or circumscribed about a conic. It is a Sign, in that the collinearity of the 
intersections of opposite sides shows the curve to be a conic, if the hexagon 
is inscribed … Its Mode of Being may be Actuality: as with any barometer. Or 
Necessitant: as the word “the” or any other in the dictionary. For a “possible” 
Sign I have no better designation than a Tone, though I am considering replacing 
this by “Mark.” Can you suggest a really good name? An Actual sign I call a 
Token; a Necessitant Sign a Type;6
It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate 
without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that the Sign 
conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. 
The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it the Dynamoid 
Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the 
Immediate Object. Each of these two Objects may be said to be capable of either 
of the three Modalities, though in the case of the Immediate Object, this is not 
quite literally true. (SS 83)
As in the letter to Lady Welby of 12 October 1904, Peirce begins the account 
of his theory of signs with the classification of the sign itself. However, the 
order in which this account develops, namely the correlate order as in Table 3.1 
and the other variant so frequent in earlier taxonomies, has no particular 
relevance to the order of occurrence of the correlates in the corresponding 
hexadic classification. Note, too, that if, as Peirce suggests in this passage, it is 
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not quite literally true that the immediate object is capable of either of the three 
modalities he sets up, neither the 28-class system nor the more complex system 
could possibly yield their full quota of sign classes. Why the immediate object 
should not be capable of the three modalities has to remain a mystery, as this 
seems to be the only allusion Peirce makes to the problem.7 This is followed by 
the subdivisions obtained for the dynamic and immediate objects, in that order:
Accordingly, the Dynamoid Object may be a Possible; when I term the sign an 
Abstractive; such as the word Beauty; and it will be none the less an Abstractive if I 
speak of “the Beautiful” since it is the ultimate reference, and not the grammatical 
form, that makes the sign an Abstractive. When the Dynamoid Object is an 
Occurrence (Existent thing or Actual fact of past or future,) I term the Sign 
a Concretive; any one barometer is an example; and so is a written narrative 
of any series of events. For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I 
have at present no better designation than a "Collective" which is not quite so 
bad a name as it sounds to be until one studies the matter … If the Immediate 
Object is a “Possible” that is, if the Dynamoid Object is indicated (always more 
or less vaguely) by means of its Qualities, etc., I call the Sign a Descriptive; if the 
Immediate [Object] is an Occurrence, I call the Sign a Designative; and if the 
Immediate Object is a Necessitant, I call the sign a Copulant; for in that case the 
object has to be so identified by the Interpreter that the Sign may represent a 
necessitation. My name is certainly a temporary expedient. (SS 83–84)
We return to the remarks Peirce makes in this passage about the common 
noun beauty below. In the meantime it should be noted that the description 
leads to the following highly original formulation of the principle behind the 
twenty-eight classes of signs. Peirce had already introduced the universes in 
his definition of the sign, but the following passage now shows how the system 
fits together. It begins with the statement of the hierarchy holding between the 
three universes – strongly reminiscent of the terse manner in which he first 
defined types of triadic relations in the Syllabus of 1903 (CP 2.235–347) – and 
applies this to the determination sequence in this expanded version of semiosis, 
now a cooperation between six elements and not the three mentioned in his 
‘Pragmatism’ definition (R318 99–101):8
It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible, it is equally 
so that Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence it 
follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object determines 
the Immediate Object,
Which determines the Sign itself,
which determines the Destinate Interpretant,
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which determines the Effective Interpretant,
which determines the Explicit Interpretant,
the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they 
would if they were independent, only yield twenty-eight classes; and if, as I 
strongly opine (not to say almost prove) there are four other trichotomies of 
signs of the same order of importance, instead of making 59049 classes, these 
will only come to sixty-six. The additional 4 trichotomies are undoubtedly 1st,
 Icons (or Simulacra Aristotle’s  Indices Symbols
óνοíωμητα)
and then 3 referring to the Interpretants. One of these I am pretty confident 
is into: Suggestives, Imperatives, Indicatives, where the Imperatives include 
Interrogatives. Of the other two I think that one must be into Sign assuring the 
Interpretants by
Instinct Experience Form
The other I suppose to be what, in my Monist exposition of Existential 
Graphs, I called
Semes Phemes Delomes (SS 84–85)9
The very important first sentence of the extract clearly applies both to 
determination order in semiosis and, I maintain, to the structure of the 
classification system to which, by extension, it gives rise. The formula employed 
so concisely by Peirce sets out the relations holding between necessitants and 
possibles in such a way as to make any mention of existents redundant and, 
at the same time, establishes a ‘universe hierarchy principle’ which renders the 
subclasses of signs made available by the six trichotomies dependent upon each 
other, and so reduces the 729 possible classes to twenty-eight.
The order of determination described in the second sentence of the extract 
can be represented simply by the scheme in Figure 3.1 (in which, it should be 
noted, the interpretants have been standardized for convenience to immediate, 
dynamic and final, in that order, respectively, to Ii, Id and If in Figure 3.1). 
Whether this is the order of the trichotomies in the classification system yielding 
twenty-eight classes of signs is another matter, as we shall see below. Indeed, 
more generally, while the order of the first six divisions seems to be clearly 
set out in the ‘definition’ preceded by the hierarchy holding between the three 
universes in the extract above, there is no guarantee that the introduction of the 
four additional divisions corresponds to any particular theoretical order. In spite 
of this, the hexadic structure of semiosis as Peirce defined it in 1908 corresponds 
to the order at which he hinted in the draft of March 1906 discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, and is represented in Figure 3.1 as the following ‘formula’, in which 
the arrows are intended to correspond to the determination process:
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Od Oi S Ii Id If
Figure 3.1 The determination order of the correlates involved in semiosis.
Table 3.2 displays the 729 (36) possible combinations of subject ‘features’ 
or ‘characteristics’ of a given sign, which, when organized according to the 
hierarchy principle that prefaces the description of semiosis given above, finally 
yield twenty-eight classes.10 For example, anticipating a fuller discussion of the 
subdivisions, a collective sign is compatible with a copulant, a designative or even 
with a descriptive sign, according to which universe the sign’s immediate object 
happens to belong. In other words, a given sign can be a collective, copulant 
type etc., since the table displays compatibilities between the characteristics, or 
what Peirce calls the different ‘respects’, of a given sign (CP 8.343) as regards 
the universes to which the latter and its correlates happen to belong. Since 
the classes are yielded by a static typology and not a dynamic process such as 
semiosis, it might be wiser to conceive the relation between subjects in terms of 
compatibility rather than state categorically that collectives determine copulants, 
for example: collectives are compatible not only with the copulant, but also with 
the designative and descriptive facets of signs. Thus the twenty-eight classes 
offered by Table 3.2 are all subject to such compatibilities as the hierarchy allows: 
to give another example, the combination of a designative sign – an existent – by 
division Oi with a type – a necessitant – in the S division would be illogical, as it 
would infringe the hierarchy rule.
There are three points to be noted regarding Table 3.2, which represents what 
will henceforth be referred to as ‘hexadb’. First, as in the case of Table 3.1, Peirce 
never set out his typologies ‘horizontally’, but, rather, ‘vertically’ in the manner of 
the tables reproduced in Chapter 2 and the Appendix. The advantage of the layout 
of the typologies in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is that the classes of signs can be read quite 
Table 3.2 A reconstruction of the 1908 hexad of divisions yielding twenty-eight 
classes of signs
Subject
Od Oi S Ii Id If
Universe 
Necessitant collective copulant type relative usual to produce 
self-control
Existent concretive designative token categorical percussive to produce 
action
Possible abstractive descriptive mark hypothetical sympathetic gratific
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simply across the page. For example, a sign in Table 3.2 which is to produce self-
control is necessarily collective, and an abstractive sign is necessarily gratific, if 
the hierarchy is respected. The way Peirce set out his typologies was very different 
but this in no way invalidates the organization of reconstructed Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Second, in his letter to Lady Welby, Peirce only identified the first three 
divisions and the subdivisions they define. The final three trichotomies in Table 
3.2 concerning the interpretants have been drawn from the typologies Peirce 
established in drafts in the days following the 23 December letter. In this way, 
for example, the three subdivisions related to the Destinate (standardized to 
‘immediate’, Ii, in Table 3.2) interpretant are, in order of increasing complexity, 
hypothetical, categorical and relative. Note, too, that Peirce was not entirely 
happy with this particular division, as can be seen from paragraph CP 8.369: 
‘V. As to the nature of the Immediate (or Felt?) Interpretant, a sign may be: 
Ejaculative, or merely giving utterance to feeling; Imperative, including, of 
course, Interrogatives; Significative. But later I made this the 7th Trichotomy 
and for the fifth substituted – with great hesitation – : Hypothetic, Categorical, 
Relative’ (the seventh division as he re-worked it would be ineligible to 
figure in the hexad in Table 3.2 as the characteristic or facet it constitutes is a 
relation, namely S–Id, and not an individual subject). Similarly, the Effective 
(dynamic) Interpretant trichotomy is based upon the sixth division in CP 
8.370: ‘VI. As to the Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetic, or 
Congruentive; Shocking, or Percussive; Usual.’ The division containing the 
classes of signs identified by the nature of the final interpretant, referred to in 
the letter as the ‘Explicit’ interpretant, distinguishes between signs intended 
to produce, respectively, in order of increasing complexity, feeling, action 
or self-control. The ‘purpose’ of the final interpretant which is, after all, the 
defining characteristic of the signs which this division identifies, might be 
considered different from its ‘nature’, but by a process of elimination, the 
classes of signs thus defined can be assumed to correspond to this division in 
earlier typologies. Table 3.2 has in this way been obtained from an incomplete 
description by Peirce but is easily reconstructed from other typologies, in spite 
of his misgivings concerning the viability of the classes forming the immediate 
interpretant division.
Returning to Table 3.2, we note two immensely significant consequences 
of its fundamentally different way of classifying signs from the single division 
of the period from 1867 to 1902 and from the three divisions yielding the ten 
classes of 1903. To begin with, the S–Od division which Peirce claimed to be 
the one he used most (CP 8.368) and the one yielding the universally known 
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division into icon, index and symbol, has disappeared from the scheme in 
Table 3.2. The system here is based not on how a sign represents its object 
– is not based on the sign’s mode of representation, in other words – but, 
among other things, upon the sorts of objects it represents.11 Gone, too, is 
the S–If division defining rheme, dicent and argument, the absence of the 
dicisign being particularly significant in view of the importance Peirce seems 
to have accorded it in the 1906 draft and of the importance attributed to 
the proposition in traditional theories of logic, and it is no wonder that 
Peirce was at pains to retain these two divisions in particular in his projected 
66-class system.
Principles determining typology order
The abrupt passage from Peirce’s hexadic definition of semiosis in the letter of 
23 December 1908 to the incomplete classification of the projected twenty-eight 
possible classes of signs suggests, but in no way proves, that the latter should 
be modelled on the former. This raises the problem of the order of occurrence 
of the correlates in the two late typologies – both the 28- and 66-class systems 
– a problem which preoccupied Peirce late in December 1908 (cf. CP 8.342–
379) and numerous Peirce authorities since. Restricting the discussion to the 
hexadic system illustrated in Table 3.2, there are conflicting considerations 
that merit discussion. To begin with, semiosis is a dynamic process defined 
formally within the logic, while the various divisions established and employed 
in sign typologies are the product of a different, if related, methodology. There 
may be no reason for the second to be organized according to the order of 
occurrence of the correlates participating in the former, although Peirce’s 
cryptic definition in the remarks he made to Lady Welby in the letter of 23 
December (SS 84), while hardly helpful in this respect, suggests that this is 
indeed the case with this particular hexadic typology in spite of persuasive 
arguments to the contrary. Indeed, it has been suggested that by placing the 
Sign division (S in Table 3.2) in initial position in the typology, as his remarks 
on the English common noun beauty suggest, Peirce was justified in classifying 
this particular sign as an abstractive type (SS 83–84).12 This can only be done 
if the sign division precedes that of the dynamic object in the classification 
system, in complete contrast to the initial order given in Table 3.2.
Unfortunately, the exact position of the sign division is not the only problem 
to have been raised in discussions of the ordering of the six and ten divisions. 
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Another issue stems from the way in which Savan (1988) and others have 
interpreted Peirce’s sometimes disturbing, but understandable, habit of providing 
the interpretants with alternative names. This was quite clear from the discussion 
in Chapter 2 of the numerous typologies Peirce established between 1904 and 
1908. For example, in the passage from the letter quoted above Peirce sets out 
the interpretant order as Destinate, Effective and Explicit. With respect to this 
issue Savan makes the following statement in an explanatory note: ‘(N: Peirce 
sometimes used “Explicit Interpretant” as an alternative name for the Immediate 
Interpretant, as in the Welby Correspondence (PW 84 [= SS 84]). Weiss and 
Burks, and Lieb, mistakenly identify the Explicit Interpretant with the Final 
Interpretant)’ (1988: 52). If this were the case, then the interpretant order for 
hexadb above would be If, Id and Ii since ‘Explicit’ has been standardized to 
‘final’ on the table, and for the ten divisions a similar order with the relational 
divisions interleaved according to the opinion of the commentator. The order 
established by Weiss and Burks, for example, basing their information concerning 
the later sign-systems on material from Ogden and Richards’ Appendix D, adopts 
the order of the hexad given in Table 3.2, with the final interpretant in final 
position among the interpretant divisions, followed by the relational divisions 
S–Od, S–Id, S–If and S–O–I (1945: 385–87). This is the order, too, adopted by 
Irwin Lieb, according to the list established by Hardwick in Appendix B in the 
Peirce-Welby correspondence (SS 162–163).13 Savan has clearly confused the 
explicit interpretant with the immediate, following the principle of correlate 
order discussed earlier, which is not the order given by Peirce in the letter to Lady 
Welby: pace Savan and others, the explicit interpretant is simply an alternative 
designation for the final interpretant.
Phenomenological criteria
Savan is not the only Peirce scholar to dispute an order such as the one given 
in Table 3.2. Yet other authorities prefer what was referred to above as ‘cyclical’ 
correlate order, in other words an ordering system which places the sign division 
first, then the object divisions with the dynamic preceding the immediate, 
followed by the interpretant series beginning with the final interpretant and 
finishing with the immediate, the whole series interspersed with the relational 
divisions according to the decisions of the authority concerned. This final–
dynamic–immediate order is favoured by, for example Morand, who offers a 
‘phaneroscopic’ justification of the order (2004: 209–20). This is the case, too, 
with Müller (1994: 145–49), who contests the ‘categorical’ order established 
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by, for example, Weiss and Burks, and considers, like Morand (2004), that the 
immediate and dynamic interpretants and the immediate object are somehow 
degenerate forms of the final interpretant (Müller’s term is ‘normal’) and 
the dynamic object, respectively. Similarly, too, Diversey (2014) establishes 
his ‘correct’ order by means of three rules, based, essentially, on different 
levels within the basic S–O–I triad, and, significantly, the phenomenological 
principle that genuine trichotomies [e.g. Od, If] precede allegedly degenerate ones 
[e.g. Oi, Id, Ii].
This particular explanatory strategy, based on Peirce’s phenomenology, 
seems to have originated with Weiss and Burks. They set out five principles 
governing the construction of the various divisions (1945: 384), the fourth 
of which being: ‘Thirds [e.g. legisigns, but their conception is broader than 
this] have two degenerate forms, Seconds one degenerate form (1.365). The 
application of this principle to the three divisions yields ten divisions.’ In 
other words, while Peirce was discussing his categories in the passage cited – 
CP 1.365 is from ‘A Guess at the Riddle’, composed almost thirty years earlier 
than the 23 December letter – Weiss and Burks have extended the principle 
to the sign relation, and for them the dynamic object has the immediate 
object as its degenerate form while the final interpretant has the dynamic 
and immediate interpretants for its degenerate and doubly degenerate forms, 
respectively. See, for example, their entry for division (D) ‘The Nature of 
the Doubly Degenerate or Immediate (Destinate, Emotional) Interpretant’ 
(1945: 386).
However, it is important to see in this matter that as far as the 
phaneroscopic nature of the table is concerned, the only way in which we can 
measure genuineness and degeneracy if we have to – and such a project is 
surely irrelevant to the ‘universal’ criterion adopted by Peirce here – is not 
orthogonally from dynamic object to immediate and from final interpretant 
to immediate via the dynamic interpretant, but, rather down Table 3.2, from 
necessitant to possible. If anything on the table has to be doubly degenerate, it 
is surely an abstractive, for example, with respect to a collective, should we wish 
to introduce phaneroscopic criteria into the classification. There is evidence, 
however, from Peirce himself, and from the way the type/token distinction 
functions in the later sign-systems, that he found distinctions based on 
phenomenological principles less important than in 1903;14 and in any case the 
typology of 23 December is not based on the categories but on three universes: 
the classificatory criteria are ontological rather than phenomenological.
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Terminological confusion
It seems probable in such cases, too, that the ordering choices of the authorities in 
question depend upon how they, like Savan, have interpreted the denominations 
‘destinate’ and ‘explicit’. The question is why should ‘destinate’ be equivalent to 
‘final’, and ‘explicit’ to ‘immediate’? Savan, for example, adduces evidence for his 
decision by half-quoting Peirce himself: ‘It is this significance, conveyed by the 
simple presentation of the sign itself, that is the Immediate Interpretant. In a 
passage that suggests why it might be called the Explicit Interpretant, Peirce wrote 
that this interpretant is “all that is explicit in the sign itself apart from its context 
and circumstances of utterance” (B 276)’ (1988: 53).15 What Peirce actually wrote 
in 1907 was this: ‘For the proper significate outcome of a sign, I propose the 
name, the interpretant of the sign … On these terms, it is very easy … to see what 
the interpretant of a sign is: it is all that is explicit in the sign itself apart from its 
context and circumstances of utterance’ (B 275–76). Peirce is, in fact, defining 
the interpretant of any sign as whatever is explicit in the sign independently 
of conditions of use, and Savan here is victim of his own misquotation. In this 
particular extract from the ‘Pragmatism’ variants of 1907, the interpretants were, 
remember, in order of increasing complexity, emotional, energetic and logical, 
namely those discussed in the final sections of Chapter 2, and Savan has surely 
misinterpreted Peirce at this point by assimilating the use of the adjective explicit 
to the designation of a particular interpretant. There is no logical reason why 
the Explicit Interpretant represented as If in Table 3.2 and in the ‘determination’ 
passage from the letter of 23 December quoted above should be anything other 
than another term for the final interpretant, and this for two reasons.
First, consider Table 3.3, which sets out in linear sequence the order of the 
‘subjects’ in the typologies discussed in Chapter 2. With the exception of the 
first two typologies, from August 1904?16 and 12 October 1904, all the others 
adopt the Ii, Id and If order of divisions, even when relational divisions are 
interspersed between them in the sequence. This being the case, it is difficult 
to see why anyone would want to resuscitate a rare version of correlate order 
that Peirce himself had abandoned very early in his researches into six and ten 
divisions of signs.
Second, if we return to the 1906 draft letter to Lady Welby discussed 
in Chapter 2 we find the terminology concerning the more conventional 
designation ‘immediate’ interpretant similar to that of the 1908 letter. Peirce, 
remember, referred to it at the time as the ‘intentional’ interpretant, stating 
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Table 3.3 Division order in typologies from 1903–04 to 1908, with some interpretant 
series standardized to Ii, Id and If
Typology order
Date
Aug?  1904 (S); S-Od, Oi; Isig (=If), Id, I(i)?
07/08/1904 (S), Oi, S-Od, Ii, Id, Isignified
12/10/1904 S, S-Od, S-Oi; S-If, S-Id, S-Ii
08/10/1905 S, Oi, Od, Ii, Id, Isig (=If)
09/10/1905 S, Oi, Od, If (incomplete)
13/10/1905 S, Oi, Odα, Odβ, Ii, Idα, Idβ, Ifα, Ifβ, Ifγ
06/03/1906 Od, Oi, S, Ii, Id, If (reconstructed with interpretants standardized)
31/03/1906 S, Oi, Od, S-Od, Ii, Id, S-Id, If, Pass(If), Signif(If)
31/08/1906 S, Oi, Od, S-Od, Ii, Id, '(S-Id)', purpose(If), influence(S), Ass. of S to  
Interp.
23/12/1908 Od, Oi, S, Ii, Id, If, S-Od, S-Id, S-O-I, S-If (interpretants standardized)
24/12/1908 S, Oi, Od, S-Od, Ii, Id, S-Id, If, S-If, S-Od-If (interpretants 
standardized)
25/12/1908 S, Oi, Od, S-Od, Ii, Id, S-Id, If, S-If, S-O-If (interpretants standardized)
that it was a determination of the sign, a condition which makes it immediate 
in the determination sequence and necessarily the first of the interpretants 
in that sequence. Furthermore, the intentional has to correspond to the 
immediate if only because it is inconceivable that what Peirce referred to at 
that time as the ‘communicational’ interpretant could be anything other than 
the final interpretant in the series. For these reasons, then, in this study the 
interpretant order established by Peirce in the 23 December letter of 1908 
corresponds, as standardized (in bold) in Table 3.3, to immediate, dynamic 
and final.
Continuing with this line of thought, consider Table 3.3 once more, which 
sets out the nine typologies (one incomplete, another reconstructed from the 
draft) which Peirce established in the years between 1904 and 1906, followed 
by the three to be found in the letter and draft letters intended for Lady Welby 
of December 1908. The typology reconstructed in Table 3.3 from the important 
1906 draft (in bold, line 7 on the table) specifically places the interpretants in a 
set logical sequence from the intentional (immediate interpretant Ii in Table 3.4) 
to the communicational (final interpretant If in Table 3.3), with the effectual (i.e. 
dynamic, Id) interpretant inserted between them. A determination of the mind 
of the utterer, the intentional interpretant is thus both the determination of the 
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sign and the determinant of the effectual interpretant (SS 196), an early implicit 
indication of the order of semiosis explicitly stated in the letter of 23 December. 
This is not only further justification of the order of the correlates adopted in 
Table 3.2, since the 1906 draft, as seen in Chapter 2, anticipates embryonically 
the order of semiosis, but also justifies the identification of the three interpretants 
described in the letter as Destinate, Effective and Explicit (respectively, 
immediate, dynamic and final). As Table 3.3 clearly shows, the correlate order 
adopted in the great majority of typologies is such that the interpretant sequence 
invariably begins with the immediate. Moreover, in the typology of 31 March 
1906 (Table 2.4), Peirce distinguishes between intended, dynamic and normal 
interpretants, where ‘intended’ and ‘intentional’ in, respectively, the 31 March 
1906 typology and the 1906 draft, can be considered virtually synonymous with 
Destinate in this context.17 If the two terms are not exactly synonymous from a 
semantic point of view ‘intentional’ and ‘intended’ are surely closer to ‘destinate’ 
than ‘explicit’ is.
Finally, if we set out the order of correlates in the classification as S, Od, Oi, 
Ii, Id, If or even S, Od, Oi, If, Id, Ii, that is, with S in initial position in either 
case, there is a strong possibility that such systems would have been dismissed as 
rank nominalism by Peirce, as they make the compatibility status of the dynamic 
object dependent upon that of the sign, thereby implying that all reality comes 
under the ‘sway’ of categorematic verbal signs, whereas reality is, in fact, defined 
as whatever is independently of what we think or say it to be:
Objects are divided into figments, dreams, etc., on the one hand, and realities on 
the other. The former are those which exist only inasmuch as you or I or some 
man imagines them; the latter are those which have an existence independent 
of your mind or mine or that of any number of persons. The real is that which is 
not whatever we happen to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of 
it. (CP 8.12, 1871)
Table 3.4 Hypothetical correlate classification of the noun beauty
Subject




Possible descriptive abstractive hypothetical sympathetic gratific
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In other words, he held that there was a reality ‘out there’ that was independent 
of minds, signs and, more pertinently in the present context, language: reality 
is such as it is, independently of what anyone thinks it to be and irrespective 
of the language they speak. This suggests that, as in semiosis, it is the object 
which determines the language sign, and not the other way around, and that the 
principle can also be applied to the typology that semiosis determines.
Beauty
In addition to the discussion above, a number of other persuasive criteria seem 
to argue in favour of the order retained in Table 3.2, which is, after all, the order 
of semiosis. First, if in such a process a dynamic object and then an immediate 
object can ‘determine’ a sign, that is, cause it to be such as it is, there is clearly a 
logical reason why the sign must appear after these two correlates in the table. If 
the sequence given in Figure 3.1 is correct – the hierarchy ordering the universes 
applies to this as much as to the classifying system – then it is difficult to see 
how in the process of semiosis the concept of beauty, for example (a possible, 
according to Peirce (SS 83–84)), could determine the type (a necessitant) that 
names it: such a determination would violate the universe hierarchy principle. 
Moreover, in CP 8.366 Peirce later identifies as abstractives such basic material 
qualities as colour, mass and whiteness: these can be found, for example, in a 
painting or on frescoes (unlike intellectual concepts such as that represented by 
the noun beauty), and as such would be compatible not with a type, but, rather, 
with a simple mark. Note, too, that Peirce makes the following comment:
I was of the opinion that if the Dynamical Object be a mere Possible the 
Immediate Object could only be of the same nature, while if the Immediate 
Object were a Tendency or Habit then the Dynamical Object must be of the 
same nature. Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must 
be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives. (CP 
8.367, 1908)
The type beauty – all words in a dictionary are by nature necessitant, and 
are therefore classified as types (SS 83) – can only be classified as an abstractive 
if the sign precedes the dynamic object in the classification system. As noted 
above, the order displayed in Table 3.2 would be incorrect, and would need to be 
replaced by a system displaying correlate order. Peirce’s surprising description 
of the common noun beauty as an abstractive sign (SS 83–84) has potentially 
significant consequences for the choice between correlate and ‘semiosis’ order, 
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and therefore requires examination. There are at least two ways in which to 
approach the problem: first, to analyse the term with the sign in initial position 
as Peirce places it in most of his correlate-order typologies, and as his remarks 
to Lady Welby imply; second, to examine the problem from a more empirical 
perspective.
In Table 3.4 the noun has been placed in the initial necessitant sign position as 
Peirce’s comments suggest, while with respect to the dynamic object it is classified 
as an abstractive.18 Now, according to the hierarchy principle, an abstractive 
sign – necessarily a sign with a possible object by the Od division in Table 3.4 – 
can only determine an immediate object and a sequence of interpretants from the 
universe of possibles, identifying the sign here as also hypothetical, sympathetic 
and gratific. This, in fact, is the real problem concerning the classification of the 
common noun beauty as an abstractive sign: namely, the interpretant sequence 
that it would determine if the solution proposed in Table 3.4 were adopted. For 
it is difficult to see how the effect produced by a verbal sign might be limited 
to feelings. Such a sign’s meaning has first to be ‘processed’, so to speak, at the 
immediate interpretant stage in semiosis for it to be capable of producing any 
subsequent effect at all, even a feeling: the object deemed beautiful might excite a 
feeling of pleasure or well-being, but the word beauty itself, like any other verbal 
sign, must surely require a mental immediate interpretant for the interpreter to 
be able to understand it.
An alternative, but complementary, way of resolving this issue is by adopting 
a more empirical approach to what appears to be a contradiction on Peirce’s 
part: we hypothesize that as a common noun, beauty is neither a ‘complete’ 
informational sign (as a dicisign is) in the 10-class system nor is it a complete 
representation of an object for classification by means of the hexad in Table 3.2. 
However, once integrated into a full sentence classification poses no problem. 
The justification for this is to be found in the way Peirce describes the relation 
between a complete sign such as an utterance and the object or fact it represents 
in 1907: ‘Thus the partial objects of an ordinary transitive verb are an agent and 
a patient. These distinctive characters have nothing to do with the form of a 
verb, as a sign, but are derived from the fact signified’ (EP2 408). In other words, 
it is the object in all its completeness (it can’t be otherwise) which determines 
the sign, and this is the principle at work in the 28-class typology, since signs are 
classified initially according to the sorts of objects they represent.
Moreover, it was seen in Chapter 2 that it is necessarily the case that there is 
nothing in the sign that is not already in the object. The event or fact represented 
determines the structure of the sentence representing it. This being the case, how 
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does Peirce’s beauty example satisfy this condition? Consider, by contrast, the 
‘complete’ generic utterance Beauty is truth, truth beauty. This very well-known 
compound sentence postulates as equivalent collections of entities sharing certain 
properties as exemplified by the following propositions: ‘Whatever is beautiful is 
true and whatever is true is beautiful’, or ‘Beautiful things all possess truth and true 
things all possess beauty’, or something of that sort. Keats’s line is a complete sign, a 
dicisign in the 1903 system but a collective copulant type in that of 1908, and it has 
to be analysed in terms of all the objects that determined it and the interpretant 
effects that it produced, or was calculated to produce, in order to classify it.
All of which brings us back to Peirce’s remarks concerning the ‘simple’ 
common noun beauty. Clearly beauty is not a complete sign. As Peirce tells 
Lady Welby, ‘it is the ultimate reference, and not the grammatical form, that 
makes the sign [the word beauty] an Abstractive’ (EP2 480), the problem being 
to determine the ultimate reference of what is, as it stands, nothing more than 
a simple dictionary entry. It is difficult to conceive of the conditions in which 
one might utter the word in a true situation of communication: Beauty! might 
be a (highly elliptical) summons to a horse, or to one’s dog or cat. In any other 
conditions the utterance would be laconic and mystifying to say the least.19 
People simply do not communicate by means of single-word utterances of this 
type, assuming beauty to be an effectively uttered sign, which it clearly is not – we 
might encounter exclamative utterances such as Idiot! or Clever clogs! but only 
in specific contexts. The word in Keats’s line refers obliquely to part of the more 
general object, the beautiful part, but cannot be classified in isolation from the 
generic utterance that represents that general object. It can, on the other hand, 
be classified without difficulty within the 1903 system, simply because at that 
time the object in itself was not a criterion needed to classify a sign: Peirce often 
stated that the English definite article was the epitome of the legisign, but he 
never went so far as to say what sort of object it was the sign of. What interested 
Peirce was the sign, its mode of representation and the relation holding between 
the sign and its interpretant, its information value. As a term or rheme, beauty is 
not an informational sign. On the other hand, the hexad of 1908 classifies signs 
according to the nature of the sorts of objects represented and as a linguistic sign 
beauty is simply a collective type or famisign (CP 8.359).20
Perhaps the whole beauty question was yet another case of Peirce simplifying 
matters as a ‘sop to Cerberus’. The word beauty is certainly an abstract noun 
with respect to English grammar, but in addition to the discussion above, it is 
difficult to see how Peirce would have associated a noun – a language sign – with 
an emotional interpretant, since this is what an abstractive would have to do in 
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the 1907 interpretant system discussed in Chapter 2. As a noun, he would surely 
have associated the term with what he saw then as the logical interpretant, the 
interpretant to which only concepts could appeal according to his pragmatism 
of the time. Presumably, if a classification of the noun on its own were required 
it would be a self-control producing collective, much like a dictionary definition: 
‘Such combined perfection of form and charm of colouring as affords keen 
pleasure to the sense of sight: in the human face or figure’ (OED). The definition 
introduces us to the concept; it is classified as ‘usual’ at the Id stage and confirms 
a prior interpretation;21 and as such the combination of term plus definition 
functions as a self-controlling sign. Whatever the solution adopted, it is clear 
that anyone wishing to determine the order of occurrence of the divisions in the 
more complex 66-class system will have problems of the sort posed by Peirce’s 
example of beauty to contend with.
Hexadic classification
After this long discussion of the order of the subjects in Table 3.2, we examine 
some of the sorts of classes of sign the subjects themselves determine, as they 
constitute another major innovation in the 1908 hexad. As the table shows, the 
list is composed of two divisions concerning the objects, one for the sign and 
three for the interpretants. Moreover, each division is a trichotomy the subclasses 
of which are obtained by reference to one or other of the three universes of 
experience. The question now is what sorts of subclasses and what sorts of signs 
does such a structure yield? As with other areas of the late semiotics, Peirce has 
only provided an incomplete statement.
The objects
As far as the two object divisions are concerned we do have Peirce’s brief 
examples to work with. In the draft of 25 December he has this to say of the 
dynamic object division:
III. In respect to the Nature of their Dynamical Objects, Signs I found to be 
either
1. Signs of Possibles. That is Abstractives such as Color, Mass, Whiteness, etc.
2. Signs of Occurrences. That is Concretives such as Man, Charlemagne.
3. Signs of Collections. That is Collectives such as Mankind, the Human 
Race, etc.
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By Abstractives I meant signs of immediate abstractions; but was in some 
doubt what to do with abstractions resulting from experiment. I thought it 
would be requisite to study subdivisions of these classes but never went into that 
research. (CP 8.366)
We return to the discussion of the dynamic object in Chapter 5, as Peirce develops 
the range of potential dynamic objects both in the ‘Neglected Argument’ text of 
1908 and in letters to William James from 1909. For the time being suffice it to 
note that in order of increasing complexity he distinguishes between qualitative 
objects (colour, mass etc., as noted earlier); such existential singular objects (which 
can also be found in groups or collections of singulars as in a class of pupils, or 
twenty-two individuals running after a leather ball on a football pitch) as humans, 
named individuals (e.g. Napoleon, Charlemagne, River Rat Jimmy), tables, towns, 
aeroplanes etc.; and, finally, classes of entities such as those covered by concepts 
like mankind etc., and usually represented, in English, by common nouns.
Within the immediate object division Peirce distinguishes between the three 
ways in which a sign’s object can be ‘presented’, that is, represented immediately 
on the sign-medium: as ‘mere ideas’, as ‘brutely compelling attention’ or as 
‘rationally recommending themselves’ (CP 8.349, 1908), such presentations 
yielding, moving from the possible to the necessitant via the existent, the 
following three classes of signs with reference to their immediate objects:
A. Descriptives, which determine their Objects by stating the characters of the 
latter.
B. Designatives (or Denotatives), or Indicatives, Denominatives, which like a 
Demonstrative pronoun, or a pointing finger, brutely direct the mental eyeballs 
of the interpreter to the object in question, which in this case cannot be given by 
independent reasoning.
C. Copulants, which neither describe nor denote their Objects, but merely 
express the logical relations of these latter to something otherwise referred to. 
Such, among linguistic signs, as “If – then –,” “ – is –,” “ – causes –,” “ – would be –,”  
“ – is relative to – for –” “Whatever” etc. (CP 8.350)
Alternative designations for these classes of signs are to be found in the drafts 
from the days following the letter of 23 December, for example, descriptive, 
denominative and copulative/distributive (EP2, 488), but in Table 3.2 we retain 
those mentioned in Peirce’s letter. Note, too, that in the 1904 hexadic typology 
given earlier (Table 3.1) the S-Oi trichotomy divides more vaguely into sign 
of law, sign of experience and, finally, sign of quality. At the time Peirce was 
employing the categories as criteria. In Chapter 4 we examine the sorts of signs 
the two objects thus described actually determine, but for now we simply note 
The Sign-Systems of 1908 99
the properties Peirce ascribes to them in the letter, and that since both sign and 
object can be individual, existent entities, the immediate object functions as a 
sort of semiotic filter between them.
The sign
The final division for the subclasses of which Peirce actually provides examples 
is the Sign division. In the 1903 triadic typology, he distinguished between 
legisign, sinsign and qualisign (as have many commentators since in their 
discussions of the 66-class system in spite of the fact that Peirce had introduced 
a new terminology for these subdivisions). In the 1908 hexadic typology set out 
in Table 3.2, the division was composed of type, token and mark. However, in 
the extract below, written at most two days later, he suggests the triplet: potisign, 
actisign and famisign. The latter term is a particularly felicitous denomination as 
the idea of a legisign being a sign of law, etc., suggests a distance or remoteness by 
virtue of its generality, while the term ‘famisign’, on the other hand, accentuates 
the routine and familiar nature of the general signs that make up our daily lives:22
Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are 
divisible (S) into
A. Potisigns, or Objects which are signs so far as they are merely possible, but 
felt to be positively possible; as, for example, the seventh ray that passes through 
the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal’s hexagram.
B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hic et nunc; such as 
any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of 
a single page of a single copy of a book. There may be repetition of the whole 
paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other occurrence is 
not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS 
word is only in my copy.
C. Famisigns, familiar signs, which must be General, as General signs must 
be familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (I speak of signs which are “general”, 
not in the sense of signifying Generals, but as being themselves general; just as 
Charlemagne is general, in that it occurs many times with one and the same 
denotation.) (CP 8.347)
The interpretants
However, it is surely the subdivisions of the three interpretants which are the most 
innovative feature of the hexad defined by semiosis. They are also, unfortunately 
for the researcher, the ones for which we have least information from Peirce 
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himself. Remember that the hexadic system Peirce described to Lady Welby in 
his letter of 12 October 1904 was composed of a correlate division (S) and five 
relational ones (S–Od, S–Oi, S–If, S–Id, S–Ii),23 each division subdivided into 
three classes with respect to Peirce’s three categories. Although logically possible, 
the twenty-eight-class potential of the 1904 typology seems to have been 
neglected by Peirce as there seems to be no editorial evidence of him referring to 
such a system before the 23 December 1908 letter. Alternatively, perhaps Peirce 
imagined that the actual ordering of a series of relational characteristics of a 
sign was problematic. As it was, he appended in a postscript the ten classes he 
had established in 1903, adding ‘On the whole, then, I should say there were 
ten principal classes of signs’ (SS 35), which suggests that any attempt to derive 
twenty-eight classes from the 1904 hexad was unlikely to have been on Peirce’s 
agenda at that point.
Whatever the case in 1904, there seems to have been a form of regression 
in 1907, a time when Peirce was trying to work out the relations between the 
logical, energetic and emotional interpretants and his theory of pragmatism. 
These were presented ‘of a piece’, that is, without the subdivisions mentioned in 
some of the earlier typologies to be found in the Logic Notebook and discussed 
in Chapter 2, and each corresponded to a specific type of sign: respectively, 
concept, military command and performance of a piece of music, for example. 
This was presumably the reason why some Peirce scholars (e.g. Lalor (1997), 
discussed in Chapter 2, considered the emotional, energetic and logical set of 
interpretants as the specifically ‘human’ versions of the immediate, dynamic and 
final interpretants.
The situation changes quite radically in the system presented less than 
a year later in the 23 December letter, for each of the three interpretants is 
now subdivided into what can be considered loosely as feeling, action and 
habit or thought values, according to which universe signs are referred to. For 
example, looking at the subdivisions from an orthogonal perspective we find 
that as subjects of the universe of possibles, the immediate, dynamic and final 
interpretants all present a monadic, qualitative, insubstantial character: with 
respect to the first a sign is hypothetical, to the second it is sympathetic and 
to the third the sign is gratific, signifying, one assumes, that its purpose is to 
produce positive feeling.24 The triple distinction between feeling, action and 
habit runs orthogonally through the entire interpretant series.
From a ‘perpendicular’ perspective, on the other hand, taking the Id division 
as an example, Table 3.2 shows a three-way distinction between usual, percussive 
and sympathetic. This was the sixth division of the earlier (decadic) typology 
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established on 31 August 1906 (R339 285r (H534)), distributed ‘according to 
the Nature of the Middle Interpretant’. In that particular case, Peirce offered 
the following alternative but equivalent values: ‘congruentive’ for the possible 
subclass and ‘shocking’ for the existent one. While the congruentive/sympathetic 
subdivision of signs can be understood with respect to an emotional response, 
and the shocking/percussive subdivision with respect to an active, dynamic 
one, too, the ‘usual’ subdivision is less easily understood. Presumably, by a 
usual sign Peirce means that such a sign doesn’t disturb the interpreter’s mental 
equilibrium and conforms in this way to experience and expectation, which it 
ultimately confirms. Whatever the case, the sign must, as with all necessitant 
subjects, be quite general. Indeed in most cases it must be something of the 
nature of thought. Taking another example, if we examine now the case of the 
type, a necessitant sign, we know it has to be collective by Od, and copulant by 
Oi. What sort of sign will it be if, in the If division, its purpose is to produce 
self-control? The only general sort of sign that could fit such a format is thought 
itself or habit, and, unlike an action-producing token, is necessarily unavailable 
for inspection.25
It follows, therefore, from the extended description of the interpretants and 
the late development of the trichotomies defined within the Sign–Interpretant 
branch of the grand logic that researchers now have to determine just what 
it means, for example, for the mode of being of a dynamic interpretant to be 
necessitant, or for the mode of being of an immediate interpretant to be that 
of existence, if they are to understand the signs these distinctions enable them 
to classify, and also if Houser’s programme for semiotics is to be undertaken. 
Or, from another point of view, researchers have also to determine just what it 
means for a sign to be, to name just two of the new series, relative or categorical. 
True, some of the denominations of the subdivisions defined in the hexad are 
familiar. For example, the three subdivisions of signs determined by the dynamic 
object are ‘abstractive’, ‘concretive’ and ‘collective’, a series which echoes the 
grammatical distinctions between the abstract, concrete and collective common 
nouns of the grammar of English. Furthermore, the three subdivisions of signs 
in the immediate interpretant trichotomy follow distinctions traditionally made 
between relative, categorical and hypothetical propositions (cf. CP 2.325–6). 
Nevertheless, although he was to refer on occasion to the sorts of ‘universes of 
existence’ which might enable the researcher to comprehend at least one of the 
universes to which the objects determining whether a sign was an abstractive, 
a concretive or a collective belonged (e.g. CP 6.455 and CP 8.178, both from 
1908), as Peirce left it the system poses many problems of identification 
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and classification, and it is little wonder, then, that he never was able to complete 
a description of the posited twenty-eight and sixty-six classes of signs, and had 
difficulty in developing the Sign–Interpretant branch of the grand logic to his 
satisfaction.
In short, the interpretant sequence as it appears in both the six- and ten-
division systems suggests two lines of enquiry within the semiotics. First, 
the subdivision of all the interpretants into possible, existent and necessitant 
universes modifies the principle of continuous semiosis entailed by the earlier 
principle in which one interpretant, as a sign, determines a following interpretant 
– another sign – in a potentially unlimited series: this is now only possible for 
one of the twenty-eight possible classes, the self-control producing collective. 
Since action-producing signs terminate in ‘brute’ experience when referred to 
an existent final interpretant, any such logical continuity immediately ceases. 
Second, the interpretant sequence as presented in Table 3.2 requires us to review, 
too, aspects of the general philosophy of representation described in Chapter 
1, in particular the speculative rhetoric/methodeutic branch. We return to this 
problem in Chapters 4 and 5.
Figure 3.2 displays the major differences in the classificatory principles 
employed by the 10-class typology of 1903 and the 28-class system of 1908. The 
first has a predicate-based organizing principle (the criteria for classification 
are the predicaments or categories) which applies to the sign and two relational 
facets of signhood; the second presents an array of subjects arranged in the order 
of semiosis, each divisible in three ways according to the three modalities of 
being which Peirce described to Lady Welby in the letter of 23 December; in 
other words, according to whether the particular subject is necessitant, existent 
(is an ‘occurrence’ or a fact concerning one) or possible.
We note, too, that unlike the triadic system of 1903 with its ten classes of 
signs, the complex typological structure displayed in Table 3.2 generates 
twenty-eight very different classes: one of abstractives, six of concretives and 
twenty-one classes of collectives – the most complex class of all – and even to 
name them requires considerable imagination. What sort of semiotic entity, 
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Figure 3.2 The typologies of 1903 and 1908 compared
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for example, would be classified as a copulant, categorical sympathetic sign, or 
one classified as a gratific percussive relative (note that as a consequence of the 
logical constraints imposed by the hierarchy governing the three universes, in 
the first case if the sign is copulant, it is necessarily collective, and, in the second, 
if relative it will also necessarily be a copulant, collective type)? We are now a 
far cry from the relative comfort of the rhematic symbols and iconic sinsigns of 
yore …
More problematic, however, is the requirement that two apparently 
contrasting classificatory principles should be combined if we are to obtain 
sixty-six viable classes of signs. Just how compatible, we have to discover, are 
predicates and universes, even though we can divine Peirce’s three categories of 
the forms of experience – monad, dyad and triad – behind each? More specifically, 
is it possible to add, as Peirce suggested at the end of his 23 December letter, a 
further four more relational divisions to the organically ordered six in order to 
obtain a logical ordering for the ten divisions and the projected sixty-six classes 
Peirce hoped to derive from them, an issue to which an important branch of 
Peirce scholarship for the last seventy years has applied itself? Whatever the 
theoretical difficulties of such a task, we know that both systems, in spite of their 
differences, are capable of accounting differentially for the very same semiotic 
phenomena that we encounter everyday of our lives.
Summary and discussion
This chapter has sought to introduce and describe the theoretical aspects of the 
28-class system of December 1908; to discuss the problems left to researchers 
by Peirce’s scant indications as to how it is to be organized and used; and to 
determine how such a system might be combined with other divisions to yield 
the sixty-six classes of signs that preoccupied Peirce late in his career. It first 
introduced the hexad and compared it with the earlier one from 1904. The 
innovative features were: the nature of the divisions, here based on the correlates 
of the sign in the effectively hexadic conception of semiosis implicit in the letter 
to Lady Welby of 23 December 1908; the fact that these new divisions were 
subdivided by referring each correlate to one of three universes – of possible, 
existent and necessitant entities; the consequent disappearance of Peirce’s first 
and most fundamental trichotomy identifying icon, index and symbol, and 
the disappearance, too, of the sign–interpretant division which subdivides into 
rheme, dicisign and argument.
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With respect to this ordering problem, the material examined suggests that 
the difficulties encountered may be due to conflicting interpretations of Peirce’s 
varied terminology concerning the interpretants, and that they may also be a 
consequence of an incompatibility between a predicate-based classification 
and one based upon universes and the sorts of subjects they contain. Further 
contributing issues of debate are, first, the attempts by many authorities to establish 
phenomenological hierarchies between the subjects themselves as opposed 
to hierarchies within divisions; second, the fact that these phenomenological 
projects fail to take into account that in a predicative, category-based system, 
items are classified according to shared properties. All legisigns, for example, 
share the same law-like properties, whereas in a universe-based system the 
subjects, namely the sign and its five correlates in the new hexadic conception 
of semiosis, are not necessarily alike: objects, signs and interpretants differ 
from one another, while the two objects and three interpretants differ among 
themselves, but they nevertheless are members of one or other of three universes 
or classes defined by their respective ‘modalities of being’.
It is therefore quite possible that a predicate-based system like that of 1903 
might prove incompatible with the universe-based system of 1908. Indeed, 
the attempt to organize the sixty-six classes is hampered by three potential 
incompatibilities. To begin with, the ten divisions combine classes classified 
in two very different ways (category vs. universe). Then there is the fact that 
the two sets of divisions are derived from very different definitions of the sign, 
the 1903 version being a triad (O determines S which determines I, so that I 
is mediately determined by O) as opposed to the 1908 version where there is a 
chain of determinations in which each ‘subject’ determines the one that follows 
immediately (Od > Oi > S > Ii > Id > If). Finally, the ten divisions combine 
classes obtained from these two very different definitions of the sign.
What many authorities have failed to see, too, is that what we have in hexadb 
is an alternative, independent, autonomous sign-system which can function 
without the icon-index-symbol subclasses and arguments and dicisigns. Its 
theoretical bases reside in at least three features with implications for the entire 
edifice of the philosophy of representation as described in Chapter 1. First, the 
1906 description of sign-action acknowledges that while the sign communicates 
form to the interpretants it is not the sign as conceived around 1902–03 but 
the object which is logically the origin of the process, and that neither sign nor 
object ‘aims’ to do anything in semiosis. Second, while in 1903 both sign-action 
and the triadic classification system related the sign to a single, comprehensive 
interpretant albeit with the capacity to generate an interpretant series, the 
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identification of the nature and function of the three distinct interpretants and 
the way in which they are represented in, for example, Table 3.2, are surely 
evidence of Peirce’s growing understanding of the role of the interpretant. 
Third, the classification of the sign with respect to the three interpretants in the 
1908 system is a very feasible solution to the inquiry into what he had earlier 
seen as those ‘general conditions of reference of symbols and other signs into 
the interpretants they aim to determine’ of 1902, while the labels themselves 
identifying classes of signs with respect, in particular, to their final interpretants, 
give a logical, impersonal account of every sign’s telic, purposive nature. Clearly, 
Peirce has now left the heritage of Locke and Kant far behind.
Five years after the Lowell Lectures and the logically complete sign systems 
described in Chapter 1 Peirce produced another fully autonomous system, 
hexadb, but never exploited its potential. It is this task that Chapters 4 and 5 
modestly take up. Having described hexadb in what must seem very abstract 
detail we turn first, in Chapter 4, to concrete applications of the system and its 
potential for rhetorical analysis and, at the same time, to a comparison of the 




The previous three chapters have described, respectively, the 1903 philosophy 
of representation, some of the stages characterizing the development of Peirce’s 
conceptions of signs, sign-systems and the typologies they gave rise to in the 
period 1904–07, and, finally in Chapter 3, the hexad of 1908. After these at 
times highly technical chapters, we turn now to two chapters concerned with 
concrete examples of how the two systems function and, above all, how they 
differ. Since one of the purposes of this study is to assess the compatibility 
between the various divisions composing the three of 1903 and the six of 1908, 
the present chapter seeks to compare the way each ‘accommodates’ a variety 
of semiotic phenomena of obvious rhetorical intent – not, of course, with the 
intention of deciding which is the better or the more adequate but simply 
to show how they differ. This will also provide the opportunity to classify 
signs by means of at least one of the innovative 1908 typologies, a task which 
most commentators on the ordering of the ten divisions have conspicuously 
eschewed.
To this end the chapter first returns to the philosophy of representation 
and, in particular, to its third branch: speculative rhetoric. This is followed by 
a detailed exposition of an important concept developed within the 1903 ten-
class system, namely Peirce’s theory of the hypoicons. This has been held over 
to achieve the specific purpose of this chapter since, to all intents and purposes, 
it can be considered as a specifically rhetorical ‘module’ within the earlier 
typology. The chapter continues by analysing some of the examples discussed 
in Chapter 1 before examining a series of case studies. In this way, the chapter 
makes it possible to render in concrete terms the two very different conceptions 
of the sign in 1903 and 1908 by showing how the later typology differs from the 
earlier concerning their respective capacities to accommodate signs presenting 
this evident rhetorical intent.
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Speculative rhetoric
Speculative Rhetoric, it will be recalled, is the final branch of the Philosophy 
of Representation before Peirce declared his preference for the appellation 
‘methodeutic’, while the domain from which the examples are drawn is that of 
rhetorically motivated signs, both verbal and pictorial. To see why, we return to a 
pronouncement already mentioned in Chapter 1 concerning speculative rhetoric 
from the ‘Minute Logic’: ‘Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, 
is substantially what goes by the name of methodology, or better, of methodeutic. 
It is the doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other Signs 
to the Interpretants which they aim to determine’ (CP 2.93, 1902, emphasis added). 
This confident statement, characteristic of the 1902–03 period of the evolution of 
Peirce’s theorizing on signs, obviously concerned at the time the single division 
from 1866 to 1867. The general conditions Peirce mentioned are necessarily 
logical conditions, and are the province of the Sign–Interpretant branch of the 
grand logic. The importance of the 1902 statement is that rhetoric concerns 
not only the traditional field of verbal communication but must be extended 
innovatively to include indices and icons, the ‘other Signs’ of the definition: by this 
token, like verbal signs, photographs and paintings with or without captions also 
fall within the scope of speculative rhetoric. However, we have to bear in mind one 
of the major differences between the 1903 conception of speculative rhetoric and 
the 1908 hexad: by 1908 Peirce was working with not one but three interpretants.
A second definition makes a similar claim: ‘[Speculative rhetoric]’s most 
essential business is to ascertain by logical analysis, greatly facilitated by the 
development of the other branches of semeiotics, what are the indispensable 
conditions of a sign’s acting to determine another sign nearly equivalent to itself ’ 
(EP2 328, 1904). It also states that the rhetoric benefits from the two branches 
coming earlier in the general philosophy of representation. Equally significantly, 
this same text, ‘Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing’, promotes the idea 
of a perceived similarity with the traditional art of rhetoric by suggesting that 
good logical methodology involves signs efficiently determining their intended 
interpretants, a technically flavoured formula not only for efficient persuasion 
but also, more importantly, for efficient reasoning and hypothesizing.
Furthermore, Peirce had earlier made a crucially important distinction between 
speculative rhetoric and speculative grammar: ‘In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, 
after the main conceptions of logic have been well settled, there can be no serious 
objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, 
observations of how we think, and the like’ (CP 2.107, 1902). In other words, 
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while speculative grammar is an empty formalism specifying the purely systemic 
constraints on signhood and consequently is free from human bias, there is 
absolutely no theoretical reason why the rhetorical branch of the grand logic should 
not explicitly exploit the human factor in communication. Among other things, at 
this time, Peirce authorizes us to consider the speaker’s communicative purpose 
in the production of utterances. In 1904 he also suggests that the theoretical 
boundaries between speculative, ‘theoretical’ rhetoric and the traditional ‘art’ 
should be neutralized in a number of ways: ‘A proposition of geometry, a definition 
of a botanical species, a description of a crystal or of a telescopic nebula is subjected 
to a mandatory form of statement that is artificial in the extreme. Evidently, our 
conception of rhetoric has got to be generalized; and while we are about it, why not 
remove the restriction of rhetoric to speech?’ (EP2 326, 1904, emphasis added). The 
originality of this suggestion can be seen in the following extract from Peirce’s 
heterogeneous sample of the variety of intentional signs susceptible of rhetorical 
treatment: ‘every picture, diagram, natural cry, pointing finger, wink, knot in one’s 
handkerchief, memory, dream, fancy, concept, indication, token, symptom, letter, 
numeral, word, sentence, chapter, book, library, …’ (EP2 326, 1904). In other words, 
unlike Roland Barthes, for example, who in his essay ‘Rhetoric of the Image’ states 
that at least ‘in advertising the signification of the image is undoubtedly intentional’ 
(1977: 33), Peirce is here suggesting that there is no aspect of human communication, 
let alone advertising, which does not involve some form of rhetorical, persuasive 
intention. This, if we follow the gist of the 1904 essay, is the field of application 
of both common (cenoscopic) rhetoric and its special (idioscopic), traditional 
predecessor, a field which deals with potentially metaphorical signs as diverse as 
images and verbal utterances, for example.
It was seen in the previous chapter that of the ten divisions on which he sought 
to establish sixty-six classes of signs, Peirce considered the fourth trichotomy 
defining the icon, index and symbol to be the one he used most (CP 8.368). This 
being the case, one of the surprising aspects of his mature conception of semiosis 
is the fact that the hexad examined in Chapter 3 eliminates not only the three 
modes of representation (resemblance, physical connection and convention), 
which are functions of the relation holding between the sign and its object, 
but also, as a consequence, one of Peirce’s most notable subclasses of the icon, 
namely the diagram, which he himself put to considerable use in his Existential 
Graphs, and, concomitantly, his innovative conception of metaphor. It is this 
problem which makes it of considerable theoretical interest to distinguish 
logically between literal and metaphorical representation within the two distinct 
conceptions of signs. Enter, then, the hypoicons.
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The hypoicons
In this section we deal successively with the editorial problem concerning 
the hypoicons, why Peirce should have developed them, discussion of a small 
illustrative corpus and a series of case studies of pictorial artworks, the rhetoric 
of which is, in Barthes’s words, ‘undoubtedly intentional’.
The theoretical justification of the hypoicons is to be found in the two drafts 
of Peirce’s late 1903 Lowell Lectures discussed in Chapter 1, namely R478 and 
R540, which, as we saw, represent two distinct and complementary approaches 
to the definition of the sign. R540 identifies more fully the three correlates of any 
triadic relation and the three divisions they yield, whereas R478 first describes 
the categories and the various processes of separation, and exploits them to 
define two relational divisions: S–O and S–I.
Peirce’s original formulation is, as we saw in Chapter 1, as follows: 
‘Representamens are divided by two trichotomies. The first and most 
fundamental is that any Representamen is either an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol’ 
(EP2 273), the first sentence of which was edited out of the Collected Papers. It 
should be noted, too, that while the definition of the three hypoicons concludes 
a parent paragraph in the manuscript (EP2 274), paragraph 2.277 was published 
as an independent paragraph in the Collected Papers. Originally, then, what we 
know as CP 2.277 was simply the logical development of a trichotomy which was 
subsequently ‘postponed’ to second position in Peirce’s 1903 triadic classification 
system once he had defined the division concerning the sign itself in R540. This 
is the passage from R478 in which Peirce introduces the concept of the hypoicon:
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a 
First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a Representamen … 
But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, 
no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic 
Representamen may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is 
largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend 
or label it may be called a hypoicon. (CP 2.276, 1903)
Since the categories had enabled him to establish the three possible degrees of 
complexity of the sign, or ‘representamen’ as he called it at that time, he was finally able 
to justify logically the three modes of representation, namely, in order of increasing 
complexity, by resemblance,1 by physical connection and, finally, by convention. In 
the original manuscript (R478) he simply applied this categorial principle to the 
icon itself, by analysing the nature of the similarity which characterizes the icon. The 
result is the system set out in Table 4.1, which completes Table 1.2 from Chapter 1.
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Three grades of resemblance
Why should Peirce have deemed it necessary to trichotomize the icon and thereby 
define the hypoicons?2 It is safe to assume that if anyone had ever asked him in 
how many ways one entity can resemble another, he would never have approved 
of the idea that there was only one possible way. And, indeed, after having derived 
the icon, index and symbol subdivisions through the application of his categories 
he proceeded to derive the three hypoicons by recursively applying the categories 
to the icon itself, a process recorded in an uncompromising statement establishing 
the three degrees of structural complexity – in effect three grades of resemblance – 
exhibited by the hypoicons. The trichotomy resulting from this recursive process 
is the definition singularized as paragraph CP 2.277 in the Collected Papers 
describing image, diagram and metaphor in order of increasing complexity:3
Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of Firstness which 
they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are 
images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the 
parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those 
which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing 
a parallelism in something else, are metaphors. (EP2 274, 1903)
Since, as we saw in Chapter 1, R478 describes the categories in detail, it comes 
as no surprise that these categories should be applied in the same manuscript to 
the sign–object relation and recursively to the icon, the most basic of the three 
subclasses thus derived. Furthermore, Peirce had already described his theory of 
separation in detail in this very same manuscript. This made it possible for him to 
state in the later manuscript that the index involves a sort of icon and the symbol 
a sort of index (EP2 291–2). Since the recursive application of the categories 
to the icon yields image, diagram and metaphor, it follows by transitivity that 
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symbols will involve an icon and, consequently, any or all of the three hypoicons. 
Moreover, since, too, it can be hypothesized that the 1903 triadic definition of 
the sign and the 1908 hexadic conception of semiosis and the set of divisions 
each determines are logically compatible even though the criteria used by each 
are different, the chapter addresses the problem posed by the later exclusion of 
the icon and its three subdivisions, and shows that although these subdivisions 
cannot be explicitly identified within the hexadic system, it is possible to derive 
from it the sorts of distinctions the hypoicons realize.
Hypoicon, determination and the medium
The notion of sign–action as a process of determination began to enter Peirce’s 
definitions of the sign from about 1902 onwards. See, for example, ‘Anything 
which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which 
itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, 
and so on an infinitum’ (CP 2.303, 1902), for example, or ‘A REPRESENTAMEN 
is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a 
third, called is INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the 
REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic 
relation to the same object for some interpretant’ (CP 1.541, 1903). In these and 
subsequent definitions the interpretant is mediately ‘determined’, that is, caused 
to be such as it is, by the object via the sign. The process is represented by the 
following diagrammatic conventions: in Figure 4.1 the ‘ellipses’ represent the 
three correlates and the arrows the stages in the mediation of the sign between 
a single object and a single intepretant, a representation which will, hopefully, 
render this complex system comprehensible.
Variations in this determination or mediation process in sign-action as 
conceived in 1903 are represented in Figures 4.2 through 4.5 – respectively, 
simple illustrations of the three increasingly complex types of internal structure − 
in which some dynamic object mediately determines an interpretant by means 
of a sign whose structure that object has already determined, a sign which, 
depending upon the nature of the relation holding between it and its object, may 
be an icon, an index or a symbol.
SignObject Interpretant
Figure 4.1 Sign-action as conceived in 1903
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The three ways in which the sign can resemble its object by virtue of Peirce’s 
categorical principle are thus represented by Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, 
respectively, generic image, diagram and metaphor and a concrete example 
of metaphor, while the arrows represent both the process of determination 
and the instantiation of the sign as an inescapably ‘sensible’ – in other words, 
existential – medium such as a sheet of paper, a cinema screen or the front page 
of a newspaper. Note that it is the sign alone which has hypoiconic structure 
since it is the ‘representing’ correlate in the process.
Figure 4.2 is a very basic representation of the qualities inhering in some 
object which determine corresponding qualities – the First Firstnesses of 
the definition – in a given sinsign. As Peirce suggests in the first of the two 
definitions introducing the hypoicons given above, ‘Any material image, as a 
painting’, illustrates the process: Leonardo’s Mona Lisa is a sinsign composed of 
such qualities as lines, forms and colours arranged in a distinctive manner.
Figure 4.3 represents the structure of a very basic diagram, an icon composed 
essentially of Second Firstnesses, namely the dyadic relations mentioned in the 
definition and represented as the relation a–b between the two partial objects 
a and b in the fact represented by the sign, such relations being a step up the 
phenomenological scale from the Firstnesses composing the image. The diagram 
is thus an icon of at least one of whatever dyadic relations inform the object 
it represents (CP 4.418, 1903), and structures not only verbal utterances and 
photographs but also all manner of instruments of measurement, the instructions 
for building kits or installing electrical appliances, and the illustrations in 
geometry manuals, for example.
Finally, metaphor is the hypoiconic structure partaking of Third Firstnesses – 
mediation, synthesis, representation (see, for example, CP 1.378, c. 1890). 
Whereas the simplified scheme of the diagram in Figure 4.3 contains a relation 
SignObject Interpretant
q1, q2, q3, ... qn q1, q2, q3, ... qn q1, q2, q3, ... qn
Figure 4.2 The hypoiconicity of a sign with image structure
SignObject Interpretant
a            b a            b a            b
Figure 4.3 The hypoiconicity of a sign with diagram structure
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constitutive of some fact such as ‘I shot the sheriff ’, metaphor as defined by Peirce 
places two such relations in parallel (indicated by the pairs of // symbols in Figure 
4.4). These present counterpart mappings from elements belonging to some 
generally uncontroversial, well-known fact or relation (a–//–b), and referred to 
within cognitive linguistics as the ‘base domain’, which is the fact considered 
to be the basis of the judgement and hopefully self-evident to the addressee or 
interpreter, to the elements (a’–//– b’), elements in the target relation or ‘target 
domain’, which is the fact or relation that is being judged or commented upon, 
or is somehow controversial and not yet accepted. Note that the repetition of the 
structure of the object in the structure of the interpretant is a way of showing 
that the metaphor has been correctly interpreted. Should a child hear an adult 
state that man is a wolf, for example, the child might reply, ‘But that’s silly, a wolf 
is an animal.’ In such a case, the structure of the interpretant probably would not 
realize the intended parallelism.
It should be evident from Figure 4.4 that some of the information given in the 
simple parallelism in the object is missing from the sign, which displays a single 
relation holding between partial objects drawn from the two distinct domains. 
In this case, as the other partial objects in the original parallel are missing from 
the sign, the sign is said to be ‘underspecified’ with respect to its object: the 
sign can have no structure or form, as we saw in Chapter 2, that has not been 
communicated by the object, but in the case of metaphor it doesn’t represent 
all the elements characterizing the structure of the object. Furthermore, the 
elements which the sign contains are drawn from two very distinct relations, here 
a’ and a, with the result that metaphorical signs are diagnostically incongruous. 
For these two reasons the ellipse representing the sign in Figure 4.4 contains a 
single relation, although some metaphorical signs, as we see below, can represent 
vectorially more than two.
It was Peirce’s logical nous that enabled him to see that there are signs more 
complex than the common diagrammatic type, signs which represent an object 
structurally and, as he saw it at the time, phenomenologically more complex than 
themselves; signs, finally, which ‘synthesize’ in the guise of a judgement elements 
from two distinct relations, representing two distinct ‘worlds’ or ‘universes of 
SignObject Interpretant
a'            aa              (b)a'              (b')
a              (b)
a'              (b')
Figure 4.4 The hypoiconicity of a sign with metaphor structure
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existence’ (cf., for example, EP2 492–97, and below). However, this ‘two-tiered’ 
parallel structure is too complex to be accommodated fully by the Secondness 
of the existential medium (airwaves, paper, blackboard, computer screen etc.) 
through which the structure of the object has perforce to be communicated, and 
results in such one-dimensional, vectorial structures as the one displayed in the 
sign in Figure 4.4. This is the necessarily simplified scheme of the structure of 
the verbal sign (4.3) below represented as a phenomenological ‘bottleneck’ in 
Figure 4.5, where the bracketed items in the parallelism informing the object are 
‘sifted out’ by a phenomenologically less complex medium, which in this way 
restricts the perceivable form of the sign, rendering it both underspecified and 
incongruous. Consider the following simple verbal examples:
 (4.1) I killed the sheriff.
 (4.2) I shot the sheriff.
 (4.3) I slaughtered the sheriff.
It follows from what was seen above that the object in each case is composed 
of the partial objects I (in this case, of course, the utterer) and the sheriff. On the 
other hand, the part of each utterance appropriated to representing how the sign 
represents the relation between these partial objects is signified by a transitive 
verb. In (4.1) killed is a neutral representation of the change-of-state process 
involved in the fact represented. In (4.2) shot, as is generally the case in English, 
represents additionally the manner of change of state: to shoot someone is to kill 
them in a certain way, with a bow and arrow, for example, or, more probably in 
this case, with a gun. Both verbs are literal verbal representations of this process, 
which necessarily belongs to the same ‘universe’ or ‘world’ as the protagonists. 
The hypoiconic structure of each is diagrammatic – a straightforward dyadic 
relation holding between the two partial objects displayed in a very elliptical 
and abstract manner in Figure 4.3, where the partial objects I and the sheriff 
are represented, respectively, by the letters a and b, and the verbal process 
associating them by a line. This is the basic structure of such utterances as John 
Object
(butchers) slaughter (cattle)
 I          (kill)        sheriff
Interpretant
(butchers) slaughter (cattle)
 I          (kill)        sheriff
Sign
I slaughter sheriff
Figure 4.5 The metaphorical structure of the sign I slaughtered the sheriff
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is in love with Helen and Cain killed Abel. It is also the basic simplex structure of 
any clefts constructed on, for example (4.2) above:
 (4.4) It was the sheriff that I shot.
 (4.5) What I did was shoot the sheriff.
In (4.3), on the other hand, the verbal form slaughtered is highly charged 
from a figurative point of view: it is both hyperbolic and metaphorical, for while 
the two partial objects belong to the same universe of existence, the part of the 
sign serving to represent the relation holding between them draws upon the 
entirely different universe of the wholesale killing by butchers or slaughterhouse 
workers of cattle, sheep or other animals for food: to slaughter the sheriff is to 
treat him not as a human being but as an anonymous piece of meat. This is the 
basic structure illustrated in Figure 4.5, which shows the original parallelism 
in the object where the elements not appearing in the sign are in brackets. The 
culturally well-known relation between butchers and cattle occupies the base 
domain,4 while the controversial relation between the speaker (I) and the sheriff 
occupies the target domain beneath. It is for this reason that any counterparts 
in either relation not appearing in the sign can conveniently be indicated 
in Figure  4.5 (and subsequent diagrammatic representations of metaphoric 
structure) within parentheses, as they have been ‘bracketed out’ from the 
structure in the object by the necessity of communicating this form through an 
existential medium.
Now the process of drawing together facts belonging to distinct universes 
of existence and placing them in parallel is obviously dependent upon, if we 
retain Peirce’s preferred abstract conceptualization, some ‘quasi-mind’ having 
perceived a resemblance between them and wishing to communicate it, and the 
paragraph defining the hypoicons turns out to be pivotal between speculative 
grammar, in which it is defined, Peirce’s category theory on which the definition 
was based in 1903, and an early awareness of the universes of existence which 
enables us to understand where the parallelism in metaphor, for example, comes 
from.
Moreover, this complex situation is an ecological one, depending upon the 
necessarily existential nature of the sign as medium – we couldn’t perceive it if 
it didn’t exist – more precisely upon the three distinct structural configurations 
informing the relation holding between an iconic sign and the existential medium 
by means of which it has necessarily to be communicated, for example on the 
page of a book. The hypoicons as defined in CP 2.277 in 1903 can therefore be 
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understood to be a logical accommodation of this complex ecological situation.5 
As can be seen from the simple examples above, the form communicated by 
the object to the medium is only fully represented in the first two cases. This 
problem can be understood in terms of the relation or ‘ratio’ characterizing 
the complexity of the form to be communicated, the number of universes of 
existence composing the object and the necessarily existent and therefore, 
singular, status of the sign as a perceivable medium. The explanation as to why 
metaphoric signs are underspecified and incongruous can be explained logically 
as opposed to phenomenologically in the hexad.
The hypoicons, then, constituted a module within the S–O division 
redefining the scope of rhetorical phenomena, increasing its range from the 
traditional binary literal – figurative distinction to a three-way division between 
image, diagram and metaphor, based upon the three categories of the forms 
of experience, namely the monad, the dyad and the triad, as seen earlier. In 
short, Peirce’s hypoicons were one of the philosophy of representation’s major 
contributions to the analysis of the whole range of ‘true representation, so far 
as representation can be known without any gathering of special facts beyond 
our ordinary daily life’ as Peirce has it in 1903 (CP 1.539). It was also the source 
of a very vigorous branch of contemporary linguistic research, namely iconicity 
theory, demonstrating that languages are not arbitrary in structure – they would 
be unlearnable if this were the case – but, rather, motivated, even if the nature 
of the motivation is not always immediately observable in verbal signs.6 We turn 
now to the task of comparing the hypoicons with the analytic system provided by 
the hexad of 1908. In what follows, the classification of each sign is not intended 
to be definitive, as such an exercise could easily become repetitive and jejune, 
but principally a heuristic for exploring the potential of the system. We begin by 
examining some of the illustrations from Chapter 1.
Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1, the drawing of Cheyne Walk, was classified as an 
iconic sinsign. We saw that as such it presents a likeness with some object but, 
unlike a photograph, cannot afford proof of the existence of that object – an icon 
is a relation, not an independent correlate. It has a rhematic syntax that we can 
represent as ‘— is like this’ much like a predicate function. From the hypoiconic 
point of view, the drawing on its own is imagic: it consists in a series of qualities 
on an existent sheet of paper arranged in such a way that we recognize people 
standing on the bank of a river. If we add the original caption it becomes the 
replica of a dicent indexical legisign: the sign’s new syntax is such as to establish 
a dicent association between the caption, a verbal sign and therefore a legisign 
and the image. The resultant sign can be paraphrased as ‘Cheyne Walk is like 
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this’, where ‘this’ is the sum total of qualities on the image. In this way the degree 
of hypoiconicity increases, too, and the new completer sign composed of image 
plus caption is structured by a simple dyad and is therefore diagrammatic like 
the verbal examples (4.1) and (4.2) above.
The problem is how to classify this illustration by hexadb. For convenience, 
Table 3.2 from Chapter 3 is reproduced as Table 4.2. If we analyse the image 
from the perspective of the hexad, the approach is very different. The first 
point to note is that what we are looking at and classifying is, in fact, the way 
the sign’s immediate object has composed the lines, colours and shapes into 
an immediately recognizable representation of a given set of partial objects. 
We saw in the preceding chapter that in the draft of 25 December 1908 (CP 
8.366) Peirce identified the range of dynamic objects of signs according to the 
universe to which they belong: possibles (colour, mass, whiteness etc.), existent 
objects (humans, individuals such as Charlemagne) and collections or classes 
(mankind, humanity etc.). In view of this, Figure 1.3, which clearly represents 
existent objects such as humans, trees, buildings and river banks, among other 
things, is a concretive sign – the fact that it is a drawing and possibly the fruit of 
the artist’s imagination makes no difference; it is what it represents that counts, 
here members of classes of existent entities. As it is, in itself, namely a sheet of 
paper and an existent object, therefore, the drawing is classified as a token, and 
logically must be designative.
As far as the interpretants are concerned, there is necessarily a problem 
(which would beset any attempt at classification within the 66-class system, 
too), namely how to identify the interpretants in such a case. There are two 
ways to classify the interpretant sequence in Table 4.2: a priori as a prospective 
deployment of the interpretants in, for example, a publicity campaign, or a 
posteriori as when classifying an interpretation that has been witnessed and 
Table 4.2 A reconstruction of the 23 December 1908 hexadic typology
Subject
Od Oi S li ld lf
Universe
Necessitant collective copulant type relative usual to produce  
self-control
Existent concretive designative token categorical percussive to produce  
action
Possible abstractive descriptive mark hypothetical sympathetic gratific
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recorded. While with a little ingenuity and a lot of luck it would be possible 
to follow the series of interpretants in a real-life interpretation sequence, in an 
exercise like the present it has to be a matter of informed guesswork. Working 
back from the final interpretant division for convenience, we can say that since 
Figure 1.3 is a drawing we can assume that for the final interpretant the sign is 
gratific, that is, intended to produce a feeling (it is hard to think that it might 
have been part of some nineteenth-century town planning campaign targeting 
council action on a new housing estate, for example). In this case, it may have 
produced a verbal reaction from one or other of its viewers – ‘How nice!’ or ‘The 
perspective is wrong.’ Or even ‘The river is too close to the buildings.’ These are 
all viable dynamic interpretants and would make the sign percussive. Finally, if 
percussive, the sign at Ii is likely to be categorical: the immediate interpretant is 
what we might call the ‘semantic’ stage in interpretation, the stage in which we 
turn the squiggles on the paper medium of Figure 1.3 into creatures from the 
physical world – humans, river banks, trees and buildings. Another example of 
this semantic stage of the process of interpretation is when we mentally transform 
the colours, lines and shapes dancing on the medium of the cinema screen into 
the creatures of our experience – men, women, Martians and so on – before the 
next, active, dynamic interpretant stage when we laugh out loud, cower in our 
seats or furtively wipe a tear from our cheeks.
Now let us examine Figure 1.4 once more, which shows two young Chinese 
women sheltering from the sun beneath a parasol beside a lake at the Summer 
Palace in Beijing. This is, as we saw earlier, a dicent (indexical) sinsign 
(cf. CP 2.320, in which Peirce defines the section of rays from the model of 
a photograph as its quasi-subject and the print thus obtained as its quasi-
predicate). Its hypoiconic status as a photograph is clearly diagrammatic since 
the relations between the areas of light and dark on the print correspond term 
by term to relations holding between the objects participating in the original 
situation, although it also ‘involves’ in the sense of CP 2.247–248 clearly imagic 
complex areas of light and shade which enable us to recognize via the immediate 
interpretant stage the entities represented before we actually react to the image.
By hexadb, the photograph again is concretive since it represents exemplars of 
existent objects: females, leaves, trees, boats on the lake and so on, and the sign’s 
immediate object has communicated to the sign forms of fully recognizable 
entities. The photographic print exhibiting these forms is a physical medium, 
and therefore a token. Working back from a putative final interpretant again, 
we assume that the photograph is gratific, intended not to produce some sort 
of action – prohibit the use of personal parasols in these private grounds, or 
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introduce the hire of parasols on hot days, for example – but to produce a feeling 
of compassion, amazement or wonder at the beauty of the photograph. If this is 
the case, then the immediate interpretant is again the semantic stage when we 
mentally transform the patches of light and shade on the print into the creatures 
that we recognize – females, trees, boats and so on.
The important point is that whereas there is a significant difference between 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 within the 1903 classification – one is an icon, the other 
an index – by hexadb both are classified in identical manner: they are gratific, 
percussive, concretive signs, since both represent exemplars of objects that exist. 
There is, nevertheless, an advantage in the hexadic classification. The 1903 
system is predicate-based: the system employs Peirce’s categories in order to 
distinguish the various subdivisions within a given trichotomy. Consequently, 
whatever representation is classified as an iconic sinsign is logically the same as 
any other iconic sinsign, and by this token there is no logical difference between 
Figure 1.3 and, say, Leonardo’s Mona Lisa. Similarly, there is no logical difference 
between Figure 1.4, the photograph of the two young women taken in 2015 in 
China and Figure 4.6, the photograph of a train that fell through a station wall 
in Paris 120 years earlier.
At this point the reader is no doubt thinking ‘This is as may be, but I can 
see that one illustration depicts tiny humans on a river bank, and I know that 
Leonardo’s painting has a seated woman smiling enigmatically’ or ‘But one 
shows two women and a lake, the other an old-fashioned train’. Nevertheless, 
if any one iconic sinsign or any one dicent sinsign were logically different from 
all the others, Peirce’s system would be inconsistent. It follows, then, that when 
making judgements concerning the items in a pictorial sign, for example, the 
reader is unwittingly employing the methodology of hexadb, for this typology 
classifies a sign not according to how it represents its object (and how it relates 
to its interpretant) as does the 1903 system, but, first and foremost, according to 
the readily identifiable sorts of things, entities or objects that it represents. Unlike 
the system of 1903, a typology such as hexadb authorizes us, among other things, 
to seek to identify the sorts of partial objects in the fact or event ‘filtered’ by the 
immediate object onto the sign before us, whereas such a strategy in the earlier 
system is not validated by the logic.
In short, from a semiotic perspective, any iconic sinsign with or without a 
caption resembles nothing so much as any other iconic sinsign; any dicisign 
resembles nothing so much as any other dicisign – and this without distinction, 
since each and every one shares the properties which enable them to be classified 
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Figure 4.6 Train wreck at Montparnasse, 1895, Wikimedia Commons
as such. On the other hand, while every concretive sign (the division at Od in 
Table 4.2) must be logically similar to every other concretive sign to qualify as 
such, we are authorized to identify and list the different partial objects each 
represents, for were we not able to do so, we should be unable to classify such 
signs as concretives in the first place. Similarly, we recognize collectives and 
abstractives, respectively, as such by virtue of the classes and qualities and so on 
that they represent.
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Universes
The following section of the chapter is now devoted to the way the hexad of 
1908 accommodates rhetorical phenomena without recourse to hypoiconicity 
and reference to icons, indices and symbols. The general theoretical framework 
is provided by the concept of the universe of existence, which Peirce introduced 
explicitly in his correspondence with William James. Although less detailed 
in nature than the system of hypoicons, it is nevertheless applicable to a wide 
variety of signs since it exploits the basic principle of the hexad, namely that we 
analyse the sorts of objects that the sign represents rather than the manner or 
mode in which it represents them. It is within this framework, therefore, that 
the theoretical problems raised by the case studies can most conveniently be 
examined.
Dylan Thomas
We begin with another verbal example, an extract from Dylan Thomas’s poetic 
profession of faith, his brief Ars poetica, ‘In My Craft and Sullen Art’:
I labour by singing light
Not for ambition or bread
Or the strut and trade of charms
On the ivory stages ….
From the point of view of the topoi of classical rhetoric this extract is very rich: 
hypallage in the first line (lights don’t normally sing, whereas humans writing 
beneath them might do), the metonymy of bread, here representing more 
generally the poet’s livelihood, and, finally, the highly complex associations 
in his assertion that he doesn’t write poetry for the ‘strut and trade of charms 
/ on the ivory stages’ either. In terms of paragraph CP 2.277 the hypoiconic 
structure of these lines is definitely metaphoric, although it would take a far 
more complex diagrammatization of the sequence of intricate parallelisms 
informing the text than the one in Figure 4.4. Nevertheless, the 1903 system 
enables us to identify the diagrammatic form of hypallage and metonymy, and 
at least understand that it is informed by a series of parallelisms characteristic 
of metaphoric structure.
What of the system of 1908? The principal purpose of the chapter is to 
compare and contrast the two systems and the way each accommodates rhetorical 
material. It is important to evaluate their differences and to attempt to assess their 
compatibility since both contribute to the ten divisions that are intended to yield 
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sixty-six classes of signs. The concept of the universe of existence associated with 
the two sign-systems of 1908 (i.e. the definition and the typology it generates) 
offers an alternative method of teasing out the complex relations to be found 
in the extract from Thomas’s poem, since the universe of existence in this 
case is composed of the complex association of features involved in Thomas’s 
conception of poetic creation.7
An initial indication of the theoretical interest of the principle involved is 
provided in the following extract from a draft letter to William James composed 
barely two months after the one to Lady Welby in which the twenty-eight and 
sixty-six classes of signs were first mentioned. In it Peirce details a number of 
cases where the sign’s dynamic object corresponds to what he terms the ‘universe 
of existence’, and he makes what at first sight seems to be a very surprising 
affirmation:
The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the Sign. For the Object 
of ‘‘Napoleon’’ is the Universe of Existence so far as it is determined by the fact of 
Napoleon being a Member of it. The Object of the sentence ‘‘Hamlet was insane’’ 
is the Universe of Shakespeare’s Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet 
being part of it. (EP2 493, 1909)
In most of the definitions of the sign in which it appears, the dynamic object 
had hitherto been defined as the determinant of the sign and, mediately, of its 
three interpretants. It comes as somewhat of a surprise to find now that the 
object can also be a determination or creation of the sign. However, Peirce’s 
conception of the dynamic object, as we see in greater detail in the chapter to 
come, was undergoing considerable development in the years 1908–09, as the 
following definition shows:
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,—i.e. the Object as 
represented in the sign,—and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is 
altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the 
Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, 
which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral 
experience. (CP 8.314, 1909)
The reference to the notion that ‘perhaps the Object is altogether fictive’ 
explains the remark suggesting that the object may be a creation of the sign. In 
the James draft Peirce gives the example of the proper noun Napoleon, noting 
that its object is the ‘Universe of Existence’ so far as Napoleon the historical 
figure is a member of that universe: it is the universe itself which constitutes the 
sign’s dynamic object. At this late date, then, the object of any proper noun is in 
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this way the universe determined by the referent of that proper noun’s being a 
member of it. Similarly, the writer of the present study and any and every reader 
of it belong to a common universe of existence, and Napoleon, although a person 
of the past, also determines it. Hamlet, on the other hand, a ‘fictive’ personage, 
nevertheless also determines a universe (which, of course, impinges on our 
own through our having seen the play or learnt about it somehow), namely the 
universe of Shakespeare’s creation. In the draft letter to James, Peirce discusses 
other examples of such ‘universes’, but the important point to note is that at 
this time not only was he expanding his conception of the sign’s dynamic object 
but also that he was coming to associate it more and more with the concept of 
the universe of existence, one of the three enabling him to distinguish between 
the subdivisions of the six or ten trichotomies yielding twenty-eight or sixty-six 
classes of signs.8 It is this concept of the universe of existence, or, quite simply 
of a universe of which the protagonist(s) represented in the sign Peirce calls the 
‘Special Object’ (EP2 492), that provides a framework within which to interpret 
the complex figurative language in the extract from Dylan Thomas’s poem 
quoted above from the hexadic perspective.
With respect to the classification of the extract by hexadb, the exact nature 
of the dynamic and final interpretants remains problematic. However, we do 
know from what Peirce wrote to Lady Welby that all the words in a dictionary 
are necessarily types (SS 83). This being the case, and temporarily setting aside 
the type–instance (token) distinction for the sake of simplicity, the sentence in 
the extract is necessarily collective and copulant (the multiple associations to be 
examined below are also evidence of this). At division Ii the sign is relative, by 
which Peirce presumably means that the interpretability of such a sign involves, 
here too, the processing of multiple cognitive associations (syntactic, semantic 
and rhetorical) as opposed to identifying people, for example, in a painting 
by means of a categorical-determining immediate interpretant, since at the 
necessitant level the six ‘subjects’ of the typology are referred to a universe of 
generality and habit, a level where, for example, thought and not air waves or 
the written page is the medium of the type. If the recited poem produces an 
audible enthusiastic reception from whoever reads it, the sign is percussive, and, 
one assumes, given the genre, that this deliberately enigmatic poem is gratific 
rather than action-producing. In short, whereas the sign is the complex replica 
of a dicent symbol by the early typology, it is a gratific, percussive, relative sign 
by the later. On their own, such classifications have a mainly theoretical interest 
and contribute little in either case to our understanding and appreciation of the 
poem: it is not the final classification which is interesting but rather the abductive 
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processes that the interpreter employs heuristically in order to obtain it. A more 
interesting form of analysis is, in fact, the reconstruction of those elements of 
the universe of poetic creation that the poet rejects, poetic inspiration being 
the particular universe of existence within which the meaning of the extract is 
constructed. What follows, then, is a brief inventory of some of the allusions by 
means of which the poet has composed this universe. To simplify, we restrict 
the analysis to the final two lines of metaphor, a particularly important problem 
in view of the fact that the hexad has no icon and therefore no hypoicons to 
facilitate the task. Herewith the final two lines from the extract once more:
Or the strut and trade of charms
On the ivory stages ….
The primary theoretical interest here is that the sources of Thomas’s 
inspiration are defined negatively in the extract: the full extract lists not the 
causes or reasons for composing poetry but some of the sources of inspiration 
which do not belong in his universe of creation – he is not driven by ambition 
nor does he write simply to earn a living, for example. In the final lines of the 
extract, the ‘strut and trade of charms’ introduces the rejection of another reason 
for composing poetry disguised in a number of luminously combined allusions 
to universe-determining ‘objects’ or ‘special objects’ intended to enable us to 
appreciate the poet’s ethical position and to reconstruct a contrario the particular 
creative universe that the poet is targeting. The ‘strut’ is that of the peacock and 
of a poet parading a gaudy appearance that dazzles the public, while the object 
‘trade of charms’ characterizes a flashy, creation-debasing activity from the world 
of finance. The expression ‘ivory stages’ denotes a further complex association of 
objects – the ivory of the teeth is a synecdoche of the mouth, itself a metonym 
for speech and the organ for reciting. The ‘ivory stages’, like the ‘sullen craft’ of 
the poem’s title, constitute yet another case of hypallage,9 as the stages are not the 
location where the mouth produces the recitation but the mouth itself. In this 
case, too, we have a ‘universal’ correspondence, hypallage being in this theory 
the attribution of a property of an object from one universe of existence to an 
object belonging to another.
As a poet, Thomas, thinking possibly of the Eisteddfod, but more likely 
and more mischievously, of lucrative public poetry reading sessions, claims to 
be rejecting this latter institution which bestows public fame, appearance and 
fortune as a reason for composing his poetry (this from a poet not averse to 
giving poetry recitations on lecture tours!), writing only for the lovers, abed with 
their arms round the ‘griefs of the ages’, one of the positive elements determining 
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his creative universe alluded to in the poem. Finally, there is a veiled reference to 
the universe of Shakespearean drama, Macbeth to be precise, in the echo of the 
‘poor player, that struts and frets his hour upon the stage, and then is heard no 
more’. The ‘strut and trade of charms / on the ivory stages’ thus turns out to be 
Dylan Thomas’s striking description of what we would more mundanely refer to 
as ‘remunerated public readings of pretty-sounding poetry’.
The analysis above was intended to set out the broad lines of the 1908 
approach made possible by Peirce’s late conception of the dynamic object and the 
sorts of universes its special objects can determine: the poem blends a number 
of both positive and negative objects of this sort. This broader conception of 
the dynamic object is of particular importance within the theme of the chapter, 
of which the remainder deals with a number of pictorial case studies where the 
differences between hypoiconicity and this posited universe approach will be 
made in greater detail.
Jerry Uelsmann: Symbolic Mutation
In this case we compare two photographs depicting the male fist and the 
female face or, more generally, the vulnerability of the female at the hands of a 
potentially violent male, a photograph being able to freeze its dynamic object(s) 
in a determining moment of a universe in the Peircean sense. The immediate 
object as communicated to the sign in Figure 4.7 displays an imminent attack 
by a male on a cowering female victim. The partial objects thus represented 
determine the clearly recognizable universe of existence of violence against 
women. The elements composing Jerry Uelsmann’s photograph, Symbolic 
Mutation (1961), on the other hand, determine a far more elusive universe 
which, as in the interpretation of the Thomas extract above, we have to decipher 
from the clues, here pictorial, provided by the image.
The reader will no doubt have realized that like the verbal utterances (4.2) 
and (4.3), two replicas of dicent symbols discussed above, the two photographs, 
although both dicent sinsigns, display markedly different hypoiconic structure. 
Figure 4.7 is a straightforward dramatic diagram-structured representation of 
the imminent violence, while Jerry Uelsmann’s image, Figure 4.8, like much of 
his nature photography of the period, and indeed like much of his contemporary 
photography which he continues to create in the analogue mode,10 is subtly 
metaphorical, blending elements from two different contexts, a structure which 
Figure 4.9 is intended to show in its barest essentials.
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Figure 4.7 An image of domestic violence, Adobe Stock
Figure 4.8 Jerry Uelsmann, Symbolic Mutation, 1961, Courtesy of the artist
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From the point of view of hexadb we note, first, that the dynamic objects 
represented by the two photographs are existents, a male and a female in each 
case, which means that within the Od division both signs are theoretically 
concretive. As signs, both are tokens, and with respect to their immediate 
interpretants are categorical – we recognize the lines, shading and shapes on the 
prints as the representations of human beings. Their disturbing tenor no doubt 
provokes reactions of disgust or surprise as dynamic interpretants, and we can 
therefore classify both in the dynamic interpretant division as percussive.
However, if displayed on a poster, for example, and in view of the telic 
nature of the sign at the final stage of the interpretation process – to produce 
self-control, an action or a feeling – Figure 4.7 would presumably be intended 
to produce some sort of social change or at least consciousness-raising in the 
observers of the image, and in this case would be a ‘literal’ action-producing 
concretive. Uelsmann’s complex composite photograph, on the other hand, 
is not literal but doubly figurative. First, it blends elements from two distinct 
universes: different negatives, different moments and different worlds – the 
fragile and vulnerable world of the female and the seemingly brutal world of 
the male. Second, the partial objects of these distinct worlds are represented, 
respectively, by synecdoche: the hairy-fingered male fist enclosing the fragile 
face of the woman is all we see of either protagonist. In a manner recalling the 
metonymic references in Bulmer Lytton’s ‘The pen is mightier than the sword’ 
– in other words, the journalist/writer is a more powerful agent of social change 
than the soldier − or Wordsworth’s ‘The child is father of the man’, in which the 
nominal elements stand not for an individual child, father or man (existents), but 
as the representatives of general classes (necessitants), Uelsmann’s magnificent 
image has generic as opposed to singular scope, and can be interpreted to 
represent two general classes rather than two individuals. This suggests that the 
sign, while apparently a concretive – it represents existents, namely a man and 
a woman – is not a typical photographic concretive like the one in Figure 4.7. It 
is a token combining existents defining two distinct universes: by its immediate 





face(female victim)face in clenched fist
Figure 4.9 The pictorial parallelism in Symbolic Mutation
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In conclusion, then, we find two divisions within the hexadic system in which 
Uelsmann’s photographic masterpiece differs from Figure 4.7. First, this is a 
work of art and in spite of the negative judgement it appears to make on male–
female relations, with respect to its final interpretant, it is surely to be classified 
gratific in a sense broader than merely giving pleasure. Second, in view of the 
synecdochical structure of the photograph which transforms the individual 
man and woman into representatives of general classes, in interpreting it we 
unwittingly ‘promote’ the photograph in the dynamic object division to the 
status of a collective. If this (necessarily speculative) analysis is correct, Figure 
4.8 is a gratific, percussive, copulant (the image obviously represents its partial 
objects as humans but the striking synecdochical arrangement is determined by 
a complex structuring at the necessitant Oi stage which produces the generic 
impression) collective sign, the photograph’s immediate interpretant being the 
mental conversion of the pictorial elements of the two quite distinct universes 
which are represented elliptically in the forms communicated by its immediate 
object.
John Goto: Flower Seller
John Goto’s 2002 photographic tableau Flower Seller, Figure 4.10, is another 
example of how the partial objects frozen in the image determine a micro-
universe. Within the 1903 system, it would be classified (independently of its 
caption) as a dicent sinsign – an informational sign – as is the case with all 
photographs, this one being, within this sort of analysis, no different logically 
from any other dicent sinsign. However, independently of any classification, any 
observer of the photograph would surely recognize the tension generated in the 
image between the plight of the ex-serviceman and the emblems of his service to 
his country. The 1908 system, which has no means of identifying icons, indices 
and dicent signs and so on, requires therefore that we ‘enter’ the image. In this 
way, the sign’s ideologically charged message is to be inferred from the analysis 
and not simply from collateral knowledge of British politics of the period. This 
will involve, too, reconstructing another universe of existence, the universe of 
which this bleak tableau is the antithesis.
What are the significant details to be seen in the image? An inventory of 
the objects composing the situation depicted confirms a depressing, cold winter 
scene in what appears to be a deserted, ultramodern shopping precinct.12 The 
drab grey-blue backdrop (in the original) is formed of a building dominated 
by curtained windows, the multiple glass panes separated by steel struts and 
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bars. There are more grey metallic tubes forming a cage-like enclosure round the 
ex-serviceman, this dehumanized tube motif picked up by the Zimmer frame 
he is obliged to support himself with. Apart from the man and the bucket of 
flowers, these mineral surroundings are broken by a single plane-tree, its bare 
branches bearing one or two lingering green leaves. These, together with the 
barely visible flowers and the insignia, are the only bright colours in the image. 
The ex-serviceman wears an old-fashioned mackintosh, now a world too wide 
for his shrunk frame and probably acquired from a charity shop. He stares 
grimly into the distance, waiting for a sale from the two buckets of flowers at 
his feet, from which we infer, even without the title of the image, that he has to 
sell bouquets of flowers to survive: in short, he has been forced into a form of 
Figure 4.10 John Goto, Flower Seller, 2002, Courtesy of the artist
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begging. In contrast to this sorry plight the ex-serviceman sports two stars and 
a medal, insignia which testify to his wartime devotion to his country. Worn 
in the correct order, we find the 1939–1945 Star showing that he had served 
in the Battle of Britain, the Air Crew Europe Star and, finally, the War Medal 
1939–1945 bearing an oak leaf emblem awarded additionally for brave conduct.
Flower Seller is one of a series of digitally manipulated photographic tableaux 
from 2002. This tableau is from the third part of a general series. This particular 
series, Gilt City, is a satirical reflection of British capitalist culture under the 
government of the time, although not all the tableaux are as desolate as Flower 
Seller in spite of the critical regard to which they subject contemporary society. 
The context is the economic situation in Britain in the early years of the century. 
The title Gilt City plays on the homophonic similarities between the words gilt (a 
thin layer of gold and a type of security issued by banks) and guilt (recognition 
of a dereliction of duty), whereas the general title of the three series of tableaux, 
Ukadia, is a mocking fusing of UK and Arcadia, a mythical pastoral, uncorrupted 
and harmonious utopia. However, the ironic tension between the straitened, far 
from Arcadian circumstances of the ex-serviceman and the insignia testifying 
to his distinguished and selfless service to his country is to be seen as a virulent 
condemnation of social neglect.
Hypoiconically, irony is a diagrammatic structure, but this tells us little without 
taking the sign’s immediate object into account, a theoretical manoeuvre made 
available by hexadb. How, in this case, do we account for irony from the object-
universe perspective? Consider, to begin with, the following definition of irony 
provided by the OED: ‘1.A figure of speech in which the intended meaning is the 
opposite of that expressed by the words used; usually taking the form of sarcasm 
or ridicule in which laudatory expressions are used to imply condemnation or 
contempt.’
Translated into the analytic process ascribed to the hexad of 1908 irony can 
be seen as the tension between what should be the case (an ideal universe) and 
what actually happens to be the case (the universe represented), and while 
irony can often be humorous here it is used as an acerbic comment upon the 
economic priorities of the British government in the early years of the century. 
In the manner of the rag-and-bones man and cockle and mussels sellers like 
Molly Malone, flower sellers have all but disappeared from modern cities, a 
situation which adds to the irony of Goto’s tableau. In contrast, nineteenth-
century representations of the flower seller usually depict smiling young girls 
with flowers in a basket, not in the metal buckets of Goto’s veteran, and these 
constitute the conventional determinants of the positive universe implied by the 
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irony of Figure 4.10. As a work of art the photograph is a (collective) copulant 
token: what makes it figurative is the filtering out of the implicit universe at the 
Oi stage, leaving us to contemplate its depressing antithesis.
Thus, the irony in the sign’s ideologically charged message is to be inferred from 
the mental contrasting of these two universes. The disparity between the bleak 
universe of existence seen and the generous universe in which the ex-serviceman’s 
wartime valour would be recognized and rewarded implied in the derisive title 
of the general series is the source of the irony of the image, and constitutes a 
derisive condemnation of the seemingly widespread heartless manner in which 
supposedly advanced cultures neglect the welfare of their former warriors.
Cindy Sherman: Untitled Film Still #14
For Peirce, as seen in Chapter 1, the index is a sign whose relation to its object 
is one of physical connection. The rays emanating from the model constitute ‘a 
section of rays projected from an object otherwise known’ (CP 2.320), while the 
print itself is, as we saw, a sort of quasi-predicate. There is, nevertheless, an aspect 
concerning the index which requires investigation. From what has been seen and 
in view of the important existential status of the index in the communication of 
information, it might seem that existence exerts an inescapable ‘tyranny’ on the 
sign-user. The indexical nature of the photograph is thus the problem submitted 
to the two sign-systems in this section. We examine this problem through a 
study of Cindy Sherman’s Untitled Film Still #14 (Figure 4.11).
The image represents a young well-dressed woman standing beside a mirror 
through which we see a glass of champagne on the far side of the table in the 
foreground. She looks anxiously off-camera and is holding what looks like a 
knife in a woollen sheath in her right hand. The still, number 14 out of almost 
seventy such images, purports to be a publicity genre once much used in the film 
industry for promotional purposes: photographs taken on the set with the actors, 
for example, were used to give advanced publicity of the film and also, as here, 
of its stars, in newspapers and magazines. As a photograph, Figure 4.11 is to be 
classified conventionally as a dicent sinsign. It is theoretically diagrammatical in 
structure, but as it has no meaningful title to ‘arrest’ interpretation, there is no 
reason to rule out its being metaphorical or, indeed, allegorical – which is the 
whole purpose of not attributing a title to a work of art. And yet we know from 
the caption that this is one of a series, and from collateral experience that the 
photographer is Cindy Sherman, and that she is the protagonist of the entire set 
of sixty-nine such stills.
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Figure 4.11 Cindy Sherman, Untitled Film Still #14, 1978, Courtesy of the artist, 
Sprüth Magers and Metro Pictures, New York
The context is the 1970s. In 1977 the art critic Rosalind Krauss published 
an article in two parts celebrating the consecration of the photograph as an art 
form in the review October (Krauss 1977) and this the year that Susan Sontag 
published a very different view of the indexical realism of the photograph!13 
After an extensive discussion of Roman Jakobson’s concept of the ‘shifter’14 – 
Jakobson’s name, borrowed from Otto Jespersen, for indexical expressions such 
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as I, you and the demonstratives and so on – in works by Marcel Duchamp, she 
had this to say of the photograph’s artistic basis:
13. If we are to ask what the art of the ‘70s has to do with Duchamp and the 
shifter, we could summarize it very briefly by pointing to the pervasiveness of 
the photograph as a means of representation. It is not only there in the obvious 
case of photo-realism, but in all those forms which depend on documentation – 
earthworks, particularly as they have evolved in the last several years, body art, 
story art – and of course in video. But it is not this heightened presence of the 
photograph itself that is significant. Rather it is the photograph combined with 
the explicit terms of the index. (1977: 78)
The reasons for dignifying the explicitly indexical nature of the photograph in 
this way were no doubt due to the works of numerous photographic artists from 
Alfred Stieglitz to Edward Weston and, in a more realistic register, from Weegee 
to Diane Arbus. Although she had died eight years before the publication of this 
article, Diane Arbus was probably the photographer who had most exploited the 
deictic potential of the photograph. Directing her camera at the denizens of the 
streets and homes of New York, she produced a corpus of astonishing portraits 
characteristic of that very American motif, the grotesque: a giant dwarfing his 
parents in their living room, a wild-eyed child in a park with a toy grenade and a 
middle-aged couple sitting naked and drinking tea together, all starkly captured 
by the ‘explicit terms’ of the index and the inescapable realism of the photograph 
that Rosalind Krauss was later to celebrate. It is to the existential force of the 
index that this apparent referential tyranny is due, and it might suggest that the 
photograph is a ‘nominalist’ medium: what you see is what you get.
But this would be to ignore the creative imagination of the photographer. For 
while the art critic was celebrating the apotheosis of the photograph as index, an 
obsessive young photographer was working intently to subvert it: the sixty-nine 
stills from Cindy Sherman’s photographic series, Untitled Film Stills, produced 
between 1977 and 1979, show the artist in various guises imitating the heroines 
to be found in the stills that were taken during shooting sessions of films made 
in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s for the promotional purposes mentioned earlier. 
Here we have a photographer playing the part of an actress playing the part of a 
‘real’ person. Sherman’s stills, no less than any other photographs, including those 
made digitally or digitally modified, necessarily represent themselves to be true 
representations of the world – they are dicent quasi-propositions, remember – 
and what we get is indeed what we see on … the print. However, Sherman’s 
creative genius was to circumvent the alleged referential inviolability of the 
index by simulating the one element one would expect to remain inviolable in a 
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dicent sign such as a photograph – its dynamic object, that logical determinant 
of a myriad universes.
Within the hexadic typology Sherman’s film still can be classified as a 
sympathetic, categorical copulant collective token – it was produced for aesthetic 
reasons, to produce some sort of feeling; as a sign it is neither percussive 
nor usual (a logical impossibility) but sympathetic, and if sympathetic it is 
necessarily gratific; it is categorical, for when we examine it, we recognize the 
apprehensive female protagonist of some plot; as it represents a human being, in 
other words an entity from the universe of existents, it would seem necessarily 
to be concretive. But this would be to discount its representing not one but three 
universes, with Sherman’s still placed ‘in front’ of two others, and in this case 
the sign is also, logically, copulant at Oi, which ‘hides’ the two ‘earlier’ universes 
forming a necessitant, that is, complex, object at Od. Note that stills of the 
original genre, which were produced for practical reasons to publicize a film, 
would be classified as concretives intended to produce action – attract audiences 
to the cinema.
However, the more interesting analysis involves the sorts of universes that 
constitute the photograph’s dynamic object. Whereas the irony of John Goto’s 
flower seller tableau places two universes ‘side by side’, Cindy Sherman has 
placed one in front of the other, this other being itself in front of the ‘real’ 
universe simulated by the actress: we see one feigned universe and divine at 
one remove behind it the real world, similarly feigned, reminding us irresistibly 
of how Jean Baudrillard defined simulation: ‘To dissimulate is to feign not to 
have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one hasn’t. One implies 
a presence, the other an absence’ (1988: 167),15 this under the section title of 
the ‘divine irreference of images’. It follows from this that some images may 
simply not have what they feign to have, that they may not refer to what they 
seem to refer to – they are ‘irreferent’ – and Sherman’s stills are a marvellously 
imaginative case in point.16 Moreover, by not giving the stills a title, the observer 
is drawn into trying to identify the genre of the still: some suggest a Hitchcock-
style thriller, others, with Sherman disguised as a Loren-type heroine, seem to 
imitate films from the Italian repertoire. Although Sherman herself may not 
have read it, her teachers at Buffalo State College most probably had, and the 
influence of Derrida’s ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences’ (1970) is evident in her refusal to ‘close’ and ‘arrest’ interpretation 
of the stills by giving them a title. In the Stills, then, Sherman simulates; she 
simulates jubilantly, in a movement of post-structuralist excess that Baudrillard 
would no doubt have approved of. She simulates at two removes: she simulates 
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a genre which represents actors simulating some event, and the photographs’ 
dynamic objects are not really what they seem, yielding a form of simulation en 
abîme as it were.
Summary and discussion
The chapter has sought to show how the two conceptions of the sign differ in 
the manner in which they enable us to approach deliberately chosen rhetorical 
signs. Although Peirce dropped the designation of ‘speculative rhetoric’, the 
transuasional nature of methodeutic makes it possible to review the status of the 
philosophy of representation in the period 1908–09, and it was for this reason 
that the exposition of the hypoicons was held over from Chapter 1. The material 
discussed above calls for a number of remarks.
First, it follows from the examination of the examples that since there is no 
possibility of referring to the icon and its subdivisions, Peirce’s conception of 
semiosis and the typologies it generates in the 1908–09 period don’t allow us 
to make the traditional literal and metaphorical distinction. On the contrary, 
they draw us into a quite different analytical and critical paradigm or model 
which should not be seen as an attempt to introduce a new method of analysing 
literature and pictorial signs, but, rather, simply an exposition of the way the 
1908 system might deal with such signs: this is semiotics, not literary criticism or 
picture theory. Whereas hypoiconicity enables us to decide that the sign is literal, 
or, in a more logical formulation, diagrammatic, or is metaphorical in Peirce’s 
logical sense, the later system invites us to examine the nature and number of 
universes of existence represented or implied by the sign. The theoretical interest 
of such universes of existence cannot be emphasized enough, though there is 
much work to be done in the field. They are the forerunners of the conceptual 
domains of the cognitive linguist, the base and target domains referred to in 
present-day discussions of metaphoric structure (as in the case of Figures 4.4, 
4.5 and 4.9)17 and the input and blended spaces and generic structures of blend 
theory, set out, albeit sketchily, in the draft letter to James three quarters of a 
century earlier. They are in the embryonic forerunners, too, of the ontologies of 
AI and of computer and information science.
Returning to the case studies, it was seen that in the case of the Thomas 
extract, the principal universe was that of his conception of poetic creation, 
which, in the extract, he defined in negative terms. The metaphorical element 
of the extract was shown to rest on allusions to several very different universes 
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of existence: peacocks and preening, the Stock Exchange, the eternal troubled 
relations of lovers, a Jacobean play and recitation in theatre and auditorium. 
Similarly, the analysis of the photographic cases within the later system required 
recourse to universes of existence placed side by side in the same image, or, in 
the case of irony a second universe implied by the one represented, or finally, in 
the case of simulation, a series of universes placed, as it were, one in front of the 
other.
Now it is possible that a photograph such as Figure 4.8 would not be considered 
metaphorical within conventional theories of rhetoric, but according to Peirce’s 
1903 definition in CP 2.277, metaphor is a complex form and applies far beyond 
the scope of the traditional trope. And it is not inconceivable that his awareness 
of the association of partial objects from two or more distinct universes within 
a single sign had led Peirce to entertain the notion of a parallelism as mentioned 
in CP 2.277, partial objects being a concept that from 1907 on was becoming 
increasingly important in Peirce’s later conception of signs. Just why metaphorical 
signs such as the two examined above – one verbal and the other photographic 
– should always be underspecified and, consequently, incongruous, is, of course, 
another question, no doubt a consequence of the tension between the two-
tiered parallel structure characterizing the dynamic object and the singularity 
of the inescapably existential medium of the sign. Nor is it hard to imagine that 
the irony in Figure 4.10 and, above all, the simulation in Figure 4.11 would 
be refused figurative status within a conventional theory of rhetoric. And yet, 
through recourse to Peirce’s conception of the universe of existence it is possible 
to detect and to analyse these signs in a rigorous if unconventional manner. The 
power of this conception, as we see from the examples Peirce offers to William 
James in the draft, is that it neutralizes any distinction between the supposedly 
‘real’ world and the worlds created by fiction, poetry and film: the universes 
as determined by the entities they exhibit are all universes of existence, even 
the ‘fictive’ ones. They involve actions and plots that we try to follow using our 
experience of human intercourse irrespective of whether the representation is 
a universe inhabited by one hundred and one spotted dogs, by the heroines of 
the novels of Jane Austen or by the histrionics of the protagonists in a televised 
football match.
This said, it has to be admitted that paragraph 2.277 has been problematic 
for Peirce scholars. Thomas Short, for example, simply quotes the paragraph 
and declines to comment on it (2007: 218). David Pharies, on the other hand, 
in an interesting study of image and diagram, makes the following disarming 
observation on the passage: ‘This is one of the more obscure passages I have had 
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occasion to quote, and I do not profess to understand it completely. The central 
message, however, seems to be that hypoicons have three degrees of complexity’ 
(1985: 36).This is understandable as the passage is obscure to say the least. The 
description of image, diagram and metaphor given in the paragraphs above is 
my own reading of CP 2.277, but of course it is not the only one. Peirce himself 
developed the theory of the diagram in his Existential Graphs, and there are 
other accounts of Peircean metaphor. The interested reader may like to consult 
the following brief selection: Anderson (1985), Haley (1988), Shapiro and 
Shapiro (1988), Factor (1996), Haussman (1996), Danaher (1998) and, more 
recently, Lattmann (2012). Shapiro (1998) is a remarkable microscopic study of 
a certain form of iconicity exhibited by Shakespeare’s sonnets, and is the perfect 
illustration of the sort of analysis for which the hexad of 1908 is totally ill-fitted.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the problems discussed in the chapter 
is that if we remain within the 1903 system and the triple distinction between icon, 
index and symbol all captionless paintings are necessarily classified alike, namely 
as iconic sinsigns, and all photographs as dicent sinsigns along with others of 
the same class, such as barometers, thermometers and windsocks along a motor 
way: there is no logical way of distinguishing between the countless members of 
each of these two general classes, since the members of each necessarily share 
the same properties. The only way we have to distinguish between them is by 
looking at their internal contents, and that, precisely, is the logical scope of the 
hexadic system, which, as we saw in Chapter 3, classifies signs not according 
to how they represent but according to the sorts of objects they represent, such 
objects being members of the three distinct universes indicated in Table 4.2, each 
distinguished by its specific mode of being.18 In short, as we saw in Table 3.5 
from the previous chapter, in the first case elements of the typology such as the 
sign, the Sign–Object relation and so on are subdivided by categories, which are 
simply predicates, while in the later system the subdivisions are referred to one 
or other of three universes, which, as Peirce notes in ‘Prolegomena to an Apology 
for Pragmaticism’, are receptacles. As semioticians we are authorized therefore to 
examine the contents of these receptacles in the ways in which they have been 
filtered into the sign by its immediate object.
The third remark concerns the combined problems of interpretation, 
speculative rhetoric and the philosophy of representation. As we saw above, 
Peirce defined speculative rhetoric/methodeutic as transuasional logic, which 
was ‘the doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other 
Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine’ (CP 2.93, 1902). The 
role of the sign within semiosis underwent a theoretical revision in the period 
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following and the turning point most probably occurred in 1906, when we find 
Peirce abandoning the term ‘speculative rhetoric’ in a fragment from 1906:
Therefore, I extend logic to embrace all the necessary principles of semeiotic, and 
I recognize a logic of icons, and a logic of indices, as well as a logic of symbols; 
and in this last I recognize three divisions: Stecheotic (or stoicheiology), which I 
formerly called Speculative Grammar; Critic, which I formerly called Logic; and 
Methodeutic, which I formerly called Speculative Rhetoric. (CP 4.9)
This was the period in which he was beginning to define the sign as a 
medium for the communication of a form in the 9 March 1906 draft to Lady 
Welby (RL463; SS 195–201), the manuscript ‘The Basis of Pragmaticism in the 
Normative Sciences’ (R283; EP2 371-397) and R793, all of which were discussed 
in Chapter 2. Moreover, with this definition came the re-evaluation of the 
role of the dynamic object in semiosis. With the realization that the number 
of divisions of signs was significantly greater than the original three of 1903, 
Peirce must also have become aware of the extreme theoretical tension to which 
the original Sign–Interpretant branch of the grand logic was now subjected. 
Instead of the three subdivisions concerning the interpretant, he now had nine 
different ‘values’ to attach to the sign within the 28-class system. As evidence of 
the problematic status of speculative rhetoric/methodeutic in 1908, consider the 
following passage from Susan Sontag’s On Photography:
Photographs shock in so far as they show something novel. Unfortunately, the 
ante- keeps getting raised—partly through the very proliferation of such images 
of horror. One’s first encounter with the photographic inventory of ultimate 
horror is a kind of revelation, the prototypically modern revelation: a negative 
epiphany. For me, it was photographs of Bergen-Belsen and Dachau which I 
came across by chance in a bookstore in Santa Monica in July 1945. Nothing 
I have seen—in photographs or in real life—ever cut me as sharply, deeply, 
instantaneously. Indeed, it seems plausible to me to divide my life into two parts, 
before I saw those photographs (I was twelve) and after, though it was several 
years before I understood fully what they were about. What good was served by 
seeing them? They were only photographs—of an event I had scarcely heard of 
and could do nothing to affect, of suffering I could hardly imagine and could do 
nothing to relieve. When I looked at those photographs, something broke. Some 
limit had been reached, and not only that of horror; I felt irrevocably grieved, 
wounded, but a part of my feelings started to tighten; something went dead; 
something is still crying. (1977: 19–20)
The extract illustrates the ambivalence of Peirce’s conception of the 
interpretants in 1908 and as represented in Table 4.2. The text can be analysed 
Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and the Philosophy of Representation  140
into stages in what we might call an interpretant ‘chain’, and as suggested earlier, 
working with the interpretants involves either classifying observed effects 
on people and so on or in planning rhetorical protocols. In Sontag’s case, the 
former applies: the immediate interpretant is when the child of twelve identifies 
the lines, shapes and patches of grey as terrible, emaciated human forms. The 
images were percussive (‘something went dead; something is still crying’), 
and as far as the final interpretant was concerned, the interpretive process 
had not terminated in 1977. This is a brief analysis a posteriori; that is, we take 
an interpretation and follow it through the various stages of its evolution, in 
this case in a rather schematic manner. However, there is nothing to stop us 
from using the system a priori as a publicist might: planning the image to be 
given of the product (by manipulation of the immediate object), the support 
on which the inherited forms are to be communicated (the sign), planning the 
immediate interpretant (for this, after all, as Peirce states in the draft of 9 March 
1906, is a determination of the mind of the sign’s utterer (SS 196)), targeting the 
dynamic interpretant and, finally, persuading the observer to act (by buying the 
product, for example). Such strategies raise a very important issue, which we 
see in the passage above, namely the status and nature of the dynamic object. 
In the text it is clear that the images after due reflection (‘several years before 
…’) represent not so much suffering humans as ultimate horror: this being the 
case the dynamic object is far more general than its very physical representation. 
Similarly, in the hypothetical case of the publicist, there is no logical necessity 
for the dynamic object to resemble its necessarily incomplete representation 
communicated by the immediate object. Indeed, as Peirce explains in the Logic 
Notebook, the ‘immediate object of a sign may be of quite a different nature from 
the real, dynamical object’ (R339 277r (H523), 1906). If there are cases where the 
dynamic object of a sign may not be what it seems to be, how is semiotic theory 
to accommodate such a situation?
Thus the need to establish the values of the interpretant division and their 
subdivisions, in addition to the broader conception of the dynamic object, seems 
to have placed an intolerable strain on Peirce’s conception of methodeutic. In 
the letter to William James of December 1909, Peirce describes in relative detail 
the first two books – the former speculative grammar and critic – of a projected 
treatise on the system of logic, this being a 1909 version of the philosophy of 
representation, and then laconically summarizes the scope of methodeutic by 
means of a simple ‘My Book III treats of methods of research’ (EP2: 500–2, 1909). 
This was the branch of the grand logic of which he had confidently asserted in 
the first of his Lowell Lectures on logic in 1903 that it was the last goal of logical 
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study, the ‘theory of the advancement of knowledge of all kinds’ (EP2 256). In 
the end, the task seems to have proved beyond him, and perhaps like Samson, 
calm of mind all passion spent, in a letter to Lady Welby, he deferred completion 
of the typologies and the search for further examples to the attention of later 
investigators:
On these considerations [his definitions of the six correlates in semiosis] I base a 
recognition of ten respects in which Signs may be divided. I do not say that these 
divisions are enough. But since every one of them turns out to be a trichotomy, 
it follows that in order to decide what classes of signs result from them, I have 
310 or 59049, difficult questions to carefully consider; and therefore I will not 
undertake to carry my systematical division of signs any further, but will leave 
that for future explorers. (CP 8.343, 1908)
If Peirce here expresses doubts as to his ability to take the task he has set 
himself further, and if the methodeutic branch of the grand logic seems to 
defy completion, there remains, nevertheless, hope for an explanation of how 
dynamic objects may differ from their representations in the sign. It is to this 
problem that Chapter 5 is devoted.

In the previous chapter a number of signs were analysed within the theoretical 
frameworks of the 1903 and 1908 sign-systems in order to assess their differences. 
In this final chapter, we examine a number of features of Peirce’s late semiotics in 
its own right, investigating primarily the importance of the object as he developed 
it during the years 1908 and 1909. It is universally admitted that his introduction of 
the concept of the interpretant and the profound revisions it was subjected to over a 
period of nearly fifty years were one of Peirce’s greatest contributions to logic. Less 
chronicled is the fact that his conception of the object also underwent an important 
evolution, and thus it is the principal objective of the chapter to explore and exploit 
its interest for semiotic analysis. The major problem, already alluded to towards the 
end of the previous chapter, concerns specifically the semiotic status of the dynamic 
object, its relation to the way it is represented in the sign by its immediate object 
and the interpretations it gives rise to. For example, it was suggested that there was 
no reason not to employ the structure of hexadb in a priori fashion as a publicist 
might: planning the public image to be given of some product, its carefully planned 
form as it is to appear on a given support or medium (hoarding, television spot, 
advertisement in a newspaper etc.). Such a strategy raises the problem of the status 
and nature of the dynamic object of such a campaign, given that the dynamic object 
is, after all, the determinant of the sign: the image the team of publicists wishes 
to give of the product or the sponsor or, perhaps, the product itself as it appears 
on the advertisement, or perhaps some more nebulous object involving marketing 
dynamics. It is essentially to this complex relation holding between what actually 
constitutes a dynamic object and the way a sign represents it that the following 
sections are devoted.1
The problem
Considering once more Susan Sontag’s remark in On Photography to the effect 
that ‘one’s first encounter with the photographic inventory of ultimate horror is 
5
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a kind of revelation, the prototypically modern revelation: a negative epiphany’ 
(1977: 19), the question arises as to what the dynamic object of this particular 
photographic inventory might be. Is it the emaciated faces or bodies of the 
victims of these atrocities, is it some more general agency or is it, as Sontag 
suggests, ‘ultimate horror’? Yet another example is to be found in the previous 
chapter: when introducing the two photographs representing, respectively, 
an individual man and woman (Figure 4.7) and the two classes of men and 
women (Figure 4.8), it was suggested that the partial objects they represented 
characterized the clearly recognizable universe of existence of violence against 
women. The reader, indeed, may have thought that they were both different 
representations of the same problem – domestic violence. In either case we have 
two dynamic objects considerably more general than the references to men and 
women. The general potential of the dynamic object can be illustrated, too, by 
any of the analyses to be found in Hariman and Lucaites’s No Caption Needed, 
a meticulous study of the ideological implications of what they call ‘iconic 
images’, that is, ‘famous pictures from the news media’ (2007: 6). They show, 
for example, a photograph of the Kent State University massacre of 1970 to be 
far more than the representation of a screaming, kneeling female student beside 
the body of her dead comrade (2007: 139–60). For what we see in many images, 
whether photographs or paintings, cannot simply be reduced to what is ‘literally’ 
represented. These three examples, the Sontag extract, the Uelsmann photograph 
and the Kent State massacre photograph2 are all, in various ways, interpreted to 
represent an object more complex than the ‘contents’ of the image, in spite of the 
fact that their respective immediate objects can only communicate parts of that 
object to the sign representing it; and they all are ideologically charged. This 
relation between object and ideology must also be accounted for.
A less contentious example of how the object of the sign can be interpreted 
as being different from what appears to be the object depicted is to be found 
in the discussion of a Dutch painting titled A Young Man and Woman Making 
Music, c. 1630, by Jan Miense Molenaer. The painting was the subject of part 
of a podcast from the National Gallery of London devoted to an exhibition 
titled ‘Vermeer and Music: the Art of Love and Leisure’.3 The curator of the 
exhibition, Betsy Wieseman, describes the painting to a visitor towards the end 
of the podcast, and in the course of her description of what the musicians are 
wearing, and how the painting relates to the period, she remarks that what it 
really represents is not so much a couple making music together but, rather, ‘a 
sort of joie de vivre’: ‘I always have the sense that they’ve just reached the rousing 
chorus of the song … that they’re really into it and they’re having a good time 
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and the music has taken over. It really represents a sort of “joie de vivre”. And 
Molenaer communicates that in such a vivid way’ [emphasis added].4 In short, 
the painting really represents not so much a couple playing music but the joy of 
living, a warm feeling of enjoyment of life, exuberance and youthful high spirits. 
The sentence containing the adversative value of the adverb really suggests that 
what the observer is looking at is somehow different from the figures and their 
pose represented on the canvas: what we are looking at, in fact, is more complex 
than what is to be identified superficially by an inventory of the partial objects 
represented on the painting. Such representations seem somehow to redirect the 
observer or the reader to the real object.
The problem for Peircean semiotics, then, is to account for this discrepancy 
between what we see and what the painting, photograph or other, not necessarily 
pictorial, sign really represents and how it does so. Other examples of this 
particular type of indirection are ‘it actually represents …’, ‘what it actually 
represents is …’, ‘what it really represents is …’. Such expressions, which on any 
Internet search turn out to be too numerous to quote, represent differences in 
interpretation, no doubt, but, above all, a perceived disparity between what is 
apparently represented, or what has already been proposed as an interpretation, 
and what someone thinks is really, or actually represented: in Peircean terms 
a difference or tension between the immediately perceived object – in a 
representation, in an action, in almost any significant aspect of everyday life – and 
the real object, the object which the observer/speaker thinks is really/actually/
in fact the case, the real or actual determinant of the sign. The problem, then, is 
not to decide who is right or what the correct interpretation is, but to discover, as 
in the case of the photographs and text mentioned above, the semiotic principle 
behind this very frequently encountered tension between the perceived entity 
and what it represents.
Symbols
One possibility of accounting for the special form of indirection implicit in 
Wieseman’s remark above within the 1903 paradigm is the symbol, since this 
is a sign which within the semiotics represents general objects. This Peirce had 
defined in 1903 in an extract already discussed in Chapter 1:
A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, 
usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to 
be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, 
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that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general 
itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which 
is general has its being in the instances which it will determine. There must, 
therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must 
here understand by ‘existent,’ existent in the possibly imaginary universe to 
which the Symbol refers. (CP 2.249)
Now various forms of symbolism are, no doubt, to be found in all cultures. 
For example, peaches symbolizing longevity are a common symbol in Chinese 
art, appearing in depictions or descriptions in a number of fables, paintings and 
other forms of art, often in association with thematically similar iconography 
such as deer or cranes. In itself, a peach represented in an image or offered as a gift 
is, on one ‘literal’ level, a simple piece of fruit, but can on a second, more general, 
level, like the representations of deer or cranes, refer or redirect the interpreting 
mind to a more general object – longevity or immortality. In a similar manner, 
the Ancient Greeks believed the flesh of the peacock to be imputrescible – it was 
held not to be subject to decomposition after death, and thus became a symbol 
of immortality, and later figured in much early Church imagery and architecture 
(in iconostases, for example) as a symbol of the promised afterlife.
What is common to all symbols, as understood in the above manner, is 
the fact that their instances represent themselves as existent entities, and, at 
the same time, as something general. Yet another example of a symbol can 
be seen in the little dog which accompanies the music-making in Molenaer’s 
painting mentioned earlier: by a form of indirection a dog can often be found 
in much Christian imagery as symbol of fidelity in marriage and, by extension, 
in religious faith: see, for example, van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait in the National 
Gallery or Carpaccio’s Vision of St Augustine. The instances Peirce’s definition 
identifies are existent instances of general types or laws. The best examples of 
symbols in this sense are the words of any natural language – nouns and verbs 
in English, for example. As we saw in Chapter 1, from his earliest writings on 
signs until 1902, symbols were either arguments, propositions or terms, the 
traditional matter of logic. In 1903 he established these in a separate division, 
the Sign–Interpretant division discussed in Chapter 1, and maintained their 
verbocentric bias (EP2 275–76).5 To qualify as symbol a sign has to be a legisign, 
a sign that is interpreted in a regular, law-like fashion. This is the case with 
peaches, peacocks and little dogs, even though they don’t enter into complex 
legisign patternings in the manner of a verbal sign such as a definite article 
and the common noun with which it is associated. Nonverbal symbols are the 
creations of habit and experience and are no less law-like than a rule of grammar, 
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a fact which determines the sorts of object they represent. The problem is that 
although the little dog in Molenaer’s painting may be for us and for the Christian 
Church a symbol of fidelity, this doesn’t enable us to explain how the painting 
really represents an object other than the participants represented in the music-
making. In fact the reason is quite simple: anyone observing a painting with a 
dog in it, for example, and judging it to be a symbol of ‘fidelity’, is clearly using 
the term ‘symbol’ in the Peircean sense of 1903, but, and this is an important 
point, is identifying the object ‘fidelity’ by means of the 1908 system. A symbol 
is defined to be a conventional way of representing an object – it doesn’t identify 
that object. To do this we look in 1908-fashion ‘directly’ at the forms which 
the sign’s immediate object has communicated to it. In this way the immediate 
object functions as a logical filter ‘shifting’ part of the dynamic object’s form 
to the sign, irrespective of the universe to which it belongs, and enables us to 
attempt to identify the dynamic object. In short, the symbol of 1903 doesn’t 
enable us to identify an ‘indirect’ object of the sort exemplified in statements by 
Sontag, Hariman and Lucaites, and in the Molenaer painting, the identification 
is obtained in a different way.
There remains another possibility of accounting for what, in the system of 1903, 
a given sign might really represent, and for how it might represent something 
other than the object represented by the sign as in Molenaer’s painting, and this 
can be sought in Peirce’s conception of the hypoicon, which was exploited in 
Chapter 4. Since through the implication principle, an index can involve a sort 
of icon and a symbol can involve a sort of index, it was seen that from this a 
symbol can by transitivity involve a sort of icon, and, necessarily, one or other 
of the three hypoicons. The problem is that when we identify the metaphorical 
or diagrammatic status of a sign we are again simply stating how it is organized 
internally – iconicity cannot tell us what the sign represents, only how it represents 
it, since iconicity is the ‘sub-form’ of any sign’s mode of representation. In this 
respect the hypoicons are no different from the index and symbol: these inform 
us not of what the object is, or of what it might be really, but simply of how it 
is represented, by physical contact or by convention. For instance, when Peirce 
tells us that ‘Examples of Indices are the hand of a clock, and the veering of a 
weathercock’ (EP2 274, 1903), he is talking about these as signs, indicating how 
they represent their objects but not the objects themselves, for example, the time 
of day or the direction the wind is coming from. He does give many examples of 
the objects of signs but they are not obtained from the mode of representation. 
Consider, too, at this point, this extract from ‘New Elements’: ‘It will be observed 
that the icon is very perfect in respect to signification, bringing its interpreter 
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face to face with the very character signified’ (NEM4 242, 1904). In fact, from 
the point of view of the 1908 hexad, what the interpreter is brought face to face 
with is, rather, the form inherited from the immediate object for which the sign 
functions as the medium. It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that even when 
a symbol in the Peircean sense is informed by hypoiconicity, whatever the real 
object of that sign may be, whatever it really represents, hypoiconicity on its own 
cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of this form of indirection, which is 
why we need to review the various stages in the theoretical development of the 
object in semiosis.
A brief historical review of the object
The first stage is formed, of course, during the period from the mid-1860s to 
1903. This, as we saw earlier, was a period in which Peirce had defined a single 
division with the subdivisions of likeness, index or sign and symbol. The latter 
was, until 1902–03, subdivided into term, proposition and argument before these 
became explicitly an independent division at the time of the Lowell Lectures in 
1903. Returning to a passage of which a part was already discussed in Chapter 1, 
we can see how the object participated in the single division in 1866:
As relations separate into two kinds on account of the double reference they 
contain, so representations from containing a triple reference separate into 
three kinds. For the relation of a repraesentamen to its object (correlate) maybe 
a real relation and, then, either an agreement or a difference, or it may be an 
ideal r[elati]on or one from which the reference to a correspondent (subject of 
representation) cannot be prescinded by position. (W1 355)
The object was a non-predicable ‘substance’ or IT or ‘thing’, as Peirce was later 
to refer to it in ‘On a New List of Categories’ (CP 1.547, 1867), an idea which 
corresponds to later definitions of the dicisign in which the subject is not a 
predicate, of course, but can be associated with one. Note, too, that what was later 
to become the ‘second correlate’ in Peirce’s formal definition of representation 
(EP2 290, 1903) had already also been defined as a correlate: ‘A ground is that 
pure abstraction, the embodiment of which makes a quality. A correlate is a 
second substance with which the first is in a comparison. An interpretant is a 
representation which represents that which is referred to it as a representation 
of the same object which it does itself represent’ (W1 524, 1866). This was the 
situation by 1903, one much more fully documented in Chapter 1. A second 
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stage comes in 1904, which is an important year for two reasons. This can be 
seen first in this long extract from the text ‘New Elements’:
A sign is connected with the “Truth” i.e. the entire Universe of being, or, as some 
say, the Absolute, in three distinct ways. In the first place, a sign is not a real 
thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas. Look down a printed page, and 
every the you see is the same word, every e the same letter. A real thing does not 
so exist in replica. The being of a sign is merely being represented. Now really 
being and being represented are very different. Giving to the word sign the full 
scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes, a whole book is a sign; 
and a translation of it is a replica of the same sign. A whole literature is a sign. 
The sentence “Roxana was the queen of Alexander” is a sign of Roxana and of 
Alexander, and though there is a grammatical emphasis on the former, logically 
the name “Alexander” is as much a subject as is the name “Roxana”; and the real 
persons Roxana and Alexander are real objects of the sign. Every sign that is 
sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects. All these objects, even if we 
are talking of Hamlet’s madness, are parts of one and the same Universe of being, 
the “Truth.” But so far as the “Truth” is merely the object of a sign, it is merely 
the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so …. All these characters are elements of the 
“Truth.” Every sign signifies the “Truth.” But it is only the Aristotelian Form of 
the universe that it signifies. (NEM4 238–39, 1904)
According to the Editors of EP26 this text was probably written early in 
1904. Consequently we find no trace of the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic objects Peirce was to develop in his letter to Lady Welby the following 
October. Nevertheless, as the quotation shows, the text anticipates the three 
universes described in the letter and drafts to Lady Welby of December 1908 
and the universe of existence defined in a draft letter to William James of 
February 1909 (EP2 492–97). The notion of a universe of existence as such is not 
developed in the passage – what we have here is a universe of being presenting, 
in its reference to the object of a sign being the ‘Truth’, a more metaphysical than 
ontological character, which suggests that Peirce had the three types of inference 
in mind when he was working on this part of the text (cf., for example, CP 2.229, 
CP 2.253, 1903). Nevertheless, we see Peirce already contemplating the idea that 
the object of a sign is the universe which is determined by the ‘real’ objects which 
are members of it, these real objects becoming the ‘partial objects’ of 1907 and 
the ‘special’ objects of 1909; and there is, too, the reference to Hamlet’s madness 
that we find in a draft letter to William James of 1909.
In this context, then, the letter of October 1904 also heralds a new stage in the 
development of the object, for as seen in Chapter 2, within a year of giving the Lowell 
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Lectures Peirce had expanded the original triad of correlates to six: two objects, 
the sign and three interpretants. Concerning the two objects he made this highly 
relevant remark: ‘I’m now prepared to give my division of signs, as soon as I’ve 
pointed out that a sign has two objects, its object as it is represented and its object 
in itself ’ (CP 8.333). Another way of describing them, and one highly pertinent to 
the present topic, is, as we saw in Chapter 2, to distinguish between the object as 
it informs the sign and the object as it really is independently of its representation. 
The very possibility that a single sign should be capable of representing an object 
other than the one perceived as in the examples discussed earlier in the chapter thus 
stems from the now explicit distinction between the immediate and the dynamic 
objects, a distinction reiterated by Peirce on too many occasions to cite. What we 
need now is a means of ascertaining the sorts of dynamic objects of which the 
immediate objects might be the determinations. In short, we have to distinguish 
clearly between the two, and yet this has proved to be highly problematic with 
Peirce scholars. Consider, first, a statement by Thomas Short:
However, while no sign represents its dynamic object completely, many signs, 
such as pure icons and pure indices, cannot misrepresent their objects. For 
the object of such a sign is exactly whatever is presented or indicated. As no 
further representation is made within that sign that might be false of that object, 
the sign cannot be mistaken or misleading. In that respect, while there will be 
differences, there can be no discrepancy between such a sign’s immediate and 
dynamic objects.
A last word on this distinction: the immediate and dynamic objects 
are  not different entities. The distinction pertains, rather, to how one and 
the  same object is considered. The immediate object is the dynamic object 
as it is represented, however incompletely or inaccurately, in a given sign. 
(2007: 196)
While, in light of the material discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, we can simplify 
the situation by accepting that the ‘immediate object is the dynamic object as it 
is represented’,7 it is nevertheless logically incorrect to consider the two as facets 
of one and the same entity. Consider now, an extract from Haussman (2012), 
an extensive attempt to identify and isolate the specific characteristics of the 
dynamic object:
I also describe this distinction [between the immediate and dynamical objects] 
by saying that there is one referent of a sign and that the referent has two sides 
or aspects. Perhaps it is helpful to say that the referent of a sign consists of two 
interactive objects, the immediate object and the dynamical, or real, object, a 
distinction to be considered later.
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The dynamical object seems to be the object that functions as the beginning 
of and basis for semeiosis or the interpretive process, for it is that which is to be 
interpreted. And, as I mentioned earlier, the immediate object is the interpreted 
dynamical object. It is the outcome of interpreting the initiating object. (2012: 81)
The author, like other Peirce scholars, has adopted the distinctions and 
terminology of 1904 for the two objects but has declined to consider the 
lessons of the draft of 1906 or the way the two are integrated, along with the 
three interpretants, into the six and ten divisions of 1908. In the later systems 
it is simply not possible for immediate and dynamic objects to be, as Short also 
appears to think, aspects of a single object, or for the immediate object to be an 
‘interpreted dynamical object’, since it follows the dynamic object in semiosis 
and precedes both the sign and the three interpretants: the immediate object 
can’t interpret the dynamic; it receives form from it, which it communicates to 
the sign, which then generates the sequence of interpretants.
The immediate and dynamic objects are, as was seen in Chapters 2 and 3, 
clearly quite different entities – they instantiate different trichotomies within 
the six- and ten-division typologies established by Peirce after 1904, and can 
be referred to one or other of the three completely distinct universes in the 
classification of a given sign.8 Moreover, by 1907 Peirce had begun to refer to 
the requirement of collateral observation, experience or acquaintance of an 
object in the interpretation of the sign. The concept of ‘collateral observation’ 
seems to have been first introduced in the ‘Pragmatism’ text discussed briefly 
in the final section of Chapter 2 (e.g. R318 601, 611, 613, 623; CP 8.178; EP2 
493), while ‘collateral experience’ (EP2 480, 493, 495 and 498, CP 8.183) and 
‘collateral acquaintance’ (EP2 496, CP 8.183) figure in many definitions of the 
sign thereafter. Recourse to such collateral experience in order to identify the 
dynamic object is surely proof of the very real theoretical difference between 
the two: how else should we know that Cindy Sherman’s film stills simulate a 
genre that simulates real life? Classifying them as dicent sinsigns or as gratific, 
sympathetic, categorical concretives tells us little or nothing about the object 
represented, although in the second case we have to take it into account in order 
to classify the sign as such. It is Peirce who has the last word: ‘Say the Interpretant 
is that which the Sign brings into correspondence with the Object. The Object 
is plainly Twofold. The Dynamic Object is the Real Object according to the 
above definition [that which determines the sign]. The Immediate Object is the 
Object as presented in the Sign’ (R399, 276r (H522)). And here, too: in a letter 
to William James of 14 March 1909, he summarizes his position concerning the 
two objects with the following statement discussed earlier:
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We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, — i.e., the Object as represented 
in the Sign,— and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I 
must choose a different term; therefore:), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, 
from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and 
leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience. (CP 8.314)
However, in spite of these notable advances in Peirce’s understanding of the 
object, another stage occurs between 1906 and 1908 and begins with the draft 
letter to Lady Welby of March 1906, which was discussed at length in Chapter 
2. I will simply summarize the important points. In addition to the distinction 
between immediate and dynamic object, Peirce also redefines the sign as the 
medium for the communication of a form originating in the dynamic object 
and introduces important distinctions concerning the interpretants (SS 97). In 
the present context what is important is that by defining the sign as a medium 
he attributed a greater role to the object in semiosis: it communicates form 
via the immediate object to the sign, which then communicates it to the series 
of interpretants, the form in question being the realization of one or other 
or all of the categories of the forms of experience (CP 1.452, 1896), and this 
independently of the utterer and the interpreter as participants in the semiosis.
If we consider anew the description of the Molenaer painting given earlier 
in the chapter, it is possible to see how it would fit into the scheme of 1906. The 
persons represented can be seen as the artist’s models, the apparent dynamic 
objects of this complex, portrait-like painting. The representation which an 
observer sees finished but which must have advanced in various stages of 
completion is a determination of the immediate object – that is, the models, 
the musical instruments and furniture and so on, as represented. The piece of 
canvas itself is the medium – the material entity which receives the compound 
form communicated by the immediate object and conveys it to whatever 
potential interpretant sequence the image may produce. In this case, having 
immediately interpreted the marks on the canvas as humans, dog, instruments 
and furniture, Wieseman proffers the potentially surprising remark that 
it represents a sort of joie de vivre. It was this joie de vivre that determined 
the painting, in other words, not the artist. As was suggested in Chapter 2, 
the artist, a version of Peirce’s utterer, is outside the process. He executes the 
painting, but in doing so he is simply the vector of the artistic trends and 
public and private ideologies of the age and, if there was one, the desires of 
the patron paying for the work: according to Peirce’s conception of the sign as 
medium in 1906, it is the dynamic object which structures the representation 
on the sign, not the artist.
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From the 1906 draft on, then, in theory only the object can determine the 
sign, since the 1906 redefinition of the sign simply as a medium had the effect of 
diminishing the importance of both the sign itself and the utterer and interpreter 
in semiosis. These are indispensable agencies in any semiosis, for there would 
not be a sign in the first place without them. Note that the structure of the sign 
can only come from the object since the utterer is simply a vector: in the case of 
music or non-figurative art, for example, we feel that it is the composer or artist 
who creates the sign, but like the utterer and interpreter in Peirce’s examples, 
these are ‘outside semiosis’, so to speak, as indispensable but ‘inefficient’ quasi-
minds. It is the object which ‘efficiently’ structures the sign. Any wave of Puccini 
orchestral sound or any patch of colour on a non-figurative canvas must be the 
determination of an orchestra and its sets of instruments and musicians or of 
a brush and paint. If the qualities of these sounds and images were classified 
as ‘abstractives’, they would be ‘possible’ objects and we should be unable to 
perceive them.9 Just what sort of objects might determine such works, and any 
others, and just what role the utterer might ultimately have in the process Peirce 
was to review to in 1908 and 1909.
Summarizing the evolution of the object so far, we find, first, that Peirce has 
now introduced the crucial distinction between the two objects, a distinction to 
be found in all future definitions of the sign and, more importantly, a distinction 
which makes it logically possible for the dynamic not to be at all like the immediate. 
Second, we find that the material from the 1906 definition of the sign as medium 
had the effect of diminishing the importance of the sign in semiosis, and at the 
same time it gave the immediate object a specific representative status as a sort 
of filter, communicating parts of the form or structure of the dynamic object to 
the sign. Third, the 1908 letter to Lady Welby set out a new way of classifying 
the sign with reference to three universes instead of the three categories of 1903, 
with the object as the initial determining element in the semiotic sequence, as 
illustrated in Table 4.2.
The final stage in the development of Peirce’s conception of the object concerns 
the two ways in which he expanded its scope in 1908 and 1909. Indeed, his final 
statements on the universes of necessitant, existent and possible entities and the 
types of subjects these universes ‘hold’ or contain enable us to establish just how 
it is that the interpreter, like Susan Sontag looking at images of Bergen-Belsen, 
Hariman and Lucaites analysing the importance of the screaming student in the 
image of the Kent State massacre and Betsy Wieseman in the quotation from the 
beginning of the chapter, actually identifies an object which is not necessarily 
like its representation. This final part of our review of the development of the 
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object and of our examination of what signs might really represent involves two 
lines of enquiry. The first is Peirce’s conception of the three universes mentioned 
in the 1908 letter to Lady Welby and their modes of being as they were described 
in Chapter 3, and second, as seen in the previous chapter, the idea that the object 
itself constitutes in fact a universe of existence.
In the case of the three universes, Peirce is quite explicit as to their 
different modes of being in the same letter. However, with the exception of the 
oversimplifying remarks concerning the English common noun beauty, he gives 
little indication of the sorts of objects that are members of each of the three 
universes and in terms of which signs can be classified as, for example, collective, 
concretive or abstractive. However, as seen in Chapter 3, in a draft to Lady Welby 
dated two days later, which presumably was never sent (CP 8.366), he illustrated 
the range of dynamic objects of signs according to the universe to which they 
belong: possibles (signs of such objects being abstractives), existent objects 
(individuals and the facts concerning them, signs of these being concretives) 
and collections or classes (signs of these being collectives), thereby giving us 
some idea of the sorts of entities these universe might be the receptacles of.
In the first case the objects are qualitative entities represented by colours, 
mass, texture and so on; in the second, existents such as humans, animals, tables, 
individuals and named individuals such as Napoleon, Charlemagne and Dean 
Moriarty; finally, in the third, general classes such as mankind, prime numbers, 
classes, categories, habits and types. However, in another text of 1908, ‘The 
Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’, he breaks new ground, describing 
the three universes and, more importantly, the sorts of objects they comprise in 
greater detail. The least complex, the universe of possible objects, ‘holds’ ideas; 
the second universe is composed of existent objects – occurrences and the facts 
containing them; and the third and most complex universe comprises more 
general objects:
Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all 
mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, 
or another might give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their 
very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of 
getting thought, not in anybody’s Actually thinking them, saves their reality. The 
second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident 
that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding 
objections redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third 
Universe comprises everything whose Being consists in active power to establish 
connections between different objects, especially between objects in different 
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Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign, – not the mere body of 
the sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign’s Soul, which has 
its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. 
Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a 
plant. Such is a living institution, – a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social 
“movement” (CP 6.455)
It follows from the sections above that what we see when we look at an 
image of any sort, or what we hear when we process an utterance of any sort, 
or what we read in a text of any sort is, of course, what their immediate object 
has filtered through to them from the object they represent. We also know now 
that by 1908 Peirce had defined the range of possible dynamic objects to be 
virtually inexhaustible, and that the dynamic object is not in any way necessarily 
like the immediate. Peirce’s late illustration of various types of dynamic objects 
– ‘a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social “movement”’ – not only opens 
up our understanding of how others interpret signs but also liberates our own 
conception of what a sign might stand for. Barely three months later in a draft 
letter to William James, Peirce offered a frustratingly brief description of the 
relation holding between the universes and the objects which determined them, 
a topic referred to in the previous chapter.
The object as universe
The 26 February 1909 letter (EP2 492–497) raises a delicate problem already 
alluded to in the Introduction. It is a draft letter, and as we have seen 
throughout the book, there are a number of antecedent drafts that have raised 
important theoretical issues but which, for various reasons, were probably 
never dispatched to their intended recipient. For example, the draft of July 1905 
to Lady Welby dismissed the representamen from Peirce’s theory of signs of 
the period, and yet we know that he subsequently re-used the term in at least 
one of his final texts. The draft of 9 March 1906, like several other texts of that 
period, introduced the idea that the sign was a medium, but Peirce never really 
developed the theoretical potential of the idea, and, judging by the contents 
of Ogden and Richards’ Appendix D, the letter of which we have the draft was 
never sent. There were drafts of December 1908 that contain most of what we 
know of the ten divisions supposedly yielding sixty-six classes of signs, but they 
were never sent either, although Peirce in a letter of 14 March 1909 does admit 
to Lady Welby to having found one of them in his portfolio, and expresses the 
hope that he had actually sent it (SS 109). As in the case of the draft letter to 
Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and the Philosophy of Representation  156
William James, one wonders whether these were never sent because Peirce had 
forgotten them in his portfolio or had simply lost interest in the theoretical 
points they contained. Whatever the reasons why the draft to James was never 
sent, it nevertheless constitutes a remarkable statement on the object of the 
sign. As mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, he now associated the object 
with one or other of the three universes – not the categories, note – subdividing 
the divisions to which signs were referred in the course of classification. This is 
a useful opening statement:
A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e., specialized, 
bestimmt) by something other than itself, called its Object (or, in some cases, as if 
the Sign be the sentence ‘‘Cain killed Abel’’ in which Cain and Abel are equally 
Partial Objects, it may be more convenient to say that that which determines 
the Sign is the Complexus, or Totality, of Partial Objects. And in every case the 
Object is accurately the Universe of which the Special Object is member, or part, 
while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the 
determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the Sign, that that 
Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object. (EP2 492)
Peirce’s problem here is to distinguish the parts from the whole. For 
example, in an earlier version of the theory the model in the portrait in Figure 
2.2 is what we assume to be the dynamic object of the representation on the 
artist’s sketch pad. Now that the object in 1909 constitutes by itself the universe 
of existence the theoretical status of that model becomes problematic. Peirce’s 
answer is in the new vocabulary that he employs. Cain and Abel are now both 
‘partial objects’, a term which, as mentioned earlier, he seems first to have 
used in 1907.10 The strategy here is somewhat reminiscent of the way Peirce 
describes the dicisign in 1906. This latter class of signs has the advantage 
of being composed of two readily identifiable parts: in the 1903 system the 
proposition, a dicisign obviously, was defined as a double sign associating an 
index and a rheme (CP 2.251). In the relatively informal epistolary statement 
of 1906, these two terms are abandoned and Peirce simply refers to the ‘part 
appropriated to representing the object, and another to representing how 
[the] sign itself represents that object’ (RL 463, 28); in other words one part 
representing the sign’s partial objects (the indexical element of 1903), and 
another signifying the form of the relations holding between these partial 
objects. The theoretical entity we are dealing with now is, of course, far 
more complex than a proposition or dicisign, but Peirce makes an analogical 
distinction between the components of the universe and the universe itself. 
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The term ‘partial object’ is simply a syntactical convenience – both Cain and 
Abel are ‘subjects’ of the example sentence in the Peircean sense, whereas, 
grammatically speaking, Cain is the subject and Abel the direct object; both, 
too, are partial objects in the new terminology. However, he introduces for 
the first and only time as far as I have been able to tell, the term ‘Special 
Object’ to refer to the erstwhile dynamic object. In the case of the sentence 
‘Napoleon is lethargic’, both Napoleon and lethargy are partial objects, but of 
the two, lethargy surely cannot be the special object – the universe would be 
too great, comprising not only Napoleon but also many politicians, university 
administrators, a few students and so on, whereas we surely interpret Napoleon 
as being more ‘thematic’ and therefore the special object. This is the case, too, 
with the wrecked train in Figure 4.6: although there are other partial objects 
on the photograph – windows, an awning, pillars and so on, it is surely the 
locomotive itself which is the special object of the photograph, while in the 
case of Cain and Abel both must be special objects. So much for the special 
object, what follows is equally innovative:
In the sentence instanced [‘Napoleon is lethargic’] Napoleon is not the only 
Object. Another Partial Object is Lethargy; and the sentence cannot convey its 
meaning unless collateral experience has taught its Interpreter what Lethargy 
is, or what that is that ‘‘lethargy’’ means in this sentence. The Object of a Sign 
may be something to be created by the Sign. For the object of ‘‘Napoleon’’ is the 
Universe of Existence so far as it is determined by the fact of Napoleon being a 
Member of it. The Object of the sentence “Hamlet was insane” is the Universe of 
Shakespeare’s Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The 
Object of the Command ‘‘Ground arms!’’ is the immediately subsequent action 
of the soldiers so far as it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It 
cannot be understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker’s relation 
to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is in the Universe 
of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since the 
obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. At any rate, it 
determines the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by the circumstance 
that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of the officer.
The Sign creates something in the Mind of the Interpreter, which something, 
in that it has been so created by the Sign, has been, in a mediate and relative way, 
also created by the Object of the Sign, although the Object is essentially other 
than the Sign. And this creature of the Sign is called the Interpretant. It is created 
by the Sign; but not by the Sign quâ member of whichever of the Universes 
it belongs to; but it has been created by the Sign in its capacity of bearing the 
determination by the Object. (EP2 493)
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Like the extract from ‘The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’ 
discussed above, this extract introduces a series of examples of how a universe 
is determined by the partial or special objects that are members of it. For one 
thing, as we saw in the previous chapter, it neutralizes neatly and economically 
the conventional distinction between fact and fiction, between cases where the 
universe is ‘real’ and where it is ‘fictive’ as in the quotation from EP2 498 above. 
The universe determined by Napoleon’s being a member of it and the universe 
determined by Hamlet’s being a member of it are logically the same sorts of 
universe; this means, too, that Neal Cassady and Dean Moriarty determine 
their respective universes, and from a logical point of view there is absolutely no 
difference between them, either. Note, too, that without indulging in any form of 
psychologism, Peirce has redefined the participation of the utterer in semiosis: 
whatever motivation he or she has, the object of the motivation is in a universe 
defined by that very object – desire, expectation, volition: this is an important 
statement which in no way invalidates the earlier principle that there is nothing 
in the sign that doesn’t originate in the object or in the universe defined by that 
object.
We also have in this passage from the draft a partial theoretical explanation of 
the strategies of interpretation when people read a novel or a newspaper or watch 
a documentary on TV or a wildly imaginative science-fiction film at the cinema: 
they become involved in, bored or thrilled by, a universe of existence determined 
by its protagonists. Since such universes are always anthropomorphic and 
thus composed of events of everyday experience, we come prepared to novel, 
newspaper, documentary or film with a store of collateral experience enabling 
us to follow events and to disregard the boundaries between fact and fantasy.
The determination by its members of a universe of existence also enables 
us to explain another important difference between the hexad of 1908 and the 
10-class system of 1903. The icon was then defined in such a way as to be able 
to represent an object but, unlike the index, not to be able to offer any proof of 
its existence: it is a sinsign whose relation to its object is purely qualitative, not 
existential: Figure 1.3, the drawing of Cheyne Walk beside the Thames, is an 
iconic sinsign. However, when examining the very same image from the point 
of view of the hexad, the sign is necessarily concretive: it represents humans, 
trees, a river and boats, buildings and so on, all of which determine a universe of 
existence, even though certain or all of the characters and trees represented never 
actually existed. As suggested earlier, in its very simple way Peirce’s theory of the 
object as it is presented in the draft to William James is an embryonic theory for 
an ontology in the modern sense: it is not a theory of being or existence in the 
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conventional philosophical sense, but a skeletal theory of the sorts of realizations 
of objects and relations occurring within particular representational genres such 
as film, novel, poetry, photography and so on.
We come now to the final stage in Peirce’s development of the object and its 
implications. The reader will probably be wondering what sort of logic enables 
Peirce to claim that a newspaper or a social movement can be the dynamic 
object of a sign, and what sort of sign that might be. It is to the answers of such 
questions that we turn now through the analysis of three case studies. Since the 
universes of existence were discussed as analytical instruments in the previous 
chapter, the remainder of this one will be devoted to Peirce’s late inventory of 
the diverse classes of dynamic objects as described above. But first we need the 
logical justification for such an inventory. As in the cases studies in Chapter 4 
exploiting the universes of existence, the purpose is not to suggest or to provide 
a new methodology for the arts, but is, rather, an attempt to apply Peirce’s late 
definitions to a variety of complex signs.
The fundamental semiotic principles involved can be established if we return 
briefly to hexadb as represented in Table 4.2, from which we can infer that 
unlike a universe of existence such as the one determined by Napoleon’s being 
a member of it, or the one determined by Dean Moriarty’s being a member of 
it, the universe determined by ‘a living consciousness, the life, the power of 
growth, of a plant …. a living institution, – a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a 
social “movement”’ enjoys a more complex logical status: these are objects from 
the universe of necessitants, and therefore the signs representing them are to be 
classified, at that point in the hexad in Table 4.2 (Od), as collectives. However, 
as the table also shows, while a given sign can be classified as a collective in 
reference to its dynamic object, at the immediate object stage (Oi) that same 
sign can be classified as either copulant, designative or descriptive. Now if the 
sign is designative or descriptive, the immediate object will necessarily belong 
to a different universe from that of the dynamic. Furthermore, even if in the 
immediate object division the sign is copulant, to be physically perceivable at 
all it will have itself to be a token at (S): a given sign can therefore have both 
an immediate and a dynamic object more complex than itself. The possibility 
for a sign to be classified according to objects in different universes from itself, 
as in the case of a collective designative hypothetical token, clearly bears out 
Peirce’s earlier remark in the Logic Notebook to the effect that the immediate 
object may not be at all like the dynamic: ‘The immediate object of a sign 
may be of quite a different nature from the real dynamical object’ (R339 277r 
(H523), 1906).
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It follows from this that in the case studies with which we engage below, the 
signs are necessarily tokens and that what we shall be examining is the way they 
have been structured by their respective immediate objects. It follows, too, that 
even if the immediate objects are in these cases existents, making the sign a 
designative, this doesn’t prevent their dynamic objects from being necessitant 
and not perceivable: such objects are general and hence can only be inferred. For 
these reasons, the case studies are based on two premises: first, that the dynamic 
objects represented can logically be more complex than the signs and immediate 
objects representing them, and second, consequently, that such dynamic objects 
may not be at all like the immediate objects that they determine.
Worldviews and social movements
Westward the course of empire
We begin with a concrete example, Figure 5.1, artist Emmanuel Leutze’s study 
for the mural Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way located in the House 
Figure 5.1 Emanuel Leutze, Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way, 1862, 
Smithsonian American Art Museum, Bequest of Sara Carr Upton 1931.6.1
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wing, west stairway of the US Capitol. It is a stirring depiction of a wagon 
train formed of a group of pioneer settlers and their scouts heading westwards 
through a mountain pass. Beneath the main image is a cartouche showing their 
destination, San Francisco Bay. This is the exhibition label proposed by the 
Smithsonian American Art Museum accompanying the study:11
Leutze’s mural study for the Capitol in Washington celebrated the idea of 
Manifest Destiny just when the Civil War threatened the republic. The surging 
crowd of figures [on the mural] records the births, deaths, and battles fought 
as European Americans settled the continent to the edge of the Pacific. Like 
Moses and the Israelites who appear in the ornate borders of the painting, 
these pioneers stand at the threshold of the Promised Land, ready to fulfill 
what many nineteenth-century Americans believed was God’s plan for the 
nation.
Figure 5.1 reproduces the study rather than the mural for reasons of legibility 
and simplicity.12 What this and other similar images seem to represent is not so 
much the almost religious notion of the Manifest Destiny, as the exhibition label 
for the Smithsonian study has it, but rather the project of a new, hopefully just, 
expanding empire to be created on American soil in the New World.
Frances Palmer’s Across the Continent: ‘The Course of Empire Takes Its Way’ 
(Figure 5.2) echoes the title of Leutze’s mural and study, and displays a later, 
more aggressive image of western expansion: the coloured lithograph is divided 
diagonally by a railway line and displays contemporary signs of the social, 
technological and transportation superiority of the settlers from the East – a 
school and log cabins, a railway line, roads, covered wagons and the telegraph – 
on one side, and on the other a wilderness with a group of Indians on horseback 
engulfed by smoke from a locomotive.13
The image clearly illustrates contemporary perceptions of westward expansion 
and the idea Frederick Turner was later to give of the frontier as ‘the outer edge 
of the wave [of westward expansion] – the meeting point between savagery and 
civilization’.14 Four years later, John Gast executed American Progress (Figure 
5.3), a more complex allegorical painting which displays a female figure floating 
westwards above yet another representation of the superiority of the means of 
transportation and techniques for the exploitation of the land issuing from the 
East with the advent of the settlers over that of the soon-to-be-overcome hunter-
gatherer, nomadic Indians.
If, in Table 4.2 once more, we neglect for convenience the series of interpretants 
and work back from the sign division, we classify all three images as, of course, 
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tokens, and the fact that they may have been duplicated many times is of no 
logical import. As far as the Oi division is concerned, Leutze’s study and mural 
and Palmer’s lithograph are designative. The allegorical American Progress, on 
the other hand, which associates a spirit of progress with the various means 
of transportation and so on, is interpreted as copulant with respect to the Oi 
division: we observe a physical sign in which the complex association of a wraith 
from one universe of experience has been combined with groups of humans 
from another, quite distinct, universe of experience by an immediate object 
necessarily more complex than the painting itself. Now the protagonists of all 
three images are human, suggesting that they all should theoretically be classified 
as concretive signs. However, as the exhibition label suggests, Leutze’s study – the 
other two images likewise – celebrates something far more general than the sum 
of the beings that we can see on them. What these three very different images 
represent is surely more than settlers supplanting the indigenous populations on 
American soil – they validate an idea, an idea which itself legitimated westward 
Figure 5.2 Frances Flora Bond Palmer, Across the Continent. Westward the 
Course of Empire Takes Its Way, 1868, Philadelphia Museum of Art, Hand-
colored lithograph, Image: 17 5/8 × 27 1/4 inches (44.8 × 69.2 cm) Sheet:  
21 5/16 × 30 1/8 inches (54.1 × 76.5 cm), Gift of Kathy and Ted Fernberger, 2009 
2009-215-2
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expansion – and so all three are collective signs at Od.15 The exhibition label for 
Leutze’s study for Westward the Empire Takes Its Way suggests that it celebrated 
the idea of Manifest Destiny, a concept owed to the journalist John O’Sullivan. 
However, although O’Sullivan was to coin the expression in an article titled 
‘Annexation’ in 1845, in an earlier text he had suggested that America should 
turn its back on the Old World model of empire:
How many nations have had their decline and fall, because the equal rights of 
the minority were trampled on by the despotism of the majority; or the interests 
of the many sacrificed to the aristocracy of the few; or the rights and interests of 
all given up to the monarchy of one? … So far as regards the entire development 
of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may 
confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity. 
(1839: 426)
What philanthropist can contemplate the oppressions, the cruelties, and 
injustice inflicted by the monarchies and aristocracies of antiquity and, by 
implication, contemporary European nations on the masses of mankind, and 
not turn with moral horror from the retrospect?
America is destined for better deeds. (1839: 427).16
Figure 5.3 John Gast, American Progress, 1872, Prints and Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress
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What the Indians and the African slaves would have made of these clearly 
idealistic remarks is not hard to imagine, but they formed nevertheless the 
basis of a very powerful set of expansionist ideas. The idea of the empire as one 
way of dominating a territory was not new. While the title of both of Leutze’s 
works is probably an innocent quotation from a poem of 1727 by Bishop 
Berkeley, there is clearly a reference to the inevitability of the fall of Old World 
empires as described in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall in O’Sullivan’s rejection of 
the earlier instances of such empires. Furthermore, the rise and fall of such 
empires had been illustrated only a few years earlier by the five tableaux of 
Thomas Cole’s The Course of Empire (1833–36), which seem to have inspired 
the title of Leutze’s mural and study. The concept of empire was clearly in the 
air of the times, especially, no doubt, in the sense of a country or territory not 
owing allegiance to any foreign power or influence. So what these images seem 
to celebrate is not so much a ‘Manifest Destiny’ as the ideal of a new form 
of empire, for which, by celebrating it pictorially, they provided a legitimacy. 
The three images may seem quaint, even innocuous, to us today more than 
a hundred and fifty years later, but at the time their object was nothing less 
than a propaganda effort, for they are militant images, determined not by real 
pioneers and Indians but by the concept of a new empire whose sovereign 
was held to be the people, in short, determined by a dynamic object of a very 
complex type. As vehicles of this propaganda, they were nevertheless far less 
extreme than other images determined by the same object – for example, James 
Earl Taylor’s Scrapbook sketches of heroic cavalry officers and settlers, the 
outnumbered victims of indigenous savages and these designative tokens, too, 
were a particular determination of the same general object.
The Lady of Shalott
Another case of a much more general dynamic object than might first be 
thought is provided by a painting from a series by the British painter John 
William Waterhouse. It is the last in the series of three, but the first in relation 
to the sequence of events in the medieval tale made famous earlier by the poet 
Tennyson. The ballad recounts the tragic plight of the heroine of a medieval 
legend, the Lady of Shalott. The story, briefly, is as follows. The Lady of Shalott 
has been cursed for some unspoken reason. She has been condemned to live 
alone in a tower, where she weaves a magic web and is only able to look at the 
world outside by means of a mirror which reflects people passing along the road 
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to Camelot. She becomes dissatisfied with her lonely existence. The following 
relevant short extract is from the 1842 version of the poem:
But in her web she still delights
To weave the mirror’s magic sights,
For often through the silent nights
A funeral, with plumes and lights
And music, went to Camelot:
Or when the moon was overhead,
Came two young lovers lately wed;
‘I am half sick of shadows,’ said
The Lady of Shalott.
One day the handsome Sir Lancelot rides by. She stops weaving and looks 
directly out of the window at him instead of using the mirror, thereby defying 
the curse. She leaves her castle, finds a boat and drifts downriver to her death. 
Ostensibly the story is about the female victim of a curse – she is the principal 
dynamic object, the ballad’s ‘special’ object, but there are, of course, other 
partial objects (Lancelot, the town of Camelot, for example) in the poem – 
but that is not the only way the poem has been interpreted. The following is a 
sample of the critical opinions quoted in Wikipedia concerning what the poem 
really represents. Feminist critics, it is claimed, see the poem as dealing with 
issues of women’s sexuality and their place in the Victorian world or with the 
temptation of sexuality, where the Lady of Shalott’s innocence is preserved by 
death. The act of leaving the tower is considered as an act of defiance or a 
symbol of female empowerment, or is thought to allow the Lady of Shalott to 
break free emotionally and come into terms with her sexuality. The depiction 
of her death has also been interpreted as sleep, with its connotation of physical 
abandonment and vulnerability. Yet other critics have suggested that the poem 
is a representation of how a poet like Tennyson lives separated from the rest 
of society, and that the mirror functions as a filter, providing a form of artistic 
licence.17
These divergent interpretations once more raise the problem of what 
a poem, novel or pictorial representation really represents, as in the cases 
mentioned earlier in the chapter. We approach the problem not by means of 
the poem, but from an artist’s depiction of one of the episodes. Waterhouse’s 
painting (Figure 5.4) in fact represents the earliest. Such serial paintings 
were not unusual in the Victorian era, although this one, paradoxically, is 
Edwardian. In Waterhouse’s case the first visually dramatic episode is from 
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1888: on display in the Tate Gallery, it depicts the Lady of Shalott drifting 
downstream to her death.18 The second, from 1894, catches the heroine at 
the fateful moment when she sees Lancelot in the mirror and turns to look 
Figure 5.4 John William Waterhouse, ‘“I am half sick of shadows,” said The Lady of 
Shalott’ (Alfred, Lord Tennyson, The Lady of Shalott, Part II), 1915, oil on canvas, 
Overall: 100.3 × 73.7 cm (39 ½ × 29 in.) Art Gallery of Ontario, Gift of Mrs. Philip B. 
Jackson, 1971, 71/18, © 2016 Art Gallery of Ontario
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directly out of the window at him, thereby breaking the curse. Waterhouse’s 
representation of the Lady of Shalott in this final version of 1915 shows her 
sitting in front of her loom with the mirror on the wall beside her. She is 
gazing reflectively into space, having just seen the ‘two young lovers lately 
wed’ at the bottom right of the mirror. This leads her to question her life 
without love in the isolation of the tower.
Referring to Table 4.2, the painting as a piece of canvass has to be classified 
as a token, and indeed is actually hanging in an art gallery in Toronto, Canada. 
Working back, there are two possibilities: the sign at Oi can either be a 
copulant, like Jerry Uelsmann’s photograph from the previous chapter and 
Gast’s painting, or else designative. If designative, as is more likely, the sign at 
Od either represents a necessitant object – a class or collection or some other 
general entity – making it a collective, or else represents an existent, making it a 
concretive like the photograph and the drawing from Chapter 1. In view of the 
materiality of the subject, the latter seems initially to be the more likely option, 
and yet this would be to disregard one of the most pervasive themes of Victorian 
paintings. This is immediately obvious when Waterhouse’s image is compared 
with Figure 5.5. Richard Redgrave’s very different painting, The Outcast, depicts 
Figure 5.5 Richard Redgrave, The Outcast, 1851, © Royal Academy of Arts, London; 
Photographer: John Hammond
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yet another aspect of the predicament of women in the Victorian era, but in 
a far more realistic manner. We are presented with the daughter of a middle-
class family and her illegitimate child being driven from her home by her stern 
and unyielding Old Testament father, oblivious to the supplications of the other 
members of the family.
In spite of their obvious differences, the paintings can be construed as two 
representations of middle-class Victorian anxieties concerning female sexuality. 
Within this pervasive ideology the possibility for the sexual freedom of females 
to be on a par with that of males represented a danger to the fabric of family and 
society, and was, as paintings by Redgrave and others and the novels of Dickens, 
Eliot and Hardy in particular show, often severely repressed. Augustus Egg, 
for example, produced a series of three paintings depicting the downfall of an 
unfaithful wife and her baby titled Past and Present (all of 1858).19 The persistent 
influence of this moralizing worldview was absorbed more or less consciously by 
contemporary painters such as Holman Hunt – his The Awakening Conscience 
(1853)20 and John Stanhope’s Thoughts of the Past (1859)21 portray, respectively, 
a mistress with her ‘gentleman’ and a prostitute in a room beside a port, two 
variations on a much-worked Victorian stereotype, namely the fallen woman – 
while its influence is to be seen antithetically in its rejection by artists such as 
Whistler and Beardsley.
In view of this, Waterhouse’s late depiction of the Lady of Shalott is more 
likely to be collective than concretive, copulant than designative: Arthurian 
legends clearly interested him as they did other Pre-Raphaelite painters, 
but beyond the illustration of a medieval tale the series of paintings can 
be interpreted, as was the poem, as an allegory of female containment and 
repression within a stern and severely patriarchal Victorian middle-class 
ideology.22 If this is the case the heroine in the image represents allegorically, 
and therefore indirectly, not an individual but, rather, the ‘collection’ of 
Victorian middle-class females, while the general object of the series is this 
very ideology, and in particular
that compulsive masculine fantasy one might call the official Victorian attitude 
[to the socio-sexual division]. Its other side, the darker side of the male attitude, 
can be found in fiction, and especially in poetry. The dark woman, the period 
avatar of feminine evil, lurks there in subterranean menace, stationed at intervals 
all the way from Tennyson’s verse to the more scabrous pornography of the age. 
(Millet 1972: 122)
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In other words, Victorian middle-class fears of the havoc that unbridled 
female sexuality might wreak on the stability and social cohesion of family and 
country alike determined more or less conscious creative responses – signs, 
therefore – from novelists like George Eliot, poets like Tennyson and artists like 
Waterhouse.
A Sunday march
Finally, the reader is invited to examine the photograph on Figure 5.6, which 
records some of the forty thousand and more people walking quietly but 
determinedly through a French town in the winter sunshine.
If we adopt the system of 1903, the dynamic object of this photograph, as in 
the case of all photographs, is composed collectively by the protagonists of the 
image – the people we see on the photograph. According to Peirce’s definition for 
the Syllabus the photograph is a quasi-proposition; the section of rays (projected 
from an object, Peirce says in 1903, ‘otherwise known’) constitutes the quasi-
subject while the print is its quasi-predicate. The 1906 definition of the dicisign 
examined briefly above would, if applied to a photograph, define the section of 
rays as the part appropriated to representing the object and the print as the part 
Figure 5.6 A crowd walking peacefully through a French town
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representing the way the sign represents that object. But these definitions, in 
view of the later development of the status of the object, together constitute too 
simple a view, for this is not what the image really represents.
Even if we momentarily forget that this is a photograph and go ‘behind the 
frame’ as Meyer Schapiro invites us to (1994: 7), and in imagination join the 
walkers, there still remains the question of what caused a third of its population 
to be walking around a town on a Sunday morning in the south of France in 
winter. The photographer is the vector not so much of a culture’s obsession with 
using its mobile phones to take innumerable images of the self, monuments 
and the here and now, but in this case of a worldview that was brought violently 
into being four days before the photograph was taken. This is 11 January 2015, 
and throughout France citizens marched through their towns, motivated by a 
sympathy for the victims of the 7 January 2015 massacre of the Charlie Hebdo 
journalists, and by their resolute defence of the principle of the freedom of speech. 
What the photograph represents, and indeed what the crowd itself represents, 
is, according to Peirce’s wide-ranging late inventory of the entities that can 
constitute necessitant dynamic objects, nothing less than a social movement. It 
is this general social movement, then, that the photograph really represents, not 
just a collection of individuals: the individuals represent collectively a complex 
general object, which the photograph records at two removes.
How do the foregoing analyses relate to the hexad in Table 4.2? If correctly 
classified as representing a necessitant object, all the images in this chapter 
are collectives. However, there are significant differences between them. The 
crowd photograph is necessarily literal and Redgrave’s painting is likely to be 
a literal representation of the fallen woman: at Oi, then, both are designative. 
On the other hand, Leutze’s mural and study, judging by their respective 
exhibition labels, are not to be taken simply literally, while the paintings by 
Gast and Waterhouse are both clearly allegorical (the latter represents a 
contemporary female predicament by means of a medieval legend). In this case, 
their immediate object, which communicates a complex structure to the sign it 
determines, is necessitant, and these works, like Jerry Uelsmann’s photograph 
from Chapter 4, are all copulant at this stage of the classification process. As 
they are all necessarily tokens (a wall, canvases and photographic prints with 
arrangements of pigments on their surfaces), Redgrave’s painting and the crowd 
photograph are collective designative tokens, while the others are copulant 
(collective) tokens. What their respective interpretants are, or have been, is, of 
course, impossible to determine.
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Summary and discussion
When Peirce defined logic in 1903 as the philosophy of all representation, ‘so far 
as representation can be known without any gathering of special facts beyond 
our ordinary daily life’, the logic had a restricted definition of the sort of entity 
that an object might be. In order to show how the later semiotics expanded 
this conception, the chapter has traced the evolution of Peirce’s conception of 
the sign’s object through two important stages: first, the distinction between 
the immediate and the dynamic object, a significant development in its own 
right, but, more importantly, making it theoretically possible for there to be a 
representational discrepancy between the two; second, the extended inventory of 
potential dynamic objects established in the years 1908 and 1909 which reflected 
the virtually limitless potential of the three universes. Indeed, as these case 
studies have shown, the late conceptions of 1908 and 1909 provide the researcher 
with a very powerful range of necessitant objects which all participate, at times 
imperceptibly, in our ordinary daily lives. On the other hand this extensive 
expansion of the 1903 system might, for some, mean that Peircean semiotics has 
now reached a stage of formal break-up where ‘anything goes’. There are at least 
three answers to such a charge.
First, we note that Peirce’s conception of the final interpretant underwent 
a series of revisions contemporaneous with those of the object once he had 
expanded his interpretant system from one to three. In 1906 in ‘Prolegomena 
to an Apology for Pragmaticism’, for example, in an early reference to the 
concept, he defined the final interpretant in the following manner: ‘Finally 
there is what I provisionally term the Final Interpretant, which refers to 
the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself to be related to its 
Object’ (CP 4.536). Examination in Chapter 2 of the various typologies Peirce 
established in the years 1904–1906 showed great hesitation in the naming and 
status of what was in 1909 to become the final interpretant, and in most cases 
at the time this was associated, as in the definition above, with the way the sign 
represents itself to be related to the object. However, definitions from 1909 
suggest a much broader view, in which what might be called the ‘consensual’ 
logical status of the final interpretant placed the onus of interpretation on the 
community of interpreters rather than on the intrinsic manner in which signs 
tend to represent themselves to be related to their objects, as in the definition 
of 1906. The following is from the draft letter to James dated January 1909 
discussed above:
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As to the Interpretant, i.e., the ‘‘signification,’’ or ‘‘interpretation’’ rather, of a sign, 
we must distinguish an Immediate and a Dynamical, as we must the Immediate 
and Dynamical Objects. But we must also note that there is certainly a third kind 
of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would 
finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter 
were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2 496, 1909)
To this we can add a similar definition in a letter addressed to Lady Welby 
two months later: ‘the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which 
every Interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered … 
The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends’ (SS 111, 1909), 
by which we understand that the purpose of signs for such an interpretant 
must, at If in Table 4.2, be self-control. By this time, however, Peirce appears 
to have dropped the strict formality of previous definitions – the definition of 
hexadic semiosis and the ten-division classification postulated in the letter to 
Lady Welby of 23 December 1908, for example – in favour of a more relaxed, 
even anecdotal approach in his late correspondence. This is confirmed by the 
following definition addressed this time to William James a further month 
later: ‘The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind 
does act but in the way in which every mind would act’ (EP2 499, 1909), where 
by the expression ‘the way every mind would act’ we are to understand the 
establishment of a ‘communal’ habit (he is discussing yet again the ‘Ground 
arms!’ military command, here with respect to the three interpretants).
A second reason to reject the notion that the late systems have reached a 
stage where interpretation has become anarchic and idiosyncratic lies in 
the very nature of representation. In view of the fact that the hexad of 1908 
involves a very different approach to signs from that of 1903 – in the case of 
an image, for example, the system of 1908 invites the semiotician to examine 
the form inherited from its immediate object and draw up an inventory of its 
‘contents’ – the analyses given above might be mistaken for the methodology 
developed by Barthes in Mythologies, ‘Rhetoric of the image’ and ‘Éléments de 
sémiologie’ (Barthes 1970, 1977, 1964, respectively), in which he identified the 
signifying elements in a court trial, advertisement, magazine cover and so on, 
and, by means of a complex semiotic superstructure, censured the bourgeois 
ideology which had, he thought, determined them. But Peirce was no proto-
structuralist, and the analyses conducted in the course of the case studies above 
were not informed by any ‘semioclastic’ intention any more than Peirce’s own 
discussions of example signs. It is simply that, rather in the manner of Eco’s opera 
aperta principle, once a representation has been made public and recognized 
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as such, there is no theoretical limit to the interpretations it can stimulate, 
irrespective of what the original sign-producer intended. And so it is only in 
the long run, if ever, that any consensus can be reached by any single group – 
a social ‘commens’ – concerning a given sign’s appropriate final interpretation 
and with it the identification of its dynamic object, namely, the identification 
of what it really represents. Sontag, Hariman and Lucaites and Wieseman in 
the examples given earlier interpreted photographs and a painting by looking 
at their immediately perceivable objects and then drawing conclusions based 
upon their experience, that ‘cognitive resultant’ of their past lives, as to what the 
images mediately represented, which, in every case, turned out to be something 
more complex than the elements immediately displayed: ultimate horror, the 
tension between individual rights and collective obligations – ‘the concepts of 
democratic citizenship and dissent’ (Hariman and Lucaites 2007: 48) – and joie 
de vivre. They may have been mistaken in their interpretations, but that is beside 
the point: they posited a concept, a necessitant object, for very existential signs 
independently of any theory of semiotics: these were genuine interpretations. 
For similar reasons, the very obvious lack of consensus in the various critical 
responses to Tennyson’s ballad culled from Wikipedia and quoted above 
is evidence that interpretation of the work is far from complete and that any 
final interpretation lies in a probably distant future. But this is not a situation 
to deprecate or to combat on some anxious theoretical front; it is a perfectly 
normal situation and one for which Peirce’s late conception of the interpretants 
provides a logical explanation.
Finally, it is important to realize that Peirce’s late sign-systems and the 
broadening of the scope of the dynamic object has developed our understanding 
of what was identified above as an ideologically charged object following Peirce’s 
extension of the list of necessitant objects in ‘The Neglected Argument for the 
Reality of God’. Now, it is obvious from the logical possibility of concretive and 
abstractive signs that not every object is necessarily necessitant, and even when 
necessitant, not necessarily ideological in nature. Nevertheless, the criterion 
Peirce offers concerning objects belonging to the universe of necessitants is to be 
found in this extract from a quotation given earlier: ‘The third Universe comprises 
everything whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between 
different objects, especially between objects in different Universes’ (EP2 435). 
Any object of this universe has at least to be systematic, that is, to belong to a set of 
entities interconnected by some relation: ‘Now, a class is a set of objects comprising 
all that stand to one another in a special relation of similarity. But where ordinary 
logic talks of classes the logic of relatives talks of systems. A system is a set of 
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objects comprising all that stand to one another in a group of connected relations’ 
(CP 4.5, 1898). Consider in the light of this two definitions, both from the OED: 
‘Ideology: 4. A systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics or society, 
or to the conduct of a class or group, and regarded as justifying actions.’ Returning 
to the examples it would surely be gross naivety to think that the Lady of Shalott 
serial paintings are simply a pictorial reworking of a medieval Italian tale of a 
young woman mysteriously imprisoned in an ivory tower, ignoring the Victorian 
capitalist ideology that allowed owners of factories and mills not only to exploit 
women (and children) in complete impunity but also to keep their females as 
though in a gynaeceum. And the OED has this for propaganda: ‘3.The systematic 
propagation of information or ideas by an interested party, esp. in a tendentious 
way in order to encourage or instil a particular attitude or response. Also, the 
ideas, doctrines, etc., disseminated thus; the vehicle of such propagation.’ And 
so it would also be gross naivety to think that Leutze’s mural and study, Palmer’s 
lithograph and Gast’s painting are simply ingenuous records of the movement 
westward and its attendant dangers: they were, rather, contributions to, and 
determinations of, what was in fact imperialist propaganda.
By focusing on the object of complex signs such as advertising, slogans, 
Internet blogs, paintings, photographs and written documents past and present 
and so on, it is now possible within Peircean semiotics to identify and examine 
their ideological determinants.23 Although analysts adopting the 1903 system 
obviously have little difficulty in inferring the ideology behind a given sign, that 
particular system is not entirely suitable for ideological analysis: there is no class 
of signs in the system which enables us to identify the sign’s dynamic object – 
such a strategy requires recourse to the 1908 28-class system since this provides 
access to what a given sign’s immediate object has communicated to it and thus 
to ‘contents’ from which to infer the possibly necessitant object, and offers a 
theoretical approach much closer to our everyday engagement with signs both 
familiar and unfamiliar.
Should there be readers still in doubt as to the ideological character that 
certain signs can present, they might like to decide whether the first two lines 
of a recent poem by Lawrence Ferlinghetti refer to a bucolic world of nymphs, 
shepherds and sheep or, rather, to something more sinister: ‘Pity the nation 
whose people are sheep/And whose shepherds mislead them.’ They might also 
like to identify the sort of object John Goto’s photographic tableau Deluge, 
number VIII in the series High Summer, really represents.24 The final word goes 
to Peirce: ‘A Sign necessarily has for its Object some fragment of history, that is, 
of history of ideas’ (R849, 1911).
This study began with a reference to a programme for semioticians which 
might further our understanding of Peirce’s sixty-six classes of signs. The 
research undertaken in the previous chapters involved a less ambitious project, 
one that sought to exploit not all of the original ten divisions announced in the 
1908 letter to Lady Welby but a subset of six of those divisions, and to contrast 
it with his better-known three-division system from 1903. The very significant 
differences that the study has brought out between the two can be summarized 
as follows. In the first case, the 10-class typology was defined within a 
phenomenological framework since it used three categories – predicates bearing 
on whatever can be present to the mind – as the criteria by means of which to 
subdivide the sign and two sign-correlate relations. The second typology, on 
the other hand, was defined within an ontological framework, and employed 
three universes – receptacles of what there is, embracing possible, existent and 
general objects – to define the subdivisions of the six correlates of semiosis 
which, when properly combined, generate twenty-eight very different classes. 
Such an ‘ontological turn’ – modal and diagnostically triadic – can be nothing 
but the inevitable consequence of Peirce’s unremitting realism: collections are 
real and so are the collective signs that represent them.
In view of his desire to classify as many possible signs as was in his power, the 
attraction of establishing sixty-six classes must have far outweighed the twenty-
eight offered by the six divisions as described in the study, and this probably 
explains why Peirce never sought to develop and exploit what is in effect an 
organically organized set of divisions. Moreover, as he admitted to William James 
in the 25 December 1909 letter mentioned in Chapter 2, he was not so much 
interested in classifying existing classes of signs as in discovering new ones: in 
his search for possible signs Peirce presumably passed over the semiotic interest 
of the 28-class system, and one can only surmise what might have happened if he 
had developed the full potential of the 1908 hexad. In spite of this evident lack of 
interest on Peirce’s part, within the restricted but more feasible project adopted 
in the study, the following conclusions can be drawn, although they might better 
be considered as programmes for future research.
Conclusion
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First, one of the very interesting results of the work on the hexad has been 
to identify clearly the relations holding between the two objects and the sign 
with respect to one another and the way these relations come to determine the 
structure of the latter, with interesting implications for future work in the field 
of rhetoric. The definitions and conventions attributed by Peirce to the hexad 
have shown that each of the three can belong to one or other of three universes 
of increasing complexity. This means that the sign can be as complex as, or less 
complex than, the two objects, and that the immediate object can be as complex 
as, or less complex than, the dynamic. This being the case, tokens, which 
form the vast majority of the signs we use to communicate with others, can 
be classified with respect to two objects as complex as, or more complex than, 
themselves. This makes it possible to explain how allegorical and metaphorical 
utterances, text and images, and so on, which perforce are existential themselves, 
can present a form which may be underspecified with respect to their respective 
dynamic objects. It was seen to be the immediate object, functioning as a sort of 
filter, which determines what form or forms emanating from the dynamic object 
find expression in the sign. If the immediate object is a necessitant, for example, 
the dynamic object must be, too, while the sign, if it is a perceivable and therefore 
existent entity such as a painting, a photograph or an utterance in a conversation, 
will display a complex, sometimes incongruous but logically valid structure. 
This incongruity stems from the sign’s being identified as copulant with respect 
to a necessitant immediate object, a class of objects ‘which neither describe nor 
denote their Objects, but merely express the logical relations of these latter to 
something otherwise referred to’ (CP 8.350). It is these logical relations which 
determine the complex structure that has to be accommodated by an existent, 
simply structured token, leading to underspecification and incongruity. Such 
underspecification and incongruity were accommodated in the 1903 system by 
Peirce’s theory of the hypoicons, but the theoretical justification of how these 
functioned semiotically was never given: however, the notion that metaphor is a 
formal configuration representing a parallelism between two or more universes 
can now be justified logically by the semiotic differential between the two objects 
and the sign as defined within the hexad of 1908.
Second, the study has brought out the explanatory power of Peirce’s late 
definition of the object, which led to several lines of enquiry. For example, it 
was shown in Chapter 4 that reference to one or more universes organized 
in very specific ways but represented in a single sign offered an alternative 
analytical methodology to the hypoicons in the analysis of certain types of 
figurative signs, metaphor, irony and simulation being the cases in point. 
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Here, too, there is much promising work to be done. Another line of enquiry 
involving the concept of the universe of existence was explored in Chapter 5 
and concerned the sorts of objects identified by Peirce in 1908. Now, at the 
time of writing, Britain is preparing for a referendum on its continued presence 
in the European Union, while in the United States presidential candidates are 
vociferously debating their differences. In both cases, battle lines between 
newspapers have been drawn, with each expressing its particular editorial 
stance, and although the articles published are written by individuals, it is the 
opinion of the institution – a necessitant object – which is being canvassed (a 
more sinister scenario would have obscure, money-hungry gnomes working 
the strings of their puppet media, but even in such cases the object is quite 
general). These living institutions, daily newspapers, together with other 
sources of public expression unimaginable in Peirce’s time – social media such 
as Facebook, Twitter and the applications on mobile telephones – are the new 
realizations of Peirce’s extended conception of the sign’s object. The logic now 
has the theoretical means to specify the sign’s dynamic object more fully than 
in 1903, with the result that in addition to changes in the direction of the wind 
and the unexpected presence of another human on an island, the inventory 
of potential objects can now be extended to include propaganda, worldviews 
and social movements. Peircean semiotics, which appeared to be ‘frozen’ 
in 1903 and the triadic system developed for the Lowell Lectures with its 
reassuring abundance of examples and comments from Peirce himself and an 
often perfunctory reference to the two objects and three interpretants from its 
commentators, has, with the later systems, been shown to be logically capable 
of accommodating the complex signs of our age.
Third, the study has contributed to the specificity of Houser’s programme by 
isolating the 28-class system and establishing its viability as a means of analysing 
signs. There obviously remains much research to be conducted in this field, too, 
particularly with respect to the interpretants, but discussion of the ordering 
problems encountered in Chapter 3, for example, offers researchers interested in 
the 66-class system a number of lines of enquiry, and shows that in attempting 
to establish the correct order of the ten divisions, it is a theoretical necessity and 
a source of considerable semiotic interest to work out what sorts of sign classes 
the hypothetical arrangement might lead to, and actually give examples of them 
– a challenging enterprise. The hexad has been shown to be a fully functional, 
organically organized and autonomous system, enabling the researcher not 
only to analyse signs but understand better the way the various subjects of the 
typology relate to each other.
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What of the sixty-six classes of signs? As far as adding the four supplementary 
divisions as Peirce suggests in the 1908 letter, there are two possible strategies: 
first, to add them to the end of the hexad in the order Peirce suggested, or some 
variant of it, and in effect combine divisions obtained within distinct theoretical 
frameworks; second, as several authorities have tried to do, interleave them 
with the divisions of the hexad. In the first case, it may be possible to find some 
arrangement which, respecting the universe hierarchy rule, might generate the 
sixty-six classes; in the second, disturbing the order of the hexad by interleaving, 
for example, the division concerning the relation between sign and dynamic 
object, the sign’s mode of representation, in other words, between the divisions 
of the dynamic and immediate objects might disturb the organic unity of the 
original association of the two and introduce ‘noise’ into the hexadic system. 
Such a strategy might work, but the lessons to be drawn from the comparisons 
conducted in Chapter 4 incline to doubt.
As for the philosophy of representation which occupied much of Chapter 1, 
the 10-class system remains, but the project of a grand logic with all its branches 
accounted for is a task for future Peirce scholars since the great man was forced 
by age, ill health, overwork and incredible poverty to abandon this mission. This 
will not be an easy task: as the later sign-systems grew in importance, the hopes 
of a grand logic seemed to diminish. What we are left with, on the other hand, 
shows how Peirce had departed from the European tradition in which he began 
his logical investigations and had finally forged his own.
The third branch of Peirce’s grand logic may never be satisfactorily developed. 
There may never be a solution to the problem of the correct ordering of the ten 
divisions, either. Whatever the case, the present study will, perhaps, contribute 
to Houser’s programme by stimulating informed reactions to it or further 
research into the classes of signs made available by the late sign-systems, the 
more manageable hexadb in particular. A final word, now, and a personal one: 
the research reported in the previous chapters was undertaken by a – hopefully 
– responsible academic, who is also – most certainly – an unregenerate member 
of the ‘wrong crowd’.
The eight typologies from Peirce’s Logic Notebook (R339) to follow were 
produced by Peirce between August 1904 and August 1906, and testify to his 
growing mastery of the classification of signs in this period; they also show him 
passing from six divisions to ten. As mentioned in the Abbreviations page, the 
Houghton sequences are not synchronized with the page numbers of the Logic 
Notebook, and so the appropriate sequence number in parentheses has been 
added for readers wishing to check the manuscript themselves. Three of the 
tables have already appeared in the main text with comments, while on Table 
A.4, from the entry for 8 October 1905 (page 3), the notes added by Peirce beside 
each of the three interpretants have been placed at the bottom of the page. As 
mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 2, Peirce reviewed and replaced a 
number of labels in his typologies. Those that seemed important to me have 
been retained in barred form in the following tables. Note, finally, that the tables 




Table A.1 August 1904?
Aug 1904? 239v    (H450)   
B Icon B Index B symbol
are Icon Index Symbol
in the genuine sense
A Icon A Index A Symbol
are Icon Index Symbol
in the degenerate sense
C Rheme C Dicent C Argument
are Rheme Dicent Argument
in the genuine sense
Rheme is represented in the proper signified Interpretant as if a Quality of the Object
Dicent is represent [sic] in the signified Interpretant as if in a Real Relation to its 
Object
Argument is represented in the signified Interpretant as if it were a Sign
Rheme professes to describe a quality
Dicent has two terms professing to describe Quality & Existent
Argument has 3 terms professing to be Major Quality, Minor Existent, Middle Sign
B Rheme B Dicent B Argument
are Degenerate Rheme Dicent Argument
B Rheme determines its interpretant formally by definition making it one sign
B Dicent determines its interpretant by force
B Argument determines its dynamic interpretant by its being represented as doing so
B Dicent has to be asserted  C Dicent may be asserted
A Rheme A Dicent  A Argument
are Dedegenerate Rheme Dicent Argument
NB. The hesitation in the dating is explained in Note 7 of Chapter 2.
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Table A.2 7 August 1904
7 August 1904 240r (H451)
The distinction of Icon Index Symbol may be two ways defined
1st A-_ Icon 
A _ Index 
A _ Symbol }
formal 
has for its immediate object { QualityExistent Law
2nd B _ Icon 
B _ Index 
B _ Symbol } is determined by its dynamic object by virtue of {
Own Internal 
nature Real Relation 
to Object Being 
Interpreted as such  
(Imputed in 
Interpretant)
The distinction of Rheme Dicisign Argument should, then, be three ways defined
A _ Rheme 
A _ Dicisign 
A_ Argument }
formal
has for immediate Interpretant { Quality Existent Law




determines its dynamic 
Interpretant 
by virtue of
{ Own Internal Nature Real Relation to it Interpreted as such
C _ Rheme 
C _ Dicisign 
C_ Argument }
refers to      proper 
is represented by its signified 





Table A.3 8 October 1905
8 October 1905    252r    (H477)
Division of Signs
A As to being of Sign
Qualisign — Sign is Presentment or Abstraction
Sinsign     — Sign is Existent
Legisign   — Sign is Generality in itself
B As to Object
a As to Immediate Object
Vague Sign Sign represents object as Indefinite
Singular Sign Sign represents "  " Individual 
{Abstract/Concrete/Collective
General Sign   "   "  "  " Distributive general
b. As to Dynamic Object
Icon   Sign affected agrees with object by virtue of 
Common Quality
Index   "   "  "  "  "  "  " Being Really 
acted on by it
Symbol  "   "  "  "  "  "  " Being so 
interpreted
C As to Interpretant
a As to Immediate Interpretant




Interprets by Sympathy by Compulsion by Reason
c Significant Interpretant
The interp. represents sign as in Rheme, Proposition, Argument
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Table A.4 8 October 1905
8 October 1905 (page 3)   253r     (H479)




B Divisions according to the Object




b. According to the Dynamic Object








C Division according to Interpretant
a. According to Immediate interpretant (how represented) Oct 9↓
Immediate interpretant represented as Vague       Clamatory
"    "    "    " Singular      Imperative
"    "    "    " Distrib. General 
Representative
b. According to Dynamic Interpretant









c According to Representative Interpretant












NB1 Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant as Represented in the Sign or as a determination of the sign. To what 
the sign appeals
NB2 The dynamic Interpretant is the determination of a field of representation exterior to the sign (such a field is an 
interpreter’s consciousness) which determination is effected by the sign.
NB3 The representative Interpretant is the interpretant that truly represents that the Sign represents its Object as it 
does
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Table A.5 9 October 1905
9 October 1905 continued   255r (H483)
As it now seems to me the Representative Interpretant
is that which correctly Represents the Sign to be
a Sign of its Object and the divisions are
α According to the nature the Sign is Represented as
having in itself or as having in reference
to its immediate object
β According to the Nature of the Sign as Represented
to be determined by its Object
as Icon in a term
as Index in a proposition
as Symbol in an argument
γ According to the Nature of the Sign as
represented in the Representative Interpretant
as determining its Interpretant
Professes to be exclamatory Abductive
"  " " imperative Deductive
"  " " enlightening Inductive
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Table A.6 13 October 1905
13 October 1905      262r    (H497)
A Nature of Sign in itself
Abstraction = Qualisign
Existent = Sinsign
Combinant Type = Legisign
B Of Object
a Immediate
In what form Object is represented in Sign { Indef./ Sing. /
General
as far as affects Form of Sign
b. Dynamical
α Nature of Object in Itself {Abstraction/Concrete/Collection
β Cause of/How Sign is/being determined to represent obj
Causation of sign's representing Obj
C Of Interpretant
a Immediate
In what form interpretant is repr. in sign
As far as it affects form of sign {Interrog/Imper./Significat.
b Dynamical
α Nature of Interpretant in Itself
As far as this affects Nature of sign {Feeling/ Fact/ Sign (? Sign.)
β Cause of sign being determined to affect/ being represented
Causation of Sign's affecting Interp. {Sympathy/Compulsion/
Representat.
c Representative
α In what form sign is represented in Interpretant
As far as this affects form of sign,
β Causation of representation of Sign by Interpretant
As far as this affects nature of the Sign,
γ Rationale of Connection between Sign and Object effected by 
Interpretant
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Table A.7 31 March 1906
Provisional Classification of Signs 275r  (H521)  31 March 1906
  A Sign is in its own Nature
6 5 is either A Tone  
What has all its 
being whether 
it exists or not
A Token
Whose being exists 
in dyadic relations
or A Type  
whose being exists in the 
order of whatever may 
come hereafter to be or 
in the order that will be 
shown whenever certain 
kinds of action shall take 
place
in reference to its Immediate Object
8 6 is either Indefinite Singular or General Sign   *
in reference to the Nature of its Real Object
7 5 1/2 ? is either Abstract Concrete or Collective    *
in reference to its relation to the Real Object
9 7 is either Icon Index or Symbol     *
in reference to its Intended Interpretant
(1906 August 30 
Transpose first & third) 
5 4 is either Positive Imperative or Interrogative
in reference to the Nature of its Dynamic Interpretant





or excitant of action  
Ergoseme 
or Impressive or 
determinant of a  
Habit Logoseme
in reference to its relation to its Dynamic Interpretant
  3 is either Sympathetic Compulsive or Rational
in reference to the Nature of its Normal Interpretant
  2 is either Strange Common or Novel
in reference to the Passion of its Normal Interpretant





in reference to the Significance of its Normal Interpretant
  1 is either Monadic Dyadic Triadic      ??
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Table A.8 31 August 1906
PROVISIONAL DIVISION OF SIGNS 31 Aug 1906   285r   (H534)
I. Ist Division according to the Matter of the Sign
Tinge Token Type
Vague Quality Thing or Fact
II.i. 2nd Division according to the Form under which the Sign presents the 
Immediate Object
Indefinite Designation General
II.ii.1. 3rd Division, according to the Nature of the Real Object
Abstract Concrete Collection
or other Ens Rationis
II.ii.2. 4th Division, according to the Connection of the Sign with its Object
Icon Index Symbol
III.i.  5th Division, according to the Form of Signification of Immediate Initial 
Interpretant
Medad Monad Dyad Polyad
perhaps Hypothetic Categorical Relative
III.ii.1. 6th Division, according to the Nature of the Middle Interpretant
Sympathetic Shocking Usual
Congruentive Percussive
III.ii.2. 7th Division, according to the Manner of Appeal to the Middle Interpretant
Interrogative Imperative Indicative
(or Suggestive)
III.iii.1. 8th Division, according to the Nature Purpose of the Eventual Interpretant
Gratific Studious Actuous Moral or Temperative
to Produced Self-
Control




III.iii.3. 10th Division, according to the Nature of the Assurance afforded the 
Interpreter of taking the Sign according to its Purpose
Abducent Inducent Deducent
assurance of assurance of assurance of
instinct experience Form
Placeholder for back of book note content Introduction
1 From R343, 1902, and quoted in Fisch (1983: xxvii).
2 The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition (1982–), Peirce Edition 
Project (Eds), Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Volume Eight, the latest in 
the series, covers the period 1890–1892.
3 ‘[T]he numerical spinning of classes of signs is most confusing, and I suspect, 
like Gary Sanders (1970), that attempts to detail all classes of signs is counter-
productive.’ Spinks (1991: 235n).
4 ‘The final typology adds four new trichotomies, bringing the total to 10. However, 
although the final typology is an interesting experiment, it is rather underdeveloped 
and tentative in Peirce. For this reason, and for the reason that the most detailed 
classification of signs is associated with the interim typology, focus on the 1903 
typology might be the most fruitful.’ Liszka (1996: 35).
5 Although it does reappear as one of four supplementary divisions of the 66-class 
system.
6 Peirce’s terminology varied between ‘semiotic’ and ‘semeiotic’, but I have retained 
the more usual term ‘semiotics’ in this study.
Chapter 1
1 It was, in fact, finalized in the first few months of 1904 but this is of little 
consequence since Peirce expanded the system to six correlates the following 
October.
2 In the manuscript R465 there are no commas in the final sentence but it has 
uppercase T, P and R, which the editors of the Collected Papers have ‘corrected’. I 
have retained the original spelling and punctuation.
3 ‘As to my terminology, I confine the word representation to the operation of a sign or 
its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation.’ (CP 1.540, 1903)
4 For the reader not familiar with Peirce the Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic was a 
pamphlet published as a supplement to the lectures themselves. It ran to 23 pages 
and consequently omitted much of the material of the lectures.
Notes
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5 ‘Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given 
which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the 
place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is 
something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created 
by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in 
which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, 
that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a historical review of 
all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is 
no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite 
generally held, though not generally recognized’ (NEM4 20–21, 1902).
6 See, too, Peirce (1982: xxxiii).
7 Max Fisch, Introduction to Writings, Volume One, page xxxiii, and (1986: 338–
341).
8 Quotations from the Critique of Pure Reason are by reference to Meiklejohn’s 1855 
translation of the second edition (1787), the text used by Peirce himself, and not by 
the more conventional reference to the A and B page numbers of, respectively, the 
first and second editions.
9 Later to be titled ‘phaneroscopy’, which studies the ‘phaneron’. This, Peirce suggests, 
bears similarities to the ‘ideas’ of, for example, a philosopher like Locke: see CP 
1.285. Peirce also referred to the science as ‘ideoscopy’ in a letter to Lady Welby, 
and to the categories as ‘cenopythagorean’, that is, determined by number (SS 
23–24, 1904).
10 Peirce had suggested as early as 1866 that Kant’s deduction of the categories from 
the faculty of judgement is flawed in that there is no guarantee that the table of 
judgements itself is correct (cf. W1 351).
11 Peirce never actually proved the theorem, but cf. Herzberger (1981).
12 ‘And so you will find out that it is a universal rule that to have a testing art we need 
no other knowledge than a classifying science. And, accordingly, if we wish to be 
able to test arguments, what we have to do, is to take all the arguments we can find, 
scrutinize them and put those which are alike in a class by themselves and then 
examine these different kinds and learn their properties. Now the classificatory 
science of reasons so produced is the science of Logic.’ (W1 359)
13 By ‘ground’ Peirce seems to mean qualitative continuity: ‘The ground is the self 
abstracted from the concreteness which implies the possibility of another.’ (CP 
1.556, 1867)
14 Peirce himself likened the cognitive process to dipping a triangle apex-first into 
water. Before the triangle touches the water, there is no cognition, but subsequently, 
the lines drawn by the water on the triangle represent degrees of ever-increasing 
‘liveliness’. There is no first line, and as each successive line is greater, each 
successive cognition more lively that the one before. Cf. CP 5.263 (1868).
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15 ‘Thought, however, is in itself essentially of the nature of a sign. But a sign is not a 
sign unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more developed’ (CP 
5.594, 1898). Note that although Locke does not state the matter in such terms, 
by making ideas the signs of other ideas, he anticipates Peirce’s theory of the 
interpretant as expounded in the early years of the century.
16 Cf., too, ‘The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a 
sign, or representation. A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, 
or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. 
That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; 
and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation 
can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the 
interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the one 
behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning 
of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but 
the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this 
clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for something 
more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant 
is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; 
and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series’. 
(NEM4 309–10, 1894?)
17 Titled respectively, ‘Sundry Logical Conceptions’ and ‘Nomenclature and Divisions 
of Triadic Relations, as Far as They are Determined’.
18 ‘By an application of Categoric, I show that the primary division of logic should 
be into Stechiology [Speculative grammar], Critic and Methodeutic.’ Memoir 13 
(NEM4 21, 1902).
19 Jakobson ([1965] 1971).
20 Marty (nd.).
21 Deely (2014): ‘Appendix A: Table and Texts of the 85 Peirce Definitions of Sign in 
Chronological Order’.
Chapter 2
1 Some unpublished material in this chapter was presented at the Charles S. Peirce 
International Centennial Congress in Lowell in September 2014, and at the 
International Symposium on Cultural and Communication Semiotics, Sichuan 
University, Chengdu, China, in July, 2015.
2 Cf., too, this by Max Fisch: ‘We may add now that logic also is a classificatory 
science …. and that in his own lifetime as a whole, he devoted more labor to the 
classification of signs than to any other single field of research.’ (1982: xxii)
Notes192
3 Short (2007: 191), suggests that the two objects have their origin in the work of 
the Stoics. Cf. ‘It will do no harm to note here that philosophists are in the habit of 
distinguishing two objects of many signs, the immediate and the real. The former 
is an image, or notion, which the interpreter is supposed to have already formed in 
his mind before the sign is uttered.’ (R318 399–401, 1907)
4 Cf., too: ‘Objects of many signs: the immediate and the real object. The former is 
the notion the interpreter is presumed already to have of the object’. (R318 529, 
1907)
5 ‘The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is thought; that is to say 
this respect is the immediate object of consciousness in the thought, or, in other 
words, it is the thought itself, or at least what the thought is thought to be in the 
subsequent thought to which it is a sign.’ (EP1 38–39, 1868)
6 ‘Now the reason why there should be three meanings but only two objects must lie 
in the difference between the nature of the relation of the one and the other to the 
sign. The principal difference of this kind is that the object, being the determining 
cause of the sign, is previous to it, while the meaning, or interpretant, being 
determined by the sign as its essential effect, is subsequent to it. This sought for 
something must be of a mental nature, because such is the nature of the sign.’ (R318 
407–409, 1907)
7 It is difficult to date this particular page and typology. It occurs on the verso of page 
239 dated 10 July 1903 (H450), facing a similar hexadic typology on 240r (H451) 
dated 7 August 1904. Peirce seems to have added it after the August typology, 
which is why I have added a question mark. In any case, it is obvious it is from 1904 
and not 1903.
8 See, for a different point of view, Joseph Ransdell’s essay ‘On the Use and Abuse 
of the Immediate/Dynamical Object Distinction’ on the Arisbe site: http://www.
iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/useabuse.htm (Accessed March 
2016).
9 Note that an intervening classification of 7 August 1904 (R339, 240r (H451)) sets 
out the divisions as (S), Oi, S–Od, Ii, Id, If (the latter is referred to as ‘signified 
interpretant’ in the typology), with the three interpretants relating to different ways 
of distinguishing between rheme, dicent and argument. S–Od is the only relational 
division in this typology.
10 Note that Peirce appears to be inconsistent at this point, although it is more likely 
that the sentence is simply elliptical. The general introduction to the typology reads: 
‘Now signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their relations 
to their objects, and as to their relations to their interpretants’ (CP 8.333), but he 
refers to the Oi division as though it is independent: ‘In respect to its immediate 
object a sign … [Emphasis added]’ (CP 8.336). References to this division will 
simply show the relation S–Oi as in Figure 2.1.
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11 Cf. R793 9, which reads ‘this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a 
relation …’.
12 The actual quotation is from pages numbered by Peirce as ‘26’ and ‘27’, but 
the sequences themselves are numbers 39 and 40 out of eighty-one pages of 
manuscript. The two objects in each case refer to the immediate and dynamic 
objects: ‘–killed–’ is composed of two partial objects and therefore has two dynamic 
and two immediate objects in each place-marker; the second, a monad, had one 
dynamic and one immediate object.
13 ‘But if my words (can) be the seed (of infamy’s fruit) …’
14 The page is numbered ‘14’ by Peirce but the quotation appears on sequence 17 of 
the manuscript.
15 In 1903 ‘seme’ was an alternative term for the index (CP 2.283).
16 ‘From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my 
ten trichotomies of signs.’ (CP 8.363, 1908)
17 Hardwick (SS 35n) notes that the order in the last two trichotomies of the hexad of 
12 October 1904 is unusual for Peirce. This is because subsequently Peirce opted for 
an ordering of the divisions based upon the ‘order of occurrence’ of the correlates 
in semiosis.
18 Extracts from this draft are to be found in two pages of EP2 196–197, and seven in 
SS 195–201.
19 Note that the page numbers in the references are those of Peirce himself.
20 EP2 544 n22.
21 ‘Analysis of the 76 definitions of the sign’ http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/
rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM (Accessed March 2016).
22 Cf., too, the entry in the Logic Notebook for 30 January 1906: ‘A sign is a species of 
medium for intercommunication’ (R339 271r (H515)).
23 See, too, Bergman (2009: 128–129) for a discussion.
24 Cf. EP2 407 for a similar remark.
25 But see, too, ‘It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for 
if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, that 
mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that consider it in 
its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-
mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing 
will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign.’ (EP2 391, 1905)
26 A slightly different version of the concept of the commens is to be found in the 
‘Prolegomena’ text of 1906: ‘Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-
utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e. are one mind) in 
the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. 
Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that 
every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.’ (CP 4.551, 1906)
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27 See the table for August 31, 1906, in the Appendix.
28 Cf. ‘and more than these ten I don’t enquire into, not because I don’t think they are 
in truth there, but simply because it will be all I possibly can do to define and to 
prove these ten’. (R339 360r (H674))
29 See Liszka (1996: 120–123) for a useful discussion of the problem.
30 ‘Eventual’ and ‘normal’ are terms to which he returns on consecutive days in 
December 1908 (CP 8.344, 8.372).
31 R339 271r (H515), 30 January 1906.
Chapter 3
1 The S–Ii division is one that Peirce subsequently dropped.
2 The letter is also reproduced in EP2 478–81.
3 ‘Traditionally the three modes of being are possibility, actuality, and necessity, 
and it was natural that Peirce should have tried to correlate his categories with the 
classic triad (6.342) The correlation, however leaves much to be desired. There is no 
problem in matching Secondness with actuality, but Firstness and Thirdness do not 
correspond easily with possibility and necessity … Thus any First is a description of a 
possible object. But if this is all that is meant, it is obvious that there are two kinds of 
possibility – relational and nonrelational – so the possibility is not confined to Firstness 
but must be reintroduced in the other categories as well. In respect to Thirdness 
and necessity the lack of correlation is even more obvious. Peirce seeks to justify his 
position by arguing that just as the logical verb reappears in metaphysics as quality, 
and the individual subject as a thing, “so the logical reason, or premiss, reappears 
in metaphysics as a reason, an ens having a reality consisting in a ruling both of the 
outward and the inward world, as its mode of being” (CP 1.515).’ Murphey (1993: 394).
4 Note, too, the rather curious entry in R339 concerning Peirce’s cosmological 
investigations in 1908, the year of ‘The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’: 
‘Scheme of a Series of Papers, On the Cosmology of the Here and Hereafter …. I 
now state the purpose of these papers. It is to show what logic demands that our 
hypotheses should be in order to explain the most general phenomena of the three 
Universes, in view of what science has hitherto brought to light and assuming that 
we are sometimes able to communicate with the dead, and in view of the general 
nature of such apparent communications. I mean, especially that 999 out of ’ 
[incomplete], R339 305v (H569), 2 September 1908.
5 The designation ‘token’ had already been introduced in 1885 along with index and 
icon, but as an alternative to ‘symbol’: ‘A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing 
denoted and to the mind … Such signs are always abstract and general, because 
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habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They are, for 
the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the main 
body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For the sake of brevity I 
will call them tokens.’ (CP 3.360)
6 Cf., too, a letter to William James (EP2 497).
7 Stjernfelt suggests that what Peirce means by this rather surprising reservation is 
that the immediate object necessarily leaves part of the dynamic object unspecified 
(2014: 99). Since the immediate object acts as a filter in the sequence, and 
determines which parts of the dynamic object ‘reach’ the sign, this seems a very 
plausible explanation.
8 In his analysis of the 70-plus definitions of the sign, Robert Marty distinguishes 
between the original three correlates of the triadic relation as ‘global triadic’ 
and the later six-element definition as being ‘analytic triadic’. See his very 
useful ‘Analysis of the 76 definitions of the sign’ http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/
rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM (Accessed March 2016).
9 The order in the case of the three ‘additional’ divisions being S–Od, S–Id, S–Od–If, 
and S–If.
10 It must be understood that Peirce did not isolate the six correlates in this way, they 
were included in the ten, but in a problematic order. Nor did he ever set out a table 
in this ‘orthogonal’ manner.
11 The icon-index-symbol division is one of four divisions appended to the 
description of the hexad in the 23 December letter (SS 84–85), and becomes the 
fourth trichotomy in the ten Peirce describes in the draft of 25 December 1908 
(EP2 489).
12 Andrew Diversey, personal communication.
13 Here again, as with Savan, the order presented for Lieb by Hardwick depends 
crucially upon how we interpret the terms ‘destinate’ and ‘explicit’: for Weiss and 
Burks, for Lieb and for the position adopted in this book, the terms correspond, 
respectively, to immediate and final. Diversey (2014), like Savan, has mistakenly 
inverted the order.
14 Cf. CP 8.347, where he is describing actisigns, this particular draft’s version 
of the token: ‘B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hic et 
nunc; such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single 
paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a book. There may be repetition 
of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other 
occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten 
thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy.’ In other words, the legisign – 
replica distinction of 1903 seems to have been, if not completely discarded, at 
least neutralized temporarily.
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15 Savan quoted Peirce from Buchler’s selection (Buchler [1940] 2011), presumably for 
copyright reasons. In this instance the reference to Buchler 275–276 corresponds to 
CP 5.473.
16 See Chapter 2, n 7.
17 Cf. OED, entry ‘Destinate: 2.2 Set apart for a particular purpose; ordained; 
intended’.
18 Within his later systems, in which the type/instance distinction seems less 
important (CP 8.347), the noun could conceivably have been placed at 
existent ‘level’, so to speak, as a token. In CP 8.359 he maintains the distinction 
between the ‘general’ word and its instances. Note, too, that it is immaterial 
whether the immediate object division precedes or follows that of the dynamic. 
It is the interpretant sequence determined by a possible dynamic object which 
counts.
19 This was the reasoning I suggested in Jappy (1985), and thirty years later I see no 
reason to change my point of view.
20 ‘The verbal expression “If—, then— ” is a Famisign, as all words are (in the sense in 
which two that are just alike are the very same “word”).’ (CP 8.359)
21 Peirce had already used this denomination in the typology of 31 August 1906 
(Table 8 in the Appendix).
22 The justification given for the contents of this particular division is to be found in 
the preceding paragraphs, given here (CP 8.346): ‘I. A Sign is necessarily in itself 
present to the Mind of its Interpreter. Now there are three entirely different ways in 
which Objects are present to minds:
 First, in themselves as they are in themselves. Namely, Feelings are so present. At 
the first instant of waking from profound sleep when thought, or even distinct 
perception, is not yet awake, if one has gone to bed more asleep than awake in a 
large, strange room with one dim candle. At the instant of waking the tout ensemble 
is felt as a unit. The feeling of the skylark’s song in the morning, of one’s first 
hearing of the English nightingale.
 Secondly, the sense of something opposing one’s Effort, something preventing 
one from opening a door slightly ajar; which is known in its individuality by 
the actual shock, the Surprising element, in any Experience which makes it sui 
generis.Thirdly, that which is stored away in one’s Memory; Familiar, and as 
such, General.’
23 See Chapter 2, n 10.
24 Savan has suggested convincingly that Peirce was influenced at this stage by the 
Greek concept of ‘καλοσ’ (1988: 64).
25 Remember that in 1908 the earlier distinction between sinsign and replica of a 
legisign is less rigorously stated since the token doubles for both, in spite of some 
references to ‘instances’ (compare CP 8.345 and CP 8.347, for example).
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Chapter 4
1 ‘Resemblance is an identity of characters; and this is the same as to say that the 
mind gathers the resembling ideas together into one conception’ (CP 1.365, c. 
1890).
2 Even before working on the various drafts for the Lowell Lectures on logic, Peirce 
had already envisaged employing the categories to trichotomize the icon in his 
Harvard Lectures on pragmatism presented earlier in the year: ‘Now the Icon may 
undoubtedly be divided according to the categories; but the mere completeness 
of the notion of the icon does not imperatively call for any such division. For a 
pure icon does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents 
whatever it may represent, and whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an affair of 
suchness only’ (CP 5.74, 1903).
3 There is also an earlier version of this particular statement: ‘Icons may be 
distinguished, though only roughly, into those which [represent] are icons in 
respect to the qualities of sense, being images, and those which are icons in respect 
to the dyadic relations of their parts to one another being diagrams or dyadic 
analogues, and those which are icons in respect to their intellectual characters, 
being examples’ (Lattmann 2012, 536n2). According to André de Tienne, 
director of the Peirce Edition Project (personal communication), the passage is 
not a variant, as Lattmann suggests, but is in fact part of a text that precedes the 
composition of what was published as CP 2.277. I assume, therefore, that Peirce 
preferred the version to be found in volume two of The Essential Peirce (274) and 
the Collected Papers and which I have quoted in the main text.
4 ‘Slaughter-house workers’ would have been more appropriate but would have 
complicated Figure 4.5. Hence ‘butchers’.
5 See chapter five of Jappy (2013) for a fuller discussion.
6 It would be irrelevant to give the details of this linguistic movement here, but the 
interested reader can consult Jappy (1999) and references.
7 Note that it has to be a universe of existence; otherwise we should be unable to 
perceive it. A universe of necessitants would be invisible, and a universe of ideas 
and qualities would be an indefinite chaos.
8 The notion was not entirely new: ‘All propositions relate to the same ever-reacting 
singular; namely, to the totality of all real objects. It is true that when the Arabian 
romancer tells us that there was a lady named Scherherazade, he does not mean 
to be understood as speaking of the world of outward realities, and there is a great 
deal of fiction in what he is talking about. For the fictive is that whose characters 
depend upon what characters somebody attributes to it; and the story is, of course, 
the mere creation of the poet’s thought. Nevertheless, once he has imagined 
Scherherazade and made her young, beautiful, and endowed with a gift of spinning 
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stories, it becomes a real fact that so he has imagined her, which fact he cannot 
destroy by pretending or thinking that he imagined her to be otherwise. What he 
wishes us to understand is what he might have expressed in plain prose by saying, 
“I have imagined a lady, Scherherazade by name, young, beautiful and a tireless 
teller of tales, and I am going on to imagine what tales she told.” This would have 
been a plain expression of professed fact relating to the sum total of realities’ (CP 
5.152, 1903). The association seems to have been inspired initially by his work on 
the graphs. See, for example, CP 4.421 of 1903.
9 A figure much favoured by Dylan Thomas: ‘Fern Hill’ begins with a number of 
cases.
10 See, for example, Jerry Uelsmann’s contemporary art photography in Uelsmann et 
al. (2013).
11 If the analysis is correct, the photograph is a gratific, concussive, collective copulant 
token, a rather soulless label for such a magnificent image.
12 The image is set, in fact, in the City of London’s financial district. The portrait is 
first made in the studio and then mapped digitally onto settings like the one in 
Flower Seller. For a general introduction to the series the reader can consult, as I 
have, Professor Mark Durden’s essay on how Goto’s tableaux subvert conventional 





14 Briefly, shifters are verbal items whose meaning is determined by their relation 
to a ‘deictic centre’ composed of speaker, place and time of utterance. In other 
words, instead of there being a reference in the utterance to something outside 
the utterance, the reference is to the act of uttering. This relation is obviously 
existential, hence their classification by Peircean linguists as lexical. Peirce himself 
suggests that an index is a sign of ‘direct experience so far as it directs attention 
to an Object’ (CP 2.255). See, too, CP 2.287–290, for a detailed discussion and 
examples.
15 ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, from Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, Mark Poster 
(ed.), Stanford; Stanford University Press (1988: 166–184).
16 Similarly, Barbara Kruger was to subvert and at the same time emasculate, so 
to speak, the existential power of the index by photographing other peoples’ 
photographs, generally from the 1950s, and placing lines of text on them, a strategy 
which destroys their deictic character by lowering their indexical status in the 
hierarchy and turning them into icons. We see, then, that although the photograph 
is a truly indexical medium, the existential nature of the relation holding between 
model and camera is, in fact, anything but tyrannical.
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17 Lakoff and Johnson (1980) was the groundbreaking study in the field, and it showed 
how combinations of the universes of everyday experience contributed to the 
construction and production of metaphor.
18 Cf. CP 6.338–348 and EP2 478–79.
Chapter 5
1 As mentioned in the Acknowledgements, some of the ideas in this chapter were 
worked out in a paper published in Semiotics and Language Studies, Volume 1, No. 
4, 2015 (Jappy 2015).
2 It is an ‘icon of dissent’ (2007: 148).
3 The National Gallery Podcast: Episode 81, July 2013. http://www.nationalgallery.
org.uk/podcasts/the-national-gallery-podcast-episode-eighty-one (Accessed March 
2016). The extract from the podcast and the painting itself can be seen in Jappy 
(2015: 2).
4 http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/jan-miense-molenaer-a-young-man-
and-woman-making-music (Accessed March 2016).
5 Peirce did not, of course, suggest that symbols were fixed once and for all. ‘Symbols 
grow’, he wrote in 1894 (EP2 10). In 1903 he made the following remark: ‘For every 
symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The 
body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates 
new elements and throws off old ones … Every symbol is, in its origin, either 
an image of the idea signified, or a reminiscence of some individual occurrence, 
person or thing, connected with its meaning, or is a metaphor’ (CP 2.222). This 
does not mean, however, that it can represent two distinct objects at the same time 
as a theory of indirection requires: for this we really need the distinction between 
immediate and dynamic object.
6 EP2 300.
7 If Short had investigated the hypoicons, metaphor in particular, he might not have 
made this statement.
8 Short’s remark is possibly due in part to the fact that Peirce uses the term 
‘immediate object’ in at least three distinct manners. The first is the familiar 
semiotic distinction that he made in 1908 between the dynamic and immediate 
objects of any sign and is an important subject of the present study. The second, 
earlier, conception was used in a metaphysical sense in relation to cognition in 
general: ‘Every cognition involves something represented, or that of which we are 
conscious, and some action or passion of the self whereby it becomes represented. 
The former shall be termed the objective, the latter the subjective, element of the 
cognition. The cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element, which may 
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therefore be called, also, the immediate object’ (CP 5.238, 1868), while almost forty 
years later, as in this extract from ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’, he 
was to write: ‘The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last 
analysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with Pragmaticism, which 
holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought proper is Conduct’ (CP 4.539, 
1906). The third is confusing, and seems to be a mirror image of the immediate 
interpretant inasmuch as it is the idea or notion the interpreter of, say, a verbal 
utterance is supposed by the utterer to have of the dynamic object of the utterance: 
‘Objects of many signs; the immediate and the real object. The former is the notion 
the interpreter is presumed already to have of the object’ (R318 529 and also at 
R318 401, 1907). This comes from the complex ‘Pragmatism’ text in which Peirce 
is principally concerned with conceptions for which, as we saw in Chapter 2, he 
suggested in his pursuit of the logical interpretant that the dynamic and immediate 
objects were the determinants of the energetic and emotional interpretants, 
respectively.
9 Note, however, when a label such as ‘Nocturne’ or ‘Serenade’ or ‘Symphony No. 9’ is 
attached to them, the classification, even in hexadb, would be different.
10 ‘The different members of the set which is the object of a verb, – its partial objects 
as they may be called, – often have distinctive characters which are the same for 
large numbers of verbs’ (R318 627, 1907).
11 The Gallery label describes the mural thus: ‘Emanuel Leutze’s mural celebrates 
the western expansion of the United States. A group of pioneers and their train 
of covered wagons are pictured at the continental divide, looking towards the 
sunset and the Pacific Ocean. The border depicts vignettes of exploration and 
frontier mythology. Beneath the central composition is a panoramic view of their 
destination “Golden Gate,” in San Francisco Bay. The mural’s title is a verse from 
the poem “On the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America” by Bishop 
George Berkeley (1685–1753)’ http://americanart.si.edu/collections/search/
artwork/?id=14569 (Accessed March 2016).
12 http://www.aoc.gov/capitol-hill/other-paintings-and-murals/westward-course-
empire-takes-its-way (Accessed March 2016).
13 The coloured original can be seen here: http://www.philamuseum.org/collections/
permanent/308328.html (Accessed March 2016).
14 Turner (1893), ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ (PDF). http://
nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/gilded/empire/text1/turner.pdf (Accessed March 
2016).
15 Within the 10-class system all three would be classified as replicas of dicent 
indexical legisigns with their respective captions, and iconic sinsigns without. To 




4;view=image;seq=0350;node=usde0006-4%3A6 (Accessed March 2016).
17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Lady_of_Shalott (Accessed March 2016).
18 http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/waterhouse-the-lady-of-shalott-n01543 
(Accessed March 2016).
19 http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/egg-past-and-present-no-1-n03278 (Accessed 
March 2016).
20 http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/hunt-the-awakening-conscience-t02075/text-
summary (Accessed March 2016).
21 http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/stanhope-thoughts-of-the-past-n03338 
(Accessed March 2016).
22 See Roberts (1972) for a review of how Victorian artists portrayed the often 
severely restricted roles Victorian society reserved for women, and the retribution 
visited on the poor creatures who failed to respect them by stony-hearted fathers 
and husbands.
23 It should be noted that ‘ideology’ was not a term that Peirce used – his version 
was the first branch of philosophy and was variously titled ‘phenomenology’ and 
‘phaneroscopy’ (he follows the French ‘Idéologues’ from the French Revolution and 
their ‘science of ideas’) and was oriented towards ‘conventional’ phenomenology.
24 http://www.johngoto.org.uk/summer/8.htm (Accessed March 2016).
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